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Abstract 
National Oil Companies ("NOCs") play an important role in a country's petroleum 
industry. Their relationship with their government is much more complicated than those 
between commercial oil companies and their shareholders due to the government's 
multi-dimensional role as a shareholder, resource owner, and regulator. As a result, 
NOCs usually take non-commercial responsibilities and their governments often employ 
more proactive measures to intervene. Driven by a wide range of factors, the constant 
revision of their relationship is a crucial component of the petroleum sector reform. 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the effectiveness of NOC reform in achieving 
respective objectives (both commercial and non-commercial) of governments, and the 
major factors contributing to that effectiveness or lack of it. The thesis looks at NOC 
reform to the regulatory framework, the industrial structure, the pricing and distribution 
system, and the fiscal and financial regimes. It examines the effectiveness of reforms by 
evaluating the effectiveness of the relationship between governments and NOCs, using 
the Principal and Agent theory. A case study approach and historical analysis approach 
are used in analysing NOC reforms in China during the years between 1949 and 2006. 
The thesis concludes that the regulatory capacity of government together with its social 
concerns in reforming oil pricing system are two major factors, which set the pace of 
NOC reform and decide the effectiveness of it. It therefore shows that NOC reform is 
often a long term process, as the build up of the regulatory capacity takes years or even 
decades, as demonstrated in the case of China. The thesis also developed a new 
analytical framework that can be used to study general NOC reforms in countries other 
than China. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The objective of the study and research questions 
A National Oil Company ("NOC"), by its nature, represents a direct government 
intervention in the petroleum industry. It is an oil company operating in some part of the 
petroleum value chain, fully or partially owned or controlled by its government. ' As a 
group, NOCs play an important role in the domestic economy, accounting for a large 
share of GDP, government revenue and export. 
As these companies are often "required to achieve public purposes" by their 
governments, 2 the relationship between NOCs and their governments is significantly 
different from that between private oil companies and their shareholders. Private oil 
companies pursue commercial interests comprising of long term growth and short term 
profitability in order to maximise shareholder value. 3 NOCs, on the other hand, are 
normally assigned with a wider range of non-commercial responsibilities. Meanwhile, 
different from their private counterparts, which enjoyed a high extent of autonomy in 
conducting their commercial operations, NOCs are often controlled by their 
governments through direct intervention. 
1 Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet Journal 
(14), Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/joumal/htmINoll4Noll4_10. pdf 
2 Hartley, P., & Medlock III, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a National Oil 
Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. p. 2 
3 For publicly listed companies, return to shareholders are often measured by a combination of dividend 
and capital growth. 
4 Aharoni, Y., & Ascher, W. (1998). Restructuring the Arrangements between Government and State 
Enterprises in the Oil and Mining Sectors. Natural Resources Forum, 22(3), 201-213. 
2 
Influenced by a wide range of factors, the relationship between a government and its 
NOC is under constant readjustment and reform. Most notably, since 1980s, a tide of 
commercialisation and liberalisation had significantly changed the nature of the 
relationship between government and NOCs, reduced the non-commercial 
responsibilities taken by NOCs, and the extent and nature of intervention by 
governments. Meanwhile, market forces have been allowed to play a greater role, both 
domestically and internationally, in determining oil price and in distributing oil. 5 Some 
NOCs have been commercialised to such an extent that they behave almost like 
International Oil Companies ("IOCs") 
Despite the growing number of published studies on NOCs, our understanding of NOC 
reforms and its effectiveness remains insufficient. 6 Many studies have emphasised the 
effectiveness of reforms in enhancing the commercial performance of NOCs, and 
ignored the non-commercial agenda of governments. Other studies have viewed NOC 
reforms over a shorter time period, and failed to recognise the functions of core factors 
in a prolonged process covering many stages, in which early stages influence the later 
ones in a complex way. 7 
5 ESMAP (1999). Global Energy Sector Reform in Developing Countries: a Scorecard, Joint UNDP/ World 
Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme. AegisEnergyAdvisorsCorp. (2002). State Oil 
Company Privatization, p3. Stevens, P. (1998). Energy Privatisation: Sensitivities and Realities. Journal of 
Energy and Development, 23(1), 1-14. pl 
6 See Section 1.3 of this thesis for more details on the lack of studies on the topic of NOCs 
' Victor, N. M. (2007). On Measuring the Performance of National Oil Companies (NOCs): Program on 
Energy and Sustainable Development, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford 
University, Stanford. Hartley, P., & Medlocklll, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a 
National Oil Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. Wolf, C., & Pollift, M. G. 
(2008). Privatising National Oil Companies: Assessing the Impact on Firm Performance (No. EPRG 0805 
and CWPE 0811): Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. 
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The thesis intends to address this insufficiency through an in-depth examination of the 
process of NOC reform from the perspective of the relationship between NOCs and 
governments. By exploring the process of NOC reform over a long historical period 
covering different stages, and from the perspective of the relationship between the 
government and NOCs, the thesis proposes to answer the research question, How 
effective are NOCs reforms in achieving the specific objectives of governments, and 
what are main factors which contribute to the enhancement of effectiveness or the lack 
of it? 
The thesis explore the effectiveness of reforms by evaluating the effectiveness of the 
relationship between governments and NOCs rather than trying to measure it by 
quantitative data, due to the difficulty of accessing consistent and high quality 
information relating to NOCs over a long time period. The effectiveness of relationship 
between governments and NOCs is evaluated by using the Principal and Agent theory. 
1.2 The scope of the thesis 
The thesis assumes that government is benevolent and that their objectives in reforming 
NOCs are in the best interests of the country, based on information available to them. 
This assumption, avoids the analysis of a different set of issues related to the 
accountability, transparency and governance of government, which requires knowledge 
in the field of public management and political science, and has been relatively well 
4 
covered by a wide range of literature! Based on this assumption, the thesis avoids the 
analysis of the relationship between state and government, and places emphasis on the 
relationship between government and NOCs. 
The thesis also places emphasis on NOCs in oil producing countries which have a 
substantial domestic consumption of oil. This approach avoids the narrow analysis of 
NOC reforms in terms of resource and revenue management, but focuses more on the 
practical challenges many governments face in regulating their petroleum sector. 
Therefore, for measures of NOC reforms, the thesis examines reforms to the regulatory 
framework, the industrial structure, the pricing and distribution system, and the fiscal 
and financial regimes. The list of countries in this category includes Indonesia, Brazil, 
and Mexico. Many other countries whose resource base is declining and where domestic 
consumption is increasing are also relevant benefiting from this research. 
Although the emphasis is on the reforms of NOCs, the initial creation of NOCs is also 
analysed, because this provides an important component of the context for later NOC 
reform. 
1.3 The justifications of the study 
The justification for this research lies in the paucity of systematic and in-depth analysis 
8 WB. (2007). Investing in Oil in the Middle East and North Africa: Institutions, Incentives and the National 
Oil Companies (No. 40405-MNA): The World Bank and Management Sector Assistance Managing 
Programme. Lahn, G., Marcel, V., Mitchell, J., Myers, K., & Stevens, P. (2007). Report on Good 
Governance of the National Petroleum Sector. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
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of NOC reforms in achieving both commercial and non-commercial objectives of 
governments in a historical context. In addition to better understand the historical and 
possibly future behaviour of a country by extrapolating some elements, such study is 
also a useful guide for countries contemplating NOC reforms. 
1.3.1 The importance of NOCs 
A better understanding of the nature and behaviour of NOCs has practical importance 
for home countries, for international petroleum sector, and especially for IOCs. 
NOCs are vitally important for home countries, contributing a large share of GDP, 
government revenue, and foreign exchange, supplying the domestic market with oil and 
gas, providing employment, and in some countries promoting domestic economic 
development by delivering infrastructure and social services. For most countries, the 
performance of NOCs is vital for the performance of their petroleum sector, the health 
of the economy and political stability of governments. 9 
NOCs are having a significant impact on the international petroleum sector in terms of 
their control over revenue, reserves, production capacity, and market share in emerging 
economies. NOCs control most of the world reserves and production of oil and gas. In 
2006, NOCs owned 77% of the petroleum production, and controlled 90% of oil 
9 McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & 
A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 184-204). 
Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. 
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reserves and more than 70% of gas reserves in the world. ' 0 All top ten petroleum 
companies by reserve held are NOCs, and among the top 25 petroleum companies by 
reserve held, only 6 are not NOCs. 11 The operational and investment performance of 
NOCs determines the availability of oil in the market and the possible trends in oil price 
in short and long terms. 12 Furthermore, NOCs from countries such as China and India, 
have an increasing influence on the international petroleum market, as dominant players 
in the domestic, massive and fast-growing market. ' 3 
The rising influence of NOCs in the international petroleum market also has a direct 
impact on the future of IOCs. In addition to easy access to reserves, NOCs have 
accumulated large capital reserves in recent years, and have enhanced their commercial 
competitiveness through reforms. It is said that old powerful Seven Sisters representing 
the seven western IOCs have now been substituted by seven NOCs, the so called new 
"Seven Sisters": Saudi Aramco of Saudi Arabia, Gazprom of Russia, China National 
Petroleum Corporation ("CNPC") of China, National Iran Oil Company ("NIOC") of 
Iran, Petroleos de Venezuela S. A ("PdVSA") of Venezuela, Petröleo Brasileiro S. A. 
10 Bakerlnstitute. (2007). The Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets: 
The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University. p. 1. Trauber, S. (2007). The Rising 
Influence of the NOC: The Financial Community Perspective Baker Institute Policy Report No. 35. p. 5 
" Blum, J. (2005). National Oil Firms Take Bigger Role [Electronic Version]. Wathingtonpost. com. 
Retrieved 11th Dec, 2007 from 
http: //www. wa sh i ngton post. co m/wp-dyn/co me n t/a rti cl e/2 005/08/02/A R2005080201978. htm l. 
12 Marcel, V., & Mitchell, J. V. (2006). Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East. London and 
Washington, D. C.: Chatham House and Brookings Institution Press. p. 2. IEA Concerned About Gazprom's 
Lack of Investment. (2007). Retrieved 12th Dec, 2007, from 
http: //www. robertamsterdam. com/2007/02/iea_concemed_about_gazproms_I. htm 
13 Scaroni, P. (2006). IOCs Versus NOCs-a New Game? Petroleum Review March, 24-26. 
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("Petrobras") of Brazil, and Petroliam Nasional Berhad ("Petronas") of Malaysia. 14 On 
the other hand, the IOCs' investment opportunities are constrained by limited reserves 
to book and by strict scrutiny from financial markets, emphasising short term financial 
indicators such as Return on Capital Employed ("ROCE"). Many of them have chosen 
to buy back their shares on a large scale. 15 There are even claims that IOCs may be 
driven out of business once NOCs increase cooperation with each other, and with 
services companies. '6 
As a result, it can be concluded that an understanding of NOCs is important for home 
governments, for the international petroleum sector and for IOCs. Furthermore, as 
NOCs are in a continuous process of evolution and reform, a better understanding of 
such reform mechanisms is essential for understanding the future nature and behaviour 
of NOCs. 
1.3.2 The lack of general literature on NOCs and NOCs reforms 
Despite the importance of NOCs, as above, there are scant comprehensive studies on 
NOCs, for several reasons. 17 
14 Hoyos, C. (2007,11th March). The new Seven Sisters: Oil and Gas Giants Dwarf Western Rivals. 
Financial Times 
15 Scaroni, P. (2006). IOCs Versus NOCs-a New Game? Petroleum Review March, 24-26. 
16 Trauber, S. (2007). The Rising Influence of the NOC: The Financial Community Perspective Baker 
Institute Policy Report No. 35. p. 5-7 
17 Aharoni, Y., & Ascher, W. (1998). Restructuring the Arrangements between Government and State 
Enterprises in the Oil and Mining Sectors. Natural Resources Forum, 22(3), 201-213. p. 2. McPherson, C. 
(2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino 
(Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 184-204). Washington 
D. C.: International Monetary Fund. Grayson, L. E. (1981). National oil companies. Chichester: Wiley. p. 5 
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First of all, there was a lack of interest in studying NOCs due to the notion that the 
relevance of NOCs had decreased since 1980. During 1980s and 1990s, liberalisation 
became a widely accepted way of organising the economy and large number of NOCs 
were privatised and commercialised. However, under the current situation with rising oil 
prices and prevailing resource nationalism, more studies on NOCs have be done or 
launched since 2002. 
Secondly, there was a lack of good qualify information on NOCs, due to the highly 
diverse nature of NOCs and their lack of transparency. Such diversity existed in the 
objectives, ownership structures, relationships with their owners or shareholders, 
operations and organizational forms of NOCs and they appear to share very little in 
common except for the name. '8 Additionally, NOCs were traditionally a group of 
entities, which were operated with little transparency compared to IOCs, which made it 
difficult for researchers to acquire information on NOCs. 19 Differences in accounting 
practices and language barriers presented further challenges in interpreting and 
comparing available information. 
18 Nicholls, T. (2005). NOCs 1-IOCs 0. Petroleum Economist, April, 4-9. p. 6. Sandvold, T. (2001). 
Groupings of National Oil Companies. the oxford energy forum, 57,12. p. 12 
19 Different factors cause this non-transparent practice in different countries. Some NOCs keep their 
information secretive for national security consideration. Cases include China in 1950s and Libya in 1970s 
and 80s when information related to petroleum were top national secret. Some NOCs, especially those from 
OPEC members keep their information, especially those related with reserve secretive, for the purpose of 
getting the best from the quota policy of the Cartel. Others operate in a very opaque way when NOCs are 
used by bureaucrats and politicians as cash cow or for rent-seeking and don't want to open for public 
scrutiny. 
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Furthermore, most existing studies focus on major NOCs in oil exporting states such as 
OPEC members, and NOCs operating in developed countries, such as UK, Canada, 
France, and Norway. 20 Comprehensive studies in English on NOC reforms in countries 
with significant domestic consumption, such as China, India, Brazil, Malaysia and 
Indonesia21 remain limited, particularly due to the lack of impact of these countries on 
the international petroleum sector. There are also few comprehensive studies on NOC 
reforms in developing countries, due to the lack of consistent and high quality 
information available on these countries. 
Existing studies also focus either on governance issues, or on international implications 
of the behaviour of NOCs, or on the management of a depletable resource base. 22 
Studies of NOC reforms and of the changes in their relationship with governments are 
20 Grayson, L. E. (1981). National oil companies. Chichester: Wiley. McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil 
Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy 
Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 184-204). Washington D. C.: International 
Monetary Fund. Marcel, V., & Mitchell, J. V. (2006). Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East. 
London and Washington, D. C.: Chatham House and Brookings Institution Press. United Nations Centre for 
Natural Resources, Energy and Transport Dept of Technical Co-operation for Development (1980). State 
Petroleum Enterprises in Developing Countries. New York: Published for the United Nations by Pergamon 
Press. Bentham, R. W., & Smith, W. G. R. (1986). State Petroleum Corporations: Corporate Forms, Powers 
and Control Dundee, Scotland: The Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies, University of Dundee. 
Lucas, A. R. (1985). State Petroleum Corporations: the Legal Relationship with the State. Journal of Natural 
Resources Law, 3,81-101. 
21 Noreng, 0. (2004). The Norwegian Experience of Economic Diversification in Relation to Petroleum 
Industry. OGEL (Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence), 2(4), 1-17. Al-Kasim, F. (2006). Managing 
Petroleum Resources: The 'Norwegian Model' in a board Perspective Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
Richardson, J. J. (1981). Problems of Controlling Public Sector Agencies: the Case of Norwegian Oil Policy. 
Political Studies, 29(1), 35-50. Barnes, P. (1995). Indonesia: the Political Economy of Energy: Oxford 
University Press. Hayes, D. (2004). Indonesia Faces Energy Investment Challenge. Petroleum Review, 
Nov 36-37. Machmud T. M. (2005). The Indonesian Oil and Gas Industry, Its Evolution and Current State. 
Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, 3(1). Weightman, R. C. (2006). Is Indonesia Managing its Oil and Gas 
Endowment for the Maximum Benefit of its People?, University of Dundee, Dundee. 
22 Hartley, P., & Medlock III, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a National Oil 
Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. Aharoni, Y., & Ascher, W. (1998). 
Restructuring the Arrangements between Government and State Enterprises in the Oil and Mining Sectors. 
Natural Resources Forum, 22(3), 201-213. p. 204 
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rare, with only a few exceptions. 23 
1.3.3 The difficulty of applying existing studies on the research subject 
There are substantial literature on general state owned enterprises (SOEs) and studies of 
SOEs in other sectors, such as manufacturing, power, and infrastructure. However, due 
to the distinctive nature of the petroleum sector, mainly, the international character of it 
and the scale of economic rent it generates, it is difficult to apply these studies to NOCs. 
It is claimed that "much of the conventional wisdom on national resource exploitation 
and on state enterprise dynamics does not apply very well to SOEs in the oil and mining 
sector" and "the distinctiveness of state oil and mining companies is striking and the 
behaviour of state enterprises in the oil and mining sector is notably different from that 
of SOEs in the manufacturing, service and infrastructure sector, " as these companies 
"are typically penetrated by government officials in much more complicated way than 
the activities of other sectors". 24 
Due to the reasons discussed above, the thesis does not undertake a review of the 
general literature pertaining to SOE reform. 
1.4 The research methodology 
This thesis employs theoretical and empirical approaches, comprising economic 
23 Hartley, P., & Medlock III, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a National Oil 
Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. 
24 Aharoni, Y., & Ascher, W. (1998). Restructuring the Arrangements between Government and State 
Enterprises in the Oil and Mining Sectors. Natural Resources Forum, 22(3), 201-213. p201-202 
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analysis, historical analysis and case study. In the theoretical part (chapter 3), the thesis 
lays the conceptual foundation by reviewing major drivers and measures of NOC 
reforms through the analysis of major academic literature. It develops the analytical 
frameworks that will be applied to the case study, concerning NOC reforms in China. 
The major methodologies employed in this chapter are principal and agent theory ("P-A 
theory") and document analysis. The document analysis is used to review major reform 
drivers and measures of NOC reforms. The P-A theory is the major tool used in 
analysing the relationship between government and NOCs formed by reforms, and 
evaluating the effectiveness of NOC reforms. 25 
The Principal and Agent theory is selected as the fundamental tool due to the nature of 
the relationship between government and NOC as a typical principal and agent 
relationship. 26 The thesis uses the conceptual framework of the theory, which includes 
the concepts of principal, agent, tasks, incentives, and monitoring and control systems, 
as well as the relationship between these concepts. It analyses the effectiveness of NOC 
reforms by evaluating the effectiveness of the principal and agent relationship between 
government and NOC formed by reforms. 
25 Hartley, P., & Medlock III, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a National Oil 
Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. 
26 Hartley, P., & Medlocklll, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a National Oil 
Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. p2 
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Figure 1-1 The use of P-A theory in the thesis 
Supporting system: 
-Incentive system 
-Monitoring and control 
system 
Tasks 
In the empirical part (chapters 4-7), the thesis employs the analytical framework 
developed in chapter 3 to conduct a three-stage analysis of NOC reforms in China, 
extending from the year 1949 to 2006.27 The major methodologies used in this part are 
P-A theory, case study, historical analysis, document analysis and interviews. For details 
of the methodology, see chapter 3. 
1.5 The analytical framework and structure 
In addition to the two introductory chapters (chapter 1 and chapter 2), this study 
comprises of two main analytical parts, namely the theoretical and the empirical parts. 
The theoretical part (chapter 3) analyses the research questions through literature review 
and document analysis, in order to lay a conceptual foundation for the thesis and to 
develop the analytical framework for the empirical analysis that follows. 
27 Through the discussion in this thesis is updated to reflect reforms effected till the end of 2006, certain 
important reforms effected in 2007 may also be incorporated where necessary and possible. 
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In this part, the historical evolution of NOCs and the nature of NOCs will be analysed, 
together with the process of NOC reforms, especially the drivers and measures of 
reform. For drivers of reform, the thesis examines a wide range of factors including 
ideological factors and practical factors that drive the reforms of NOCs. For measures of 
reforms, the thesis looks into components of reforms such as the regulatory framework, 
the industrial structure, the pricing and distribution system, and the fiscal and financial 
regimes. This part of the thesis also justifies the way of evaluating the effectiveness of 
NOC reforms by measuring the effectiveness of the relationship between governments 
and NOCs by using mainly the Principal and Agent theory. It also develops the 
analytical framework to evaluate the effectiveness of NOC reform, which will be 
applied latter in the empirical part of the thesis from chapters 4-7. 
The empirical analytical part (chapters 4-7) analyses the research questions through a 
case study of NOC reforms in China, which covers four distinct historical periods from 
1949 to 2006. Each chapter is demarcated to reflect certain stage-setting events and 
milestones at the national economy or at the petroleum sector level, the creation of 
NOCs, or the significant changes in the legal statues and scope of functions of the 
NOCs (see table 1.1). The modern petroleum industry in China is deemed to have begun 
in the year 1949 with the foundation of the People's Republic of China and hence the 
period of this case study commences from 1949. This stage is analysed in chapter 4 in 
order to provide a historical background of the creation of Chinese NOCs and their 
14 
reforms. Chapters 5-7 will address NOC reforms within a specific historical period, 
using the analytical framework developed in chapter 3. 
Chinese NOC reforms were chosen for the case study on account of the highly diverse 
nature of the drivers, the scope and depth of the reform measures carried out in the 
country during the past five decades. 
Table 1-1 The stages of the case study on NOC reforms in China 
Stage Chapter Year Major events Nature of the petroleum sectors 
1 4 1949-1978 Beginning of the modem petroleum sector. Ministry 
2 5 1978-1992 Beginning of market-oriented economic reform Ministry -i administrative 
corporations 
3 6 1992-1998 Breakthrough of macro-economic reform with market Administrative corporations 
economy ratified by the constitution 
4 7 I998-Present Breakthrough of the reforms of the petroleum sector, Administrative corporation 4 
with massive scale assets restructuring, privatisation 
public listed companies 
and public listing 
1.6 The contribution and originality of the thesis 
The major contribution of the thesis is that it finds that the regulatory capacity of 
government together with its social concerns in reforming oil pricing system are two 
major factors, which set the pace of NOC reform and decide the effectiveness of it. It 
therefore shows that NOC reform is often a long term process, as the build up of the 
regulatory capacity takes years or even decades, as demonstrated in the case of China. 
The thesis also developed a new analytical framework that can be used to study general 
NOC reforms in countries other than China. 
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The major originality of the thesis lies in its structured analysis of the NOC reforms as a 
long lasting process in a historical perspective. The originality also lies in the conduct of 
a detailed case study with academic interests. 
Despite the above major findings which are applicable to NOC reforms in other 
countries, the single case study has a limitation in terms of application of its more 
specific findings to countries that are by nature different from China. Additionally, the 
thesis purposely avoided significant analysis of another dimension of NOCs reforms, 
namely, those driven by non-laudable political or personal considerations of leading 
politicians and ruling parties, due to the specific nature of the subject and the different 
set of theoretical tools required by such an approach. 
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2 THE METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned in section 1.4, the thesis employs theoretical and empirical approaches, 
comprising economic analysis, historical analysis and case study. The Principal and 
Agent theory is the fundamental theoretical tool for economic analysis. This chapter 
will introduce these methodologies employed by the thesis. 
2.1 The principal and agent theory 
The P-A theory is a fundamental theoretical tool of this thesis. This section comprises 
two parts: the basic principles of the theory, and the use of the theory in the thesis. 
2.1.1 The basic principles of P-A theory 
The P-A model addresses the behaviour of principal and agent and the relationships 
between them. A principal is a party that owns a productive asset and requires another 
party, an agent, with suitable skills, to manage the asset. The relationship between 
principal and agent is established when the principal delegates tasks to an agent 
motivated by the possibility of benefiting from the agent's fulfilling of these tasks, or by 
the principal's lack of time or ability to perform the tasks themselves. The relationship 
between principal and agent is usually bonded by contracts and the agent will be 
rewarded after the fulfilment of the responsibilities required. 28 
28 Laffont, J. -J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: the Principal-Agent Model. Princeton, 
N. J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press. p. 28 
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There is an inherent risk for the principal, as agent may not always act in the interest of 
the principal due to conflicts of interests and asymmetric information, causing the 
"principal and agent problem". 29 The asymmetric information means that "one party 
(the agent) in an economic relationship has more information than another party (the 
principal)". 30 If the agent has private information that is not accessible or is expensive 
to access by a principal, it is possible for an agent to pursue its own interests at the cost 
of principal. To better monitor and control the behaviour of an agent, a principal needs 
to trade off between the cost of information and the benefit gained from the 
information. 31 Therefore the key issue for the principal is how to establish an 
appropriate arrangement with appropriate monitoring mechanisms, together with an 
effective incentive and sanction systems to ensure the maximisation of the performance 
of the agent and the interest of the principal. 32 
2.1.2 The use of P-A theory in the thesis 
This thesis chooses the P-A theory as a major tool for analysing the NOC reforms from 
the perspective of the relationship between government and NOCs, because the 
relationship between the government and NOC is a typical principal and agent 
relationship. The government as the principal assigns tasks to its NOCs. The NOCs as 
agents are responsible for the tasks and have access to information that may not be 
29 Laffont, J. -J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: the Principal-Agent Model. Princeton, 
N. J. Oxford: Princeton University Press. p. 3. Sloman, J. (2004). Essentials of Economics (3rd ed. ). Harlow: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. p. 216 
30 Sloman, J. (2004). Essentials of Economics (3rd ed. ). Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall., p. 215,216 
31 Laffont, J. -J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: the Principal-Agent Model. Princeton, 
N. J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press. p. 29 
32 Sloman, J. (2004). Essentials of Economics (3rd ed. ). Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall. p. 215-6 
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accessible or too expensive to be accessible by government. Furthermore, the interests 
of company bureaucrats, who represent the NOCs, are invariably different from the 
interest of politicians and civil servants who represent the government. In fact, in many 
countries, NOCs pursuing their own interest at the cost of the government is one of the 
major problems of their petroleum sector. 33 
The thesis also assumes that government represents and acts for the best interest of the 
state, as discussed in section 1.2. This is, though, not always the case in reality. For 
example, in a country where government has a poor governance record, the state will 
have difficulty to monitor and control the behaviour of the government and of NOCs, 
and the government could collude with their NOCs for private political or financial 
gains at the cost of the state. This could result in poor performance of the NOCs and 
damage to the interests of the state, the so called phenomena of "the agent without a 
principal". 34 This thesis will assume that governments represent the interests of their 
states and therefore purposely avoid significant analysis of NOCs reforms in those 
countries with extremely poor governance structures, in which policies are mainly 
driven by non-laudable political or personal considerations of leading politicians and 
ruling parties. This is mainly because of the specific nature of the subject and the 
33 Hartley, P., & Medlock III, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a National Oil 
Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. p. 2. "A firm's history should reflect 
influence that flow from institutional arrangement with the controlling government'. And " the P-A paradigm, 
which views the owners as principals with the managers making operation decisions as their agents, can be 
applied to understand the likely consequences of the different ownership structure of NOCs" 
34 Aharoni, Y. (1982). State-Owned Enterprise: An Agent without a Principal. In L. Jones (Ed. ), Public 
Enterprise in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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different set of theoretical tools required by such an approach. 35 
This thesis uses the P-A theory for its basic conceptual framework, such as the 
interaction between principal and agent, tasks assigned by the principal, supporting 
system such as incentive systems, and monitoring and control systems to ensure the 
fulfilment of tasks, as discussed in section 1.4.36 The thesis posits that NOC reforms are 
mainly caused by changes in the nature and agendas of governments, and that they 
represent the process of adjustment of the relationship between government and NOCs, 
including the tasks assigned to NOCs, and the supporting systems including incentive 
systems and monitoring and control systems used by government to govern NOCs in 
order to ensure the fulfilment of these tasks. 
The theory is also the major tools used in addressing the research question by evaluating 
the effectiveness of NOC reforms. Traditional studies seek to evaluate the effectiveness 
of NOC reforms by measuring the performance of NOCs using quantitative data, such 
as the financial data and operational data. 37 However, this thesis chooses to evaluate the 
35 Karl, T. L. (1997). The Paradox of Plenty : Oil Booms and Petro-states. Berkeley ; London: University of 
California Press. Eifert, B., Gelb, A., & Tallroth, N. B. (2003). The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and 
Economic Management in Oil-Exporting Countries. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal 
Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 82-122). Washington D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund. NOC reforms in these counties should therefore focus on the enhancement of 
the governance of their government or ruling parties. The theoretical tools for these countries are mainly 
political science or political economics. This thesis therefore is focused on countries with modest or good 
governance records but weak national capacity. 
36 Aharoni, Y., & Ascher, W. (1998). Restructuring the Arrangements between Government and State 
Enterprises in the Oil and Mining Sectors. Natural Resources Forum, 22(3), 201-213. p. 203 
37 Wolf, C., & Pollift, M. G. (2008). Privatising National Oil Companies: Assessing the Impact on Firm 
Performance (No. EPRG 0805 and CWPE 0811): Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Victor, 
N. M. (2007). On Measuring the Performance of National Oil Companies (NOCs): Program on Energy and 
Sustainable Development, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Stanford. 
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effectiveness of NOC reforms by exploring qualitatively the effectiveness of the 
relationship between government and NOCs established by reforms. This approach is 
selected for two reasons. First, there is a lack of consistent and good quality quantitative 
data to measure NOCs' commercial and financial performance, as discussed in chapter 1. 
Second, most NOCs take not only commercial responsibilities but also non-commercial 
responsibilities, which makes it a daunting task to measure quantitatively the 
performance of NOCs due to the difficulty of measuring the value added by NOCs' 
non-commercial activities. 
A framework based on the P-A theory is also used in the China case study to examine 
the effectiveness of reforms. For each reform stage, the thesis will examine the 
measures of reforms, comprising regulatory framework, industrial structure, pricing 
system and distribution system, fiscal regime and financial system. The P-A relationship 
between government and NOCs established by the reforms will also be examined, 
including the tasks assigned by the government during the stage, and the supporting 
system comprising the incentive system, and monitoring and control system to support 
the tasks. The effectiveness of the relationship will also be analysed in each stage to 
evaluate the effectiveness of reforms. 
There exists a wide range of other theories and schools of thought, including incentive 
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theory, public choice theory, organisational theory and public management theory 38 that 
could have been employed in place of P-A theory. However, a closer study reveals that 
the P-A theory is the basis of many relevant theories and schools of thought mentioned 
above. Furthermore, the P-A theory is fundamental, flexible and easier to employ in 
analysing the research subject. Hence, the thesis uses the P-A theory. 
2.2 Document analysis 
Document analysis is a method of collecting raw data for research and is defined as the 
"collection, review, interrogation, and analysis of various forms of text as a primary 
source of research data". 39 This method is thus different from literature review which is 
a critical review of literature to show what prior work exists on the research subject and 
what new contributions the present research can make. The thesis does not have a 
separate literature review section, mainly due to the wide scope of the research subject 
covered by the thesis. 
In this thesis, the method of document analysis is mainly used in the theoretical analysis 
in chapter 3 and the empirical analysis of the case study in chapters 4-7. In the 
38 Laffont, J. -J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: the Principal-Agent Model. Princeton, 
N. J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press. p. 3. Thompson, F. (1998). Public Economics and Public 
Administration. 2nd edition In J. Rabin, W. B. Hildreth & G. J. Miller. (Eds. ), Handbook of public 
administration (pp. 995-1064). New York: Marcel Dekker. Solomon, J. and Solomon, A. (2004), 'Corporate 
Governance and Accountability', John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. p. 17. Lane, J. -E. (2000). New Public 
Management. London: Routledge. p. 5. hftp: //site. ebrary. com/lib/dundee/Doc? id=10054251&ppg=18. 
Stretton, H., & Orchard, L. (1994). Public goods, public enterprise, public choice: theoretical foundations of 
the contemporary attack on government: Basingstoke: Macmillan. Felkins, L. (2001). Introduction to Public 
Choice Theory. Retrieved 2 Apr., 2005, from http: //www. magnolia. nett-leonf/sd/pub-choice. html 
39 O'Leary, Z. (2004). Essential Guide to Doing Research. London: SAGE. p. 177 
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theoretical part, this method is used to analyse the NOCs' history, drivers of reforms and 
measures of reforms. The main source of documents used in this thesis includes 
academic literature, laws and regulations, government official documents, reports from 
think tanks and research institutes, conference proceedings, media coverage, and 
information provided by NOCs, on websites and in annual reports. 
The document analysis method is also used in the case study to analyse the drivers, 
major measures and the outcome of reforms. The major documents used in this part are 
academic literature, historical studies on the Chinese petroleum sector, annual reports, 
internal reports, yearbooks and IPO prospectus of Chinese NOCs. 
2.3 Case study 
2.3.1 Why a case study? 
The main approach used by this research is the case study approach, which is defined as 
"a method of studying elements of the society through comprehensive description and 
analysis of a single situation or case, for example, a detailed study of an individual, 
group, episode, event, or any other unit of social life organization. Emphasis is often 
placed on understanding the unity and wholeness of a particular case". 40 For each case 
selected, several methods of data collection will be chosen according to the nature of the 
research question and the nature of the cases selected. Frequently used methods of data 
40 O'Leary, Z. (2004). Essential Guide to Doing Research. London: SAGE. p. 115 
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gathering include interviews, document analysis and observation. 41 
Case study is a widely used approach in academic research, especially social and policy 
science studies because of the two strengths of the method which are all applicable to 
this study. 
Firstly, a case study approach makes a piece of research, such as the present one, 
achievable which otherwise might have been difficult. 42 NOC reform is usually a long 
and slow process, which covers a wide range of measures and is highly influenced by 
cultural, social, economic, political settings and historical events in a country during 
relevant periods. Thus, it is extremely difficult for a single study to cover all instances 
of reforms of the diverse types of NOCs. 
Secondly, a case study approach is characterised by in-depth research of a particular 
case, which enables an "authentic" and "rich" understanding in a piece of research. 43 
This attribute is especially suitable for the study of a multi-dimensional social 
phenomenon where the complexity arises under the joint influence of cultural, historical, 
psychological, political and social factors, as is the case in NOC reforms, and suits a 
wide spectrum of disciplines such as public policy, economics, and political science. 
41 Somekh, B., & Lewin, C. (2005). Research Methods in the Social Sciences. London ; Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: SAGE Publications. p. 35 
42 O'Leary, Z. (2004). Essential Guide to Doing Research. London: SAGE. p. 116. 
43 O'Leary, Z. (2004). Essential Guide to Doing Research. London: SAGE. p. 1 16. Somekh, B., & Lewin, C. 
(2005). Research Methods in the Social Sciences. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications. p. 33 
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Thus, case study approach is apt for this study and a theoretical study would not suffice 
to address the research questions herein. 
2.3.2 The selection of the China case 
The case of NOC reforms in China is chosen due to its importance to the international 
petroleum sector, the special transformation paths of the Chinese NOCs in a special 
economic and political context, the lack of in-depth research on this subject, and the 
availability of information with the author,. 
First of all, China and its NOCs have become increasingly important players in the 
international petroleum scene due to the country's fast growing need for petroleum to 
fuel its economic growth. Its oil consumption more than doubled in the period between 
1995 and 2005 from 3.7 to 6.9 million ("mn") barrels per day ("bbl/d"). 44 Some 
commentators argue that the strong demand from China was one of the main factors 
responsible for the surging international oil price at that time, as China accounted for 
33% of the increase in world oil and 71% of that of the Asia Pacific from 2000 to 
2005.45 According to the World Energy Outlook 2006 by International Energy Agency 
("IEA"), China's crude import will grow to 12 mit bbl/d by 2030, four times the existing 
3 mit bbl/d. 46 Forecasts of Chinese oil demand and supply is shown in table 1.1. 
44 Calculated according to data from BP. (2006). BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. Retrieved 
21 Jan 2007, from http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryld=6842&contentld=7021390 
4s Ibid 
46 Interfax. (2007). China to Triple Crude Imports by 2030-I EA. Interfax-China energy report weekly, Vl(4), 8. 
12 mit bbl/d equal to about 589.7 mit ton per year, and 3 mit bbl/d equal to about 147.4 mit ton per year 
(calculation is based on the conversion factor of the Daqing oil, a ton of which equal to 7.428 barrel) 
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Table 2-1 China Oil Demand and Supply Projections 
(ml tonnes ner vear) 47 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Demand Projections 
[EA (2004) 375 503 636 
EIA(2006a) 450 540 660 780 920 
China Energy Development Report (20(13) 310 351) 400 
Supply Projections 
IEA(2004) 168 137 112 
EIA(2006a) 172 167 162 162 167 
China Energy Development Report (2003) 170-190 I80-200 170-190 
Second, China is selected because of the scope of the transformation of the country's 
petroleum sector, as well as the reform measures taken by the government in the 
selected period. The country has remained a major oil producer in the world since the 
late 1960s, while it had been transformed since then from being a net exporter into a net 
importer since 1990s. The country's experience of conducting both supply and demand 
side regulation may provide insights for both petroleum producing and consuming 
countries around the world. Furthermore, the country's petroleum sector has 
experienced extensive transformation from being a highly centralised planning entity 
into a relatively autonomous corporation operating in largely liberalised market 
domestically and internationally. The wide scope of the transformation is also valuable 
in guiding other countries in commercialising and liberalising their petroleum sector. 
Third, China is selected also because of the unique social, political, economic and 
47 Oliver, H. H. (2006). Reducing China's Thirst for Foreign Oil: Moving Towards a Less Oil-Dependent 
Road Transport System China Environment Series 2006 (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for 
Scholars), 41-58. p. 42 
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cultural settings of its petroleum sector. The scope and extent of transformation in its 
petroleum sector was significant. During the period from 1949 till 2006, the country's 
economy was transformed from a strict central planning model to a market economy 
"with Chinese characteristics". Influenced by its socialist past, the NOC reforms in the 
country and the policy choices of the government are different from other countries. 48 
Its petroleum sector began as a Soviet styled Ministry with both administrative and 
operational functions since the 1950s. It experienced decades of evolution to achieve the 
existing format of several largely commercialised NOCs with few non-commercial 
responsibilities. 49 
Fourth, there are few detailed studies completed on the subject by scholars outside 
China, partially because of little transparency in the Chinese petroleum sector in the past 
and partially due to the self-sufficient nature of the country's petroleum production and 
consumption before 1990s, which made the country's petroleum sector of less interest to 
the outside world. Limited studies on the subject include a study by Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg on the policy making process in China in terms of its petroleum sector from 
1949 to early 1980s. 5° Zhang analysed the evolution of business models, corporate 
structure, and the role of the headquarters of Chinese NOCs, and the impacts on their 
48 Walde, T. T., & Hirschhausen, C. V. (1998). Regulation Reform in the Energy Industry of Post-Soviet 
Countries Dundee: Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy. p. 4 
49 Ibid 
5o Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy making in China : leaders, structures and processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 
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competitiveness. 5 1 Kambara and Howe's study analyses China's energy challenges and 
covers the development of China's energy sector with their emphasis being on resource 
endowments, as well as on exploration, production and refinery activities. 52 A few 
other recent studies were carried out by Lewis and by Guo on the Chinese NOCs' 
impacts on the world energy markets and the current business model of these NOCs. 53 
Ma and Andrews-Speed explored the rationales and outlook of Chinese NOCs' overseas 
activities. 54 The above studies either focus mainly on the international impacts of 
Chinese NOCs' behaviour or on the business model of Chinese NOCs or petroleum 
policies of China over a limited period of time. 
Lastly, the author worked in the Chinese oil sector for four years before undertaking this 
study, and thus has the advantage of a deep understanding of the sector and access to 
people in the industry as well as relevant data. This is also the main reason why the 
study uses the example of CNPC/PetroChina in discussing the internal reforms in the 
Chinese NOCs. 
2.4 Historical analysis 
Another main methodology of the thesis is historical analysis, used in the study of 
51 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 
52 Kambara, T., & Howe, C. (2007). China and the global energy crisis: development and prospects for 
China's oil and natural gas. Cheltenham, Glos, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
53 Lewis, S. W. (2007). Chinese NOCs and World Energy Markets: CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC: James A. 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. 
54 Ma, X., & Andrews-Speed, P. (2006). The Overseas Activities of China's National Oil Companies: 
Rationale and Outlook. Minerals and Energy 21(1), 1-14. 
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Chinese NOC reforms. The historical analysis is widely used in studies addressing 
comprehensive social, political and economic issues which involve choices by human 
beings. New institutional economics argues that history is critically important because 
most social, political and economic development is influenced and restricted by existing 
institutional structure which is normally a product of past choices. Therefore, "history 
matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present 
and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society's institutions. 
Today's and tomorrow's choices are shaped by the past. And the past can only be made 
intelligible as a story of institutional evolution. Integrating institutions into economic 
theory and economic history is an essential step in improving that theory and history. "55 
This is especially true for NOC reforms. 56 The special characteristic of the petroleum 
sector is the long time span between commencement of exploration expenditure and its 
results in terms of finding oil or gas. 57 This is also the case of NOC reforms. Different 
from mainstream studies which view NOC reforms as a one-off action, the thesis posits 
NOC reforms as a long term process. During each stage of reform, the government and 
NOCs have to make their decisions based on the existing institutional framework, which 
itself has been influenced by previous decisions. The reform measures and the new 
institutional framework formed will also be constrained by events and decisions in 
55 North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Vii p. 3 
56 Hartley, P., & Medlock III, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a National Oil 
Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. p. 2 
5' Gallun, R. A., Wright, C. J., Nichols, L. M., & Stevenson, J. W. (2001). Fundamentals of Oil and Gas 
Accounting (4th ed. ): PennWell. p. 606 
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previous stages. This thesis thus views reform of NOCs as a continuous process that 
should be seen in a long-term perspective rather than a static or a one-off phenomena. 58 
In the case study on Chinese NOC reforms, four stages spanning over five decades are 
analysed in chapters 4-7, respectively. 
2.5 Unstructured interview 
The interview approach is a widely employed method and is defined as "a method of 
data collection that involves researchers asking open-ended questions" to respondents. 59 
Communicating with real people and exploring the "reality" concerning the research 
questions lie at the centre of the interview approach. 60 NOCs as a group publish less 
information as compared to private companies. An interview with stakeholders in NOC 
reforms could reveal additional useful information to supplement available documents on 
the subject, especially because official literature on the same may not reflect the true 
motives of policy makers. Thus, the interview approach can help explore the stories 
behind media coverage. 
There are three types of interview approaches depending on their forms including the 
structured interview, the semi-structured interview and the unstructured interview. 61 This 
thesis employs the unstructured interview approach to add insights on the drivers and 
58 Fossum, J. E. (1997). Oil, the State, and Federalism: University of Toronto Press, Toronto Buffalo 
London. p. 5 
59 O'Leary, Z. (2004). Essential Guide to Doing Research. London: SAGE. p. 118. Somekh, B., & Lewin, C. 
(2005). Research Methods in the Social Sciences. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications. p. 172 
so Somekh, B., & Lewin, C. (2005). Research Methods in the Social Sciences. London ; Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: SAGE Publications. p. 42 
61 Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2003). Business Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 340 
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decision making process on NOC reforms, especially for those lacking documented 
records. The target group of interview for this thesis includes government officials, and 
senior and middle managers of NOCs. The study covered interviews of officials from the 
Chinese Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Land and Resources, and the National 
Development and Reform Commission. It also covered interviews of senior officers of 
the former Ministry of Petroleum Industry, as well as middle management from the 
CNPC and PetroChina. 
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3 LAYING THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 
The aim of this chapter is to lay the conceptual foundation for the thesis by analysing 
several core conceptual issues relating to the research area, and by developing an 
analytical framework to address the research question. This chapter starts with an 
analysis of the historical evolution of NOC. It is followed by an examination of the 
fundamental nature of NOCs and their relationship with governments, in comparison to 
that of IOCs. Thereafter, the major drivers, measures and the effectiveness of NOC 
reforms are analysed with emphasis being placed on the analysis of the changes of the 
relationship between governments and NOCs and on the effectiveness of that 
relationship. This chapter concludes by developing the new analytical framework for 
analysing the effectiveness of NOC reforms, which will be used in the China case study. 
3.1 The historical evolution of NOCs 
This section analyses the evolution of NOCs in order to provide an historical 
background to the origin of NOCs, and the evolution of their relationship with 
governments. Four different stages will be analysed: the stage prior to 1960s, the stage 
during 1960s and 1970s, the stage during 1980s and 1990s, and the stage since the year 
2000. 
3.1.1 The early stage (before 1960s) 
Before 1960s, there were few NOCs around the world and NOCs as a group played only 
a marginal role in the international petroleum sector. 
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During this stage, the international petroleum sector was under the control of seven 
large IOCs known as "seven sisters". 70% of the oil reserves of the entire world were 
controlled by these companies. 62 Most of the international oil trade was conducted by 
these companies in the form of internal transactions or inter-company transactions. They 
also controlled international oil pricing through a posted price system under which 
prices of crude oil did not reflect the supply and demand of petroleum, but rather a 
fiscal parameter to calculate the share of government take. 63 
Major oil consuming countries, most of them home countries of the seven sisters, were 
in a favourable position, enjoying the prosperity caused by low and stable oil price. 
Oil producing countries, mainly Middle East countries and Venezuela, were in a weak 
position during this stage. Their reserves were assigned to IOCs through a concession 
system with strong colonialist characteristics, hugely favouring IOCs. 64 They had little 
influence over the price level and did not benefit economically as oil prices remained 
extremely low. They lacked capital, infrastructure, technology and expertise, and the 
62 Linde, C. V. D. (2000). The State and the International Oil Market: Competition and the Changing 
Ownership of Crude Oil Assets: Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 98 
63 Fattouh, B., & Oxford Institute for Energy, S. (2007). OPEC Pricing Power: the Need for a New 
Perspective. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
64 Parra, F. (2005). Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum. London. New York: I. B. Tauris. p. 1-3. Bunter, 
M. A. G. (2002). The Promotion and Licensing on Petroleum Prospective Acreage: Kluwer Law International. 
p. 1 "'The concession system was originated from Anglo-Saxon concept of ownerships of mineral wealth. 
According to the system, host government sigh contract with IOCs. Through the contract governments 
grants companies the right to explore for, develop, produce, transport, and market hydrocarbons or 
minerals within a fixed area for a specific amount of time. The concession and production and sale of 
hydrocarbons from the concession are then subject to rentals, royalties, bonuses, and taxes. " 
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situation was unlikely to change under the system as the operation of IOCs was isolated 
from the rest of the domestic economy with few local staff employed and local 
capacities promoted. 65 
During this stage only a few NOCs came into being. Some of them had their country 
specific agenda. For example the Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales ("YPF") of 
Argentina was created in 1920 in order to achieve "self sufficiency and exclusive access 
to a strategic energy resource". 66 There also existed fully state owned petroleum 
enterprises in centralised command and socialist countries such as Russia, China and 
India. Others were more or less pioneers of later NOCs as a result of developing 
countries' attempts to secure better economic benefits for themselves. Examples include 
Petröleos Mexicanos ("Pemex") of Mexico established in 1938 and NIOC of Iran 
established in 1951.67 Despite the small number of NOCs existing at this stage, 
pressure had accumulated for developing countries to change the order of the 
international petroleum sector. 
65 Bunter, M. A. G. (2002). The Promotion and Licensing on Petroleum Prospective Acreage: Kluwer Law 
International. p. 156, p. 44 
66 Khelil, C. (1995). Argentina, Hydrocarbon Sector Privatisation. Dundee: Centre for Energy, Petroleum 
and Mineral Law and Policy, University of Dundee. 
67 McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & 
A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 184-204). 
Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. p. 185. Marcel, V., & Mitchell, J. V. (2006). Oil Titans: 
National Oil Companies in the Middle East. London and Washington, D. C.: Chatham House and Brookings 
Institution Press. p. 15. Philip, G. (1997). State Oil Companies and the Reversal of National 
Developmentalism: the Case of Mexico and Venezuela. Dundee: Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law and 
Policy, University of Dundee. p. 3. Trauber, S. (2007). The Rising Influence of the NOC: The Financial 
Community Perspective Baker Institute Policy Report No. 35. p. 4 
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3.1.2 The establishment of NOCs in large scales (1960s-1970s) 
The establishment of NOCs peaked during the period from 1960s to 1970s in both 
developing and developed countries, and NOCs started to play an increasingly 
important role in the international oil industry. 
Driven by the unsatisfactory relationship between the Seven Sisters and oil producing 
countries, and by the new international economic order emerging in the United Nations 
("UN"), which sought to assert the "permanent, inalienable sovereign powers of 
countries over their natural resources" from 1958 to 1974, developing oil producing 
countries started to seek a better framework for the international petroleum sector. 68 
First of all, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") was 
established as a cartel of oil producing countries to counter the power of IOCs by 
maintaining oil prices through quota management in the 1960s. 69 Secondly, many oil 
producing countries stopped granting concessions to IOCs. New types of fiscal systems, 
such as Production Sharing Agreements ("PSA") were widely adopted, which enhanced 
the exercise of sovereign power of host governments over their resources possibly with 
68 Bunter, M. A. G. (2002). The Promotion and Licensing on Petroleum Prospective Acreage: Kluwer Law 
International. p. 1 
69 OPEC. (2008). The History of OPEC Retrieved 4th April, 2008, from 
http: //www. opec. org/aboutus/history/history. htm. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) is a permanent, intergovernmental Organization, created at the Baghdad Conference on 
September 10-14,1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The five Founding Members 
were later joined by nine other Members: Qatar (1961); Indonesia (1962); Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya (1962); United Arab Emirates (1967); Algeria (1969); Nigeria (1971); Ecuador (1973-1992); 
Gabon (1975-1994) and Angola (2007). OPEC had its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, in the first five 
years of its existence. This was moved to Vienna, Austria, on September 1,1965. 
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higher shares of return. 70 Oil producing countries also sought to increase their pricing 
power and argued for new price systems. 
Although some oil producing countries such as Saudi Arabia allowed IOCs to stay, 
others felt that "only nationalisation of the concessions and assets of IOCs would 
benefit the economic interest of oil producing countries". " Due to the lack of a well 
developed domestic private sector to fill in the gap, a large number of NOCs were 
established during this stage through nationalisation of assets held by IOCs. 72 Newly 
established NOCs included Iraq National Oil Company ("INOC") of Iraq (1966) 
Sonatrach of Algeria (1963), National Oil Company Libya ("NOCL") of Libya (1970), 
Petronas of Malaysia (1974), PdVSA of Venezuela (1975), Kuwait National Petroleum 
Corporation ("KNPC") of Kuwait (1975), Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation 
("NNPC") of Nigeria (1977), and Saudi Aramco of Saudi Arabia (1980). 73 
70 For more information on PSA, see Johnston, D. (1994). International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and 
Production Sharing Contracts. Tulsa, Oklahoma: Pennwell Publishing Company. Bunter, M. A. G. The 
Promotion and Licensing on Petroleum Prospective Acreage (Vol. 2002): Kluwer Law International. p. 1. 
Fattouh, B., & Oxford Institute for Energy, S. (2007). OPEC Pricing Power: the Need for a New Perspective. 
Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
" Linde, C. V. D. (2000). The State and the International Oil Market: Competition and the Changing 
Ownership of Crude Oil Assets: Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 97 
72 McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & 
A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 184-204). 
Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. p. 185 
73 Thompson, E. V. A Brief History Of Major Oil Companies in The Gulf Region Petroleum Archives Project, 
Arabian Peninsula & Gulf Studies Program, University of Virginia and The Kuwait Foundation for the 
Advancement of Sciences. Trauber, S. (2007). The Rising Influence of the NOC: The Financial Community 
Perspective Baker Institute Policy Report No. 35. p. 4. The History of National Oil Company Libya. 
Retrieved 9th Jan, 2008, from http: //en. noclibya. com. ly/. The History of Petronas Retrieved 9th Jan, 2008, 
from http: /twww. petronas. com. my/intemet/corp/centralrep. 2. nsf/frameset_corp? OpenFrameset. The 
History of NNPC. Retrieved 9th Jan, 2008, from http: //www. nnpcgroup. com/. The History of PDVSA. 
Retrieved 9th Jan, 2008, from http: ltwww. pdvsa. com/ 
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NOCs were also established in the developed world in response to the changing 
international petroleum order although for different reasons. The end of an era of cheap 
and stable oil supply caused increased security of supply concerns. There was also a 
prevailing ideology that governments should and could intervene in the national 
economy. 74 British National Oil Company established in 1976 is an example of this. 75 
Some developed countries established NOCs for the purpose of fostering national 
capacity, as in the case of Statoil of Norway (1972). 76 
By the end of this stage, NOCs had become vital players in the international petroleum 
sector, controlling majority of world oil reserves through renegotiation, nationalisation 
and the application of new fiscal regimes. Through them governments, especially OPEC 
members, could have a better control over oil pricing system and access to increased 
revenue. 77 Many of them also took the responsibility of assisting national economic 
development and played an important role in resource management. The relationship 
between government and NOCs was closer and the government normally controlled the 
core decision making of their NOCs. 
74 Stevens, P. (2008). Oil Wars: Resource Nationalism and the Middle East. In P. Andrews-Speed (Ed. ), 
International Competition for Resources: the Role of Law, the State and of Market Dundee: Dundee 
University Press. 
75 Helm, D. (2004). Energy, the State, and the Market : British Energy Policy since 1979 (Rev. ed. ). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. p. 14 
76 Fossum, J. E. (1997). Oil, the State, and Federalism: University of Toronto Press, Toronto Buffalo 
London. Al-Kasim, F. (2006). Managing Petroleum Resources: The 'Norwegian Model' in a board 
Perspective Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. p. 46. The History of Statoil and Hydro. Retrieved 9th Jan, 
2008, from http: //www. statoilhydro. com/en/AboutStatoilHydro/History/AboveAndBelow/Pages/default. aspx 
" Fattouh, B., & Oxford Institute for Energy, S. (2007). OPEC Pricing Power: the Need for a New 
Perspective. P. 4 Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. p. 4 
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3.1.3 The commercialisation of NOCs during (1980s -1990s) 
During the stage between 1980s and 1990s, the international petroleum sector was 
further developed. A short application of a netback price resulted in the collapse of the 
OPEC-administrative fixed price system and the beginning of the international 
petroleum price system. 78 A low oil price level prevailed throughout the stage as more 
supply from regions such as North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, Former Soviet Union 
("FSU") and West Africa came to the market. An initial attempt by OPEC to defend the 
OPEC-administrative price system resulted in significant reduction of market share of 
the Cartel. 79 
Low price and reduced revenue income of oil producing countries turned out to be a 
severe challenge for their governments. Meanwhile, the performance of many NOCs 
was disappointing, 80 in as much as their costs were high, their investment generated 
poor returns, rent-seeking and corruption were rampant, and their financial situation was 
78 AI-Moneef, M. A. (1998). International Downstream Integration of National Oil Companies. In P. Stevens 
(Ed. ), Strategic Positioning in the Oil Industry (pp. 45-60): The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and 
Research. p. 46. Fattouh, B., & Oxford Institute for Energy, S. (2007). OPEC Pricing Power: the Need for a 
New Perspective. p. 5. The netback pricing system provided oil companies with a guaranteed refining 
margin since it was based on a general formula in which the price of crude oil was set equal to the ex post 
product realization minus refining and transport costs. The system resulted in the 1986 price collapse, from 
$26 per barrel in 1985 to less than $10 per barrel in mid-1986. Out of the 1986 crisis, the current 
"market-related" oil-pricing regime was born. The adoption of the current market-related pricing system 
represented a new chapter in the history of oil price determination since it resulted in the abandonment of 
the administered oil pricing system that had dominated the oil market from the 1950s until the mid-1980s. " 
79 Fattouh, B., & Oxford Institute for Energy, S. (2007). OPEC Pricing Power: the Need for a New 
Perspective. p. 4. "Between 1975 and 1985 non-OPEC countries increased their share of world total oil 
production from 48% to 71 % with most of the increase coming from Mexico, the North Sea and the Soviet 
Union. OPEC's market share in the world's oil production fall from 52% in 1973 to less than 30% in 1985 
with Saudi Arabia's share being the most affected. " 
80 Aharoni, Y., & Ascher, W. (1998). Restructuring the Arrangements between Government and State 
Enterprises in the Oil and Mining Sectors. Natural Resources Forum, 22(3), 201-213. Stevens, P. (1998). 
Energy Privatisation: Sensitivities and Realities. Journal of Energy and Development, 23(1), 1-14. pl 
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extremely tight. Also, many NOCs, having accumulated significant power, sought to 
grow out of the government control to become a state within a state, therefore causing 
severe political unrest. 81 
Severe economic challenges and changes in economic ideologies drove governments to 
reform their NOCs. 82 The old school of economic theory arguing for direct state 
intervention in the economy was challenged by the failure of the FSU and was gradually 
substituted by new economic ideologies which argued for free market reforms with the 
support of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank and the Chicago 
school (lead by influential economists such as Milton Friedman), representing the so 
called "Washington consensuses". 83 In developed countries it was believed that "the job 
of government should be limited to the setting framework, within which the scope of 
market forces would be maximised'. 84 
In developing countries, the 1990s financial debt crisis and the need for international 
support made it possible for the World Bank and IMF to spread its ideology in these 
countries. Thus, privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation became a major theme of 
81 Barnes, P. (1995). Indonesia: the Political Economy of Energy: Oxford University Press 
82 CEE. (2007). Commercial Frameworks for National Oil Companies: Centre for Energy Economics, 
Bureau of Economic Geology, Jackson School of Geosciences, the University of Texas at Austin 
83 Stevens, P. (1998). Strategic Positioning in the Oil Industry: Trends and Options. In P. Stevens (Ed. ), 
Strategic Positioning in the Oil Industry (pp. 1-22): The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research. 
p. 13 
84 Helm, D. (2004). Energy, the State, and the Market : British Energy Policy since 1979 (Rev. ed. ). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. p. 14 
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economic reforms in both developed and developing countries. 85 Meanwhile, in oil 
consuming countries, security of supply became less of a concern as cheap and 
abundant supply of oil in a better developed international petroleum market promoted 
the notion that oil was not a strategically important commodity any more but a 
commodity that could be easily accessed through the market. 
During this stage, large scale market driven reforms characterised by commercialisation 
and liberalisation were conducted in the petroleum sector. In Norway, the Norwegian 
government removed from Statoil the automatic access to 51% resources and the veto 
right, partially because the company had run into severe cost overruns in 1980s. The 
Indonesian government started to reform Pertamina as it ran into financial crisis caused 
by inappropriate investment. Privatisation of NOCs occurred in UK, Russia and 
Argentina, when the NOC of the former two were privatised under Thatcher's and 
Yeltsin's regime, respectively, whereas Argentina privatised most of its economy under 
the aid of the World Bank during its foreign debt crisis. 86 Liberalisation of Petrobras in 
1997 took place in an environment where a liberal government took power and 
liberalised the economy on a massive scale. In China, the market oriented economic 
reforms significantly impacted the role of NOCs and they were normally selected to test 
pilot schemes to reform State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs"). Even in countries where 
privatisation was too sensitive to be accepted due to ideological and national reasons, 
85 McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & 
A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 184-204). 
Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. p. 186 
86 Economist. (2007). After Yukos. The Economist 383(8528), 71-72. 
40 
such as those in the Middle East, actions were taken to reduce the governments' 
influence on commercial operations of NOCs to make them commercially more 
efficient. 87 
As a result, the scope of NOCs' non-commercial responsibilities was largely reduced, 
and governments increasingly favoured market-driven means in regulating their NOCs 
and hence empowered them with greater autonomy. 
3.1.4 A mixture of re-nationalisation and commercialisation of NOCs (since 2000) 
Entering the 21 st century, the international oil market was increasingly exposed to two 
sets of conflicting forces influenced by the establishment of a formula-based pricing 
system and continuous high oil prices. 
During the early years of the 21 s' century the international petroleum market was further 
developed, market volumes were further expanded and a market-driven formula pricing 
system was established as the major oil pricing mechanism, in which "oil was initially 
priced off the spot market until the futures market assumed a greater role in price 
discovery". 88 A wide range of factors such as demand, supply, speculations and 
expectations of players in the futures market jointly impacts oil price level. As a result, a 
good understanding of the market mechanism and a flexible commercially driven 
87 Oxford Analytica Brief (2002). Middle East: Oil Company Reform. Oxford Analytica Brief June, 3. 
88 Fattouh, B., & Oxford Institute for Energy, S. (2007). OPEC Pricing Power: the Need for a New 
Perspective. p. 4 
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business model became important for NOCs of producing as well as consuming 
countries, to maximise their national as well as commercial interests. This together with 
adoption of market ideology and globalisation in many countries served as major 
drivers for NOCs to be further commercialised and pricing system being liberalised. 
During this stage, the international oil prices remained at a record high level, which had 
mixed impacts on NOCs reforms in producing countries. On the one hand, cash rich 
NOCs had greater access to advanced technology, qualified skills, and training schemes 
and were more able to enhance their commercial performance. On the other hand, high 
oil prices brought back the ideology of resource nationalism. 89 Although in many 
countries efforts were made to increase only the government take from resources 
activities, in many other countries these efforts were coupled by an increasing presence 
of state in the petroleum sector. This was because higher rent made NOCs more 
attractive to be controlled. This was especially so in countries that still had a populist 
and socialist influence or had a large proportion of poor people who supported 
nationalism and socialism ideologies. 90 Additionally, the high oil price increased the 
rent generated from the petroleum sector and covered up financial deficiencies resulting 
from the poor performance of NOCs, thereby delaying the commercialisation and 
liberalisation effort initiated in many countries. 
89 Trauber, S. (2007). The Rising Influence of the NOC: The Financial Community Perspective Baker 
Institute Policy Report No. 35. p. 1 
90 The recent difficulties facing by the Mexico government in reforming Pemex could demonstrate this. 
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High price levels also had mixed impacts on oil consuming countries. One the one hand, 
it triggered higher security of supply concerns and drove oil consuming countries, 
especially those lacking experience in dealing with international petroleum market, to 
increase the role of government in securing supply. This may have slowed down 
reforms of NOCs to a large extent. The most notable examples in this category are 
China and India. The NOCs in these countries are required to take a greater 
responsibility for ensuring security of supply by cooperating with NOCs in resource 
rich countries and by expanding their foothold overseas. 91 On the other hand, high oil 
prices have placed a greater financial burden on governments subsidising their domestic 
oil prices, and have pressed them hard to liberalise their domestic oil pricing systems. 
3.2 The fundamental nature of NOCs and their relationship with their 
governments 
The aim of this section is to examine the fundamental nature of NOCs and their 
relationship with their governments. It highlights the special nature and agenda of 
government, and the different relationship it formed with NOCs, which differentiate 
NOCs from IOCs This section ends with an analysis of the common non-commercial 
responsibilities undertaken by NOCs, as well as the relationship between governments 
and NOCs. 
91 Ma, X. (2007). Chinese National Oil Companies' Overseas Investment: Myth and Reality'. Petroleum 
Review, Sep 18-20. Ma, X., & Andrews-Speed, P. (2006). The Overseas Activities of China's National Oil 
Companies: Rationale and Outlook. Minerals and Energy 21(1), 1-14. Ö6ütcü, M., & Ma, X. (2007). 
Growing Links in Energy and Geopolitics: China and the Middle East. Insight Turkey, 9(3), 96-122. 
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3.2.1 The nature of IOCs in terms of their relationship with their shareholder 
The relationship between IOCs and their shareholders is formal and transparent mainly 
due to the commercial focus of their operation, the availability of good quality data, 
their practice of regular auditing, as well as a sound corporate governance structure 
employed by them. 
Private oil companies pursue commercial interests comprising of long term growth and 
short term profitability in order to maximise their shareholder value. In the case of the 
largest IOCs, the objective of their shareholders is highly commercial. They are often 
measured by a proper rate of return for their capital, which took the form of "Return on 
Capital Employed" ("ROCE")92 since the 1980s, together with a long term growth 
indicators, such as booking reserves and reserve replace rate. The latter set of indicators 
became increasingly important in recent years under the high price scenario. 
The wide acceptance of international accounting standards makes it possible for private 
shareholders to measure and benchmark the performance of IOCs with each other, and 
to monitor and control them effectively. Additionally, the adoption of a sound corporate 
governance structure helps to protect the interest of shareholders. Furthermore, for 
public-listed companies, there is an extra layer of monitoring and control mechanism 
92 Antill, N., Amott, R., & Oxford Institute for Energy, S. (2002). Oil Company Crisis: Managing Structure, 
Profitability and Growth. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. p. 52-64. The indicator ROCE is defined 
as return on capital in this context is operating earnings after tax but before interest payments (Net Operating 
Profit After Taxation, or NOPAT), divided by capital employed, which is taken to be the sum of 
shareholders' funds (including minority interests) and net debt. Scaroni, P. (2006). IOCs Versus NOCs-a 
New Game? Petroleum Review March, 24-26. 
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from stock exchange regulators and market analysts. 
3.2.2 The nature of NOCs in terms of their relationship with their shareholders 
Different from IOCs, a National Oil Company represents a direct government 
intervention in the petroleum industry. It is an oil company operating in some part of the 
oil value chain, fully or partially owned or controlled by their government. 93 The major 
difference between NOCs and IOCs originates in the different nature and agenda of 
their shareholders. 94 The multi-identity of government as a shareholder, resource owner, 
and regulator differentiates it from purely commercial shareholders. They often have a 
commercial agenda to pursue as shareholders of NOCs. However, as regulators and 
petroleum resource owners, they also have a wide range of economic, social and 
political concerns in terms of governing the petroleum sector. 95 These special 
considerations as well as their lack of regulatory capacity, 96 often drive governments to 
assign their NOCs with a wide range of non-commercial responsibilities in addition to 
their commercial responsibility. For similar reasons, the governments tend to employ a 
more proactive approach in regulating their NOCs, and often retain a tight control of 
them. As a result, the relationship between governments and NOCs is much more 
93 Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet 
Journal(14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from 
http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlprjoumal/htmINoll4/Voll4-lO. pdf. 
94 Hartley, P., & Medlock Ill, K. B. (2007). A Model of the Operation and Development of a National Oil 
Company: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. p. 2 
95 Bentham, R. (1988). Legal Status of State Petroleum Companies In N. Beredjick & T. Walde (Eds. ), 
Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing Countries (pp. 257-261). London/Dordrecht/Boston: Graham 
and Trotman. p. 258 
96 Lucas, A. R. (1985). State Petroleum Corporations: the Legal Relationship with the State. Journal of 
Natural Resources Law, 3,81-101. p. 83. It is also possible that some governments establish NOCs for 
non-laudable reasons such as to pursue private political or financial interests, which is not the major content 
of this thesis as discussed in chapter 1. 
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complicated than that between IOCs and private shareholders. 
3.2.2.1 The specific petroleum-related concerns of governments 
Economic concerns of oil producing countries 
For oil producing countries, the major economic concerns of a government in terms of 
governing the petroleum sector are security of demand, proper resource management, 
maximise long term and short term economic rent, and the promotion of economic 
linkages. 
A diversified, reliable and stable level of international demand for crude oil at a 
reasonable price is of critical interest to oil producing countries, and it is not the private 
sector's target to provide security of demand. 97 To secure long term security of demand, 
oil producing countries may get involved in cooperation with major consumer countries 
to develop infrastructure or to promote trust. 98 
Due to the existence of social obligations funded by oil revenue, governments of oil 
producing countries normally have a higher expectation of international oil price than 
97 Stevens, P. (1998). Strategic Positioning in the Oil Industry: Trends and Options. In P. Stevens (Ed. ), 
Strategic Positioning in the Oil Industry (pp. 1-22): The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research. 
p. 17-18. Hausmann, R., & Rigobon, R. (2003). An Alternative Interpretation of the 'Resource Curse': Theory 
and Policy Implications. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and 
Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 13-44). Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. p. 37 
98 It is argued that vertical integration could hedge the negative impact caused by volatile revenue, this 
explains why many OPEC members' NOC are expanding to the downstream sector. This could also be 
demonstrated by the increasing interest of the Middle East Countries to promote bond with fast growing 
consuming countries such as China. Beng, P. K., & Li, V. Y. W. (2005). China's energy dependence on the 
Middle East: boon or bane for Asian security? The China and Eurasia Forum quarterly 3(3), 12-19. 
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IOCs' shareholders. For example, a recent study conducted by PFC energy revealed that 
Saudi Arabia and Iran "require oil to stay at $55 just to break even", while the break 
even figure for Venezuela reached as high as $94 in 2008, and $97 in 2009.99 In order 
to maintain higher international oil prices, governments may cooperate with other oil 
producing countries to manipulate production levels in order to maintain the price level 
within a certain band, not too high to damage the long term security of demand, and not 
too low to damage revenue income. 100 Whereas IOCs, arguably aim at a lower price 
level compared to oil producing countries for the purpose of securing market share. 
Also, private companies that have invested huge amounts of capital have a shorter time 
perspective, as their shareholder expect them to maintain a certain level of production in 
order to achieve profitability targets. 
Oil producing countries also want to maximise sustainable economic benefits from their 
oil reserves by proper reserve management and could have views different from private 
companies. Arguably host governments have a longer view than private players. '°1 
Private players, especially those with limited years of access to resources may extract 
resources in a way that may damage long term recovery rate. Meanwhile, during 
99 Bowman, J. (2008). Oil-rich nations dependent on record prices [Electronic Version]. Arabian Business 
Retrieved 17th July 2008 from 
http: //www. arabianbusiness. com/513314-oil-producers-addicted-to-record-prices. 
, 00 The most obvious case is the quota management system employed by the Organisation of Petroleum 
Export Countries. 
101 Hartshorn, J. E. (1993). Oil Trade, Politics and Prospects. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
p. 40-41. It is said that "IOCs are thinking not of the long-term prosperity of host country but of shareholder 
exceptions of returns in the next quarter". Marcel, V., & Mitchell, J. V. (2006). Oil Titans: National Oil 
Companies in the Middle East. London and Washington, D. C.: Chatham House and Brookings Institution 
Press. p. 40-41 
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exploration stage, private companies that have secure access to blocks for a significant 
length of time may delay investment, especially when there are no sufficient regulations 
to prevent them from doing so. Whereas it is in the interest of governments to ensure 
that private players invest certain amount of capital and conduct certain amount of 
working programme. 102 
Governments from Oil producing countries, in theory also want to maximise their long 
term economic rent through the establishment of proper fiscal regime. However, private 
oil companies' target is to maximise after-tax profit. Many of them, especially IOCs 
may resort to measures such as "internal transaction price" to minimise their taxation 
burden. Private companies may also manipulate their expenditures to minimise their 
payment to resource governments, the so-called "gold-plating behaviour". These 
behaviours may have a huge negative impact on resource countries' economic interests, 
especially when governments are not well equipped to spot and stop these behaviours. 
Additionally the general economic benefit for a country could also be enhanced through 
fostering the development of domestic industry, and promoting domestic economic 
linkages. 103 Most governments seek to promote or foster the development of other 
domestic sectors, such as manufacturing and service sectors, train domestic staff, 
promote technology transfer and promote employment through the development of the 
102 Lucas, A. R. (1985). State Petroleum Corporations: the Legal Relationship with the State. Journal of 
Natural Resources Law, 3,81-101. p. 83. These measures could help optimise the Speed of Extraction (time 
Period) and Recovery rate (prevent waste of resources). 
103 Taveme, B. (1999). Petroleum, Industry and Governments - An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics and Government Policies: Kluwer Law International. p. 90 
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petroleum sector. 104 However, most of these activities may not be in the interests of 
private enterprises. 
Government of oil producing countries may also have other specific concerns under 
specific circumstances. For example, generating foreign currency is another specific 
economic concern, especially when an oil producing country is having a shortage of 
foreign reserves and therefore facing a foreign currency payment crisis. 
Economic concerns of oil consuming countries 
For oil consuming countries, security of domestic supply is a major economic concern 
and normally a core element of a country's energy policy. A safe, stable, reliable and 
affordable supply of crude oil and oil products is extremely important for domestic 
industry and welfare of households. However, it is perceived that private players, 
especially foreign players are not in a position to provide security of supply. '°5 
Although security of supply is important for developed countries, they are more critical 
for developing countries which are less able to afford petroleum at international prices, 
and lack an adequate market system to ensure the smooth distribution of oil and gas 
domestically. This is especially true for countries with large populations and a regulated 
Boa Wright, G. (2001). Resource Based Growth then and Now. World Bank. p. 11. For example, in Latin 
America countries, historically, 'European settlement was largely motivated by the search for precious 
metals; but the Spanish and Portuguese rulers had little interest in the possible spill over benefits of 
knowledge and techniques from gold and silver mining for broader mineral development. " 
105 Grayson, L. E. (1981). National oil companies. Chichester: Wiley. p. 9 
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oil price system which serves as a disincentive for private players to participate in 
petroleum activities and increases the risk of supply disruption. Countries such as China, 
India, Brazil, Indonesia and Iran are in this category. 106 For many countries driven by 
security of supply considerations, a self-sufficiency policy may be employed since it is 
argued that domestic production could reduce the dependence on foreign oil suppliers. 
"Such dependence makes any country economically and therefore political 
vulnerable". 107 
Social considerations 
The failure to address the economic issues discussed in the prior sections could result in 
social unrest. For example, the failure of governments and local communities to benefit 
from resource extraction could result in social instability in oil producing countries. 
Whereas failure to ensure a stable, reliable and affordable supply of oil could cause 
severe negative social impacts in oil consuming countries. Governments also have 
social equity concerns in terms of oil consumption. In response, governments tend to 
subsidise domestic oil price and enforce a regulated price system, especially in 
developing countries, as has been mentioned in the previous section. 
Another major social concern of governments is to minimise negative impacts of 
106 Mayorga-Alba, E. (1995). Deregulation and Reform of Petroleum Markets: From Monopolies to New 
Regulated Markets (No. 6): The World Bank Group. England, A. (2007). Egypt Weighs Domestic Energy 
Needs as Export Demands Grow. Financial Times. London: 8. 
107 Taveme, B. (1999). Petroleum, Industry and Governments - An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics and Government Policies: Kluwer Law International. p. 87-90 
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resource extraction activities. 108 The petroleum sector has a complex relationship with 
society because of the environment impacts and operations, which may be prone to 
accidents and casualties. The upstream exploration and production of oil and gas may 
harm the natural environment, soil, water and air. Explosions and blowouts occur not 
only during exploration, and production stages, but also during refining, transportation, 
and storage stages, thereby threatening human life and ecological systems. 109 Host 
governments may be concerned that oil companies could sacrifice Health, Safety and 
Environment ("HSE") priorities for their commercial interests. ' 10 This is especially true 
where governments lack the capacity to identify, regulate, and prevent possible threats. 
For example, even the industry leader BP was widely accused for its "cost cutting" 
culture which could have negative security and environment impacts. "' Developing 
countries tend to have a much lenient legislation in terms of curbing environment 
related issues. 112 Arguably, NOCs in resource rich countries are observed to have a 
poor environmental record compared to IOCs. However, they normally perform better 
than private domestic players. For instance, the small share of reserves allocated to 
regional governments and private players in Shannxi provinces in China resulted in 
108 Andrews-Speed, P., & Ma, X. (2008). Energy Production and Social Marginalisation in China Journal Of 
Contemporary China 17(55), 247-272. 
109 Taveme, B. (1999). Petroleum, Industry and Governments - An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics and Government Policies: Kluwer Law International. p. 9 
110 BP 's 2007 US law cases over the Texas refinery exploration and Alaska pipeline erosion illustrated a 
typical conflicts between cost-cutting and HSE standards during petroleum related operations 
'11 Johnson, A. (2006 ). BP Boss Attacks Cost-cut Culture. The Express. UK: 49. 
112 Ascher, W. (1994). Survey of Issues in Government Policy and Public Management of State Oil and 
Mining Companies in Developing Countries. Natural Resources Forum, 18(1), 3-11. p. 6. "while oil and 
mining companies pose environmental problems whether they are private or state owned, state enterprises 
sometimes attract more lenient sanctions for polluting than do private companies. When the government's 
own revenues depend directly on resource extraction, environmental regulators may be more likely to 
compromise their obligations to the environment. More over, the chronic undercapitalization of state oil and 
mining companies leaves them with inferior pollution control capabilities" 
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severe environmental damage and social disorder in 1990s. This partially resulted in the 
government decision of gradual transferring of these reserves from the regional 
governments and private players to their NOCs. 113 
Political considerations 
Failures in terms of addressing economic and social concerns mentioned above could 
result in political instability. In addition to that, governments may have many 
petroleum-related political interests. In countries with the oil sector playing a significant 
role in domestic economy, there is a tendency for petroleum related issues to be highly 
politicised. In these countries, control over the petroleum sector and revenue generated 
from it is critical for political influence. The nature of political interests varies among 
countries and political regimes. For example, Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth grouped 
countries into five categories including mature democracy, factional democracy, 
paternalistic autocracy, reformist autocracy and predatory autocracy, and noticed the 
difference dynamics and pattern of behaviours of their government in managing their 
resources. 
114 
In addition to petroleum related economic, political and social concerns, it is worth 
pointing out that, as part of national economy, the petroleum sector could be used as an 
113 Zhang, W. (2002). The Rampant Illegal Oil Exploration in Shannxi Province (in Chinese) [Electronic 
Version]. Retrieved 1st Mar 2007 from http: //www. chinanews. com. cn/2002-09-11/26/221574. html. 
114 Eifert, B., Gelb, A., & Tallroth, N. B. (2003). The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic 
Management in Oil-Exporting Countries. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy 
Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 82-122). Washington D. C.: International 
Monetary Fund. p. 89 
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agent of governments to support general economic, political and social issues when the 
governments feel it necessary and when other needs have higher priority from 
governments' perspectives. 
3.2.2.2 The major non-commercial responsibilities of NOCs 
Most of the special concerns analysed in the previous section could be addressed by 
laws and regulations. However, due to ideological considerations and the lack of 
regulatory capacity, many governments consider NOC a more effective tool in 
addressing these issues. As a result, governments tend to assign non-commercial 
responsibilities to their NOCs, in addition to their commercial ones. The content of 
these non-commercial responsibilities varies from time to time and from country to 
country. Normally NOCs may perform two types of non-commercial responsibilities, 
namely, those relating to administration and regulation of the petroleum sector and those 
relating to other economic, social and political liabilities. 
The first set of non-commercial responsibilities includes regulatory and administrative 
responsibilities. Typical regulatory responsibilities comprise the formulation of price 
policy, market policy, investment policy, reserve management policy, and fiscal policy. 
Major administrative responsibilities include product quality administration and market 
operation administration. 
The second set of non-commercial responsibilities includes petroleum sector related 
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responsibilities and general responsibilities. The petroleum sector related 
responsibilities concludes assuring security of supply (for consumer/importer countries), 
guaranteeing sovereign power over all petroleum resources, controlling or influencing 
the regional or global resources allocation in favour of a country, assuring diversified, 
safe and stable petroleum market (for producer/exporter countries), developing domestic 
exploration of resource and entitled overseas resource, setting up strategic petroleum 
reserves, acquiring petroleum sector related knowledge, skills, techniques and expertise, 
and developing substitute energy sources. General responsibilities include improving a 
country's international influence and leading role in regional area, expanding the 
linkage of the petroleum industry to other domestic industries, rectifying the imbalance 
of regional economy, promoting social equity, providing employment and staff training, 
environment protection and sustainable development,. 
The non-commercial responsibilities of NOCs vary from country to country and from 
time to time. The content and scope of non-commercial responsibilities of NOCs also 
differ according to the specific concerns of their governments, the relative priority 
assigned to these concerns, and the ability of their governments to achieve these 
concerns without using NOCs. 1'5 The next section will analyse the general trend of this 
variation of responsibilities by viewing the historical evolution of NOCs. 
115 In many countries with insufficient regulatory framework, market rules, and private sectors, 
governments prefer to resort to direct intervention of their petroleum sector and to establish NOCs. This 
explains why NOCs are more frequently find in developing countries or developed countries in the early 
stage of their petroleum industry. 
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3.2.2.3 The supporting system between government and NOCs 
As discussed at the beginning of this section, the supporting systems governments 
employ in regulating NOCs is often different from that of private shareholders. 
Governments tend to take a more proactive approach in controlling the important 
aspects of NOCs' activities such as investment, marketing or financing, the cash flow of 
NOCs and the appointment of senior management of NOCs. Governments also tend to 
intervene in the operations of NOCs more frequently and give direct administrative 
orders to NOCs. 
This use of proactive approach is mainly due to the difficulty in measuring the 
performance of NOCs, and in monitoring and controlling them. First, the common 
practice of assigning NOCs with non-commercial responsibilities and regulating oil 
domestic prices makes it difficult to measure the performance of NOCs using 
quantitative data. Second, the lack of regulatory capacity, especially the lack of high 
quality data to measure and benchmark the performance of NOCs makes it hard for 
governments to monitor and control the activities of NOCs. As a result, lest NOCs may 
get out of control at the cost of governments and grow into "a state within a state", 
governments often resort to tight control and direct intervention. 
3.3 The drivers of NOC reforms 
This section aims to analyse in detail the factors that drive reforms of NOCs which in 
turn will change the NOC-government relationship. As has been analysed in section 3.2 
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the changing nature and agenda of governments play an important role in reforming 
NOCs.. This change in turn is often driven by changes in the international petroleum 
sector as mentioned in section 3.1, in dominant domestic economic and political 
ideologies and situations, in the nature of the domestic petroleum sector, and in national 
capacity of a country. 
3.3.1 The economic and political ideologies 
The establishment of NOCs is supported, in many circumstances, by certain ideologies 
underpinned by theories, such as theories relating to market failure, Keynesian 
economics, structuralism, and ideologies such as socialism and nationalism. Ideological 
change is an important driver for NOC reform. The market driven reforms of NOCs are 
generally supported by ideologies such as the free market ideology, "conflict of identity 
effect" and "multi-function effect". 
3.3.1.1 Ideologies supporting the establishment of NOCs 
The major ideologies that have played a role in the establishment of NOCs include 
economic ideologies such as market failure, Keynesian economics, and structuralism. 
They support free market ideology, but argue that for certain reasons, markets may not 
function ideally, and thus need government intervention. There are other ideologies such 
as socialism and nationalism, which do not support free market ideology. 
Main stream economic theories claim that a free market is the best means of achieving 
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efficiency. A perfect market is normally defined as a market characterised by a large 
number of buyers and sellers, who are rational and are aiming at utility-maximisation. 
Such market is transparent with information being available to everybody. Also it is 
fully competitive with neither barriers to entry, nor collusion among firms in the 
industry. 116 
However, for many reasons, an unregulated market may fail in allocating resources in 
an effective way, causing "market failure". 117 Typical causes of market failure include 
limited information, poor definition of property rights, external costs and external 
benefits, monopoly power and public goods. Many of these are relevant to the 
petroleum sector and therefore could justify the establishment of NOCs. For example, 
the long value chain and complex technology used by the petroleum sector makes it 
very difficult for external stakeholder to access information and to interpret it, resulting 
in high entry barriers and preventing the market from functioning well. Additionally, 
high external cost incur, due to the social and environmental impact related to petroleum 
activities. Furthermore, the capital-intensive and pipeline-bound nature of this sector 
makes it prone to natural monopoly. Finally, the security of supply or demand being 
public goods often justifies government intervention in the sector. 
Keynesian economics also argues for government intervention in the economy with the 
16 Parkin, M., Powell, M., & Matthews, K. (1998). Economics (4 ed. ): Pearson Education Limited. 
p. 270-288 
"' Ibid. p286 
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focus on the role of governments for managing inflation, employment and economic 
fluctuation. The proponents of the Keynesian economics argue that natural employment 
rate determined solely by the market is below the rate which is optimal for a country. 
Therefore, government intervention is needed to maintain a higher employment rate 
although it may be accompanied by a higher inflation rate. To press their claim, they 
posit that the need to curb inflation is less important than the need to increase 
employment. Meanwhile, they argue that the natural macroeconomic fluctuations are 
harmful for economic well-being. Therefore, they believe that governments are 
"knowledgeable and capable enough to improve upon the free market", for example, by 
maintaining a high but stable inflation rate, governments can reduce unemployment rate 
and increase the total well-being in the economy. ' 18 Keynesian economics was very 
influential during the 1950s and 1960s, and many policymakers in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") countries adopted this ideology 
and "nationalisation of public utilities and industries" were employed as instruments of 
economic development. ' 1 
The theory of "structuralism" focuses on the differentiation of nations and therefore the 
18 Blinder, A. S. Keynesian Economics The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics Retrieved 17 Jan, 2007, 
from http: //www. econlib. org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics. html#biography. 
19 Mankiw, N. G. New Keynesian Economics [Electronic Version]. The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics. Retrieved 17th Jan, 2007 from 
http: //www. econlib. org/LIBRARY/Enc/NewKeynesianEconomics. html. Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil 
Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet Journal(14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from 
http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/joumal/htmINoll4/Vol14_10. pdf. Blinder, A. S. Keynesian Economics The 
Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics Retrieved 17 Jan, 2007, from 
http: //www. econlib. org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics. html#biography. 
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asymmetry of impact of free market. 120 Contrary to the mainstream economic theories, 
this theory argues that the free market does not necessarily diminish national differences 
and furthermore claims that empirical practice has proved the free market to be less 
effective for certain countries. 121 It also asserts that the efficiency gain through the use 
of free market may not be allocated equally among different countries, thereby 
increasing rather than decreasing differences between them. The theory also tries to 
justify government intervention in developing countries by arguing that such 
international economic order could further weaken these countries. This perception of 
developing countries against the then existing international economic order greatly 
influenced their national strategies, and government actions, to build their own 
capacities rather than rely on foreigners. 122 The ideology of structuralism is pertinent in 
the petroleum industry due to the gap between "corporate optimisation" undertaken by 
IOCs and "local optimisation" pursued by producing countries, and as a result, state 
participation "has emerged as a technique of securing national optimisation". 123 
Nationalism is a special form of "structuralism" which is commonly found in 
developing countries that take a defensive position due to weak skills, technologies and 
120 Linde, C. V. D. (2000). The State and the International Oil Market: Competition and the Changing 
Ownership of Crude Oil Assets: Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 36. 
121 Fishlow, A. (1989). Inequality Between Nations. In J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman (Eds. ), 
Economic development (pp. xii, 350). New York ; London: W. W. Norton. 
122 Linde, C. V. D. (2000). The State and the International Oil Market: Competition and the Changing 
Ownership of Crude Oil Assets: Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 36 
123 Applewhite, V. (1982). State Participation in the British Oil Industry: the BNOC. Dundee: University of 
Dundee. p21-23 
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regulatory capacities. 124 For these countries, nationalism is a measure to address the 
negative asymmetry of the impact of free market. 125 However, nationalism in theory, 
may not justify NOCs, since direct outcome of nationalism is nationalisation of assets 
and resources. It is the joint outcome of nationalism and lack of domestic private 
capacity that causes the establishment of NOCs. 126 Further discussion on capacity shall 
be presented in section 3.3.4. The ideology of sovereign sanctity is an extreme form of 
nationalism. This ideology believes that oil is a sacred treasure of a country and neither 
foreigners nor private domestic players should be permitted to own or make decisions 
over it. 
NOCs are also a result of socialist thinking, according to which collective interest is 
considered to be higher than individual interest, and social equity more important than 
efficiency. Collective ownership forms the core of socialism requiring key aspects of the 
economy to be kept under state control. 127 This justifies NOCs in FSU, China, and 
124 Taveme, B. (1999). Petroleum, Industry and Governments - An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics and Government Policies: Kluwer Law International. p. 81. Developing countries greet "the 
international oil companies with mixed feelings. On the one hand, they expect that international oil groups to 
help them generate wealth through the exploitation of the resource; and on the other hand they fear that the 
western oil companies will try to interfere and meddle in the domestic political situation and exploit the 
country through an unfair split of profits. " 
125 Noreng, 0. (2001). The New Balance of Private and Public Interests in the Restructuring of the 
Petroleum Industry- a European Perspective. The Journal of Energy and Development 25(2), 187-202. 
P. 190-191 
126 Taverne, B. (1999). Petroleum, Industry and Governments - An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics and Government Policies: Kluwer Law International. p. 81. Stevens, P. (2004). "National Oil 
Companies: Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP 
Internet Journal (14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from 
http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/J*oumal/htm[Noll4Noll 4_10. pdf. p. 6 
127 "Socialism, " as the American Socialist Daniel De Leon defined it, "is that social system under which the 
necessaries of production are owned, controlled and administered by the people, for the people, and under 
which, accordingly, the cause of political and economic despotism having been abolished, class rule is at 
end. That is socialism, nothing short of that. " 
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India. 128 Another example is Algeria, which envisaged socialism through its NOC 
Sonatrach'. 129 Traces of socialist influence can also be found in western countries in the 
1960s, believing that "the Soviet planning system was a promising mechanism to 
mobilise the resources of an economy to promote growth". 130 This trend influenced the 
establishment of NOCs in many OECD countries. 131 
The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR") and the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 led to authoritarian socialism being increasingly replaced by 
democracy, capitalism, and free market ideology around the world, 132 though socialist 
rhetoric still survives in some countries. This is illustrated by the current "socialist 
revolution" and re-nationalisation of the oil sector pursued by the President Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela. However, it is arguable whether the Venezuela's government 
believed in socialism or whether it was a convenient excuse for the government to 
nationalise and regain control over the sector. '33 
128 Friedman, T. L. (2005). The World Is Flat: A Brief History Of The Twenty-first Century, Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux. p. 50. ONGC. ONGC: History Retrieved 14 Jan, 2007, from http: //www. ongcindia. com/history. asp. 
ONGC. (2004). "ONGC road show slides. " Retrieved 14Jan, 2007, from 
www. ongcindia. com/iinvestor celVONGC_Roadshow_Feb%2023. pdf. 
129 Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet Journal 
(14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/joumal/htm[Nol14Nol14_I0. pdf 
130 Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet 
Journal (14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from 
http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/jjoumal/htmINoll4Noll4_10. pdf. Linde, C. V. D. (2000). The State and 
the International Oil Market: Competition and the Changing Ownership of Crude Oil Assets, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. p. 27. 
131 Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet 
Journal (14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from 
http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/joumal/htmiNoll4Noll4-lO. pdf 
132 Friedman, T. L. (2005). The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux. p. 49 
133 Judge, N. H. a. E. (2007). Venezuelan Currency Dives as Chavez Plots Nationalisation. The Times. 
London: 32. 
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3.3.1.2 Ideologies supporting commercialisation of NOCs 
The major ideology supporting commercialisation of NOCs is the free market ideology, 
which redefined the role of government in national economy. As has been analysed in 
section 2.2, the free market ideology was supported by the IMF, World Bank and the 
Chicago school, representing the so called "Washington consensuses" and underpinned 
commercialisation of many NOCs in 1990s. 1 34 Additionally, more theories have been 
developed since 1970, which argue that the private sector out performs the public sector 
in keeping costs low and in being innovative due to the existence of soft incentives, and 
incomplete contracts in the public sector. 13' Therefore the role of governments "should 
be limited to setting framework, within which the scope of market forces would be 
maximised". 136 Other theoretical developments such as the P-A theory further 
challenged the role of governments as shareholders. 
According to these schools of thought, not only fields such as natural resources and 
infrastructure, traditionally occupied by state owned enterprises, but also fields such as 
prisons and education should be commercialised under proper regulations formulated by 
government. Even in fields where natural monopoly prevails, such as grid bound 
134 Stevens, P. (1998). Strategic Positioning in the Oil Industry: Trends and Options. In P. Stevens (Ed. ), 
Strategic Positioning in the Oil Industry (pp. 1-22): The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and 
Research. p. 13. McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, 
R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries 
(pp. 184-204). Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. p. 186 
135 Shleifer, A. (1998). State Versus Private Ownership. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4), 133-150. 
p. 137. "When assets are publicly owned, the public manager has relatively weak incentives to make 
investment in both cost reduction or innovates they only gets a fraction of the return. " 
136 Helm, D. (2004). Energy, the state, and the market: British energy policy since 1979 (Rev. ed. ). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 14 
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industries of gas and power, market forces and the commercial sector are believed to be 
in a better position to cut costs and maximise efficiency under effective governmental 
regulation. 137 These ideologies are reflected in the privatisation of NOCs in the UK. 138 
Additionally, there were new theories based on empirical observations and theoretical 
analysis of the nature of NOCs as agents of governments, taking non-commercial 
responsibilities. ' 39 It was gradually realised that the co-existence of commercial and 
non-commercial responsibilities caused inefficiency because of the "conflict of identity 
effect" and the "multi-function effect". '4° 
For NOCs with administrative and regulatory power, the "conflict of identity" effect 
exists as these NOCs are both "game players" and "referees", and could therefore use 
their power to pursue benefits for themselves. 14' This in turn could foster corruption 
and nepotism, and have a detrimental impact on public interest and on the overall 
performance of NOCs. 142 For example, a parliamentary investigation revealed that two 
137 Shleifer, A. (1998). State Versus Private Ownership. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4), 133-150. 
p. 135-141. It was claim that 'the business of government is not the government of business' and "a 
government could print a good edition of Shakespeare's works, but it could not get them written". Business, 
E. (2007). EU Vows Action to Boost Energy Market Competition [Electronic Version]. Retrieved 12th Jan 
2007 from http: //www. eubusiness. com/Consumer/1168434027.82/. 
138 Noreng, 0. (2001). The New Balance of Private and Public Interests in the Restructuring of the 
Petroleum Industry- a European Perspective. The Journal of Energy and Development 25(2), 187-202. 
p. 194. The US administration's influence of oil prices: showed how state interests interfere in the oil market, 
even under governments with an ideological belief in the market 
139 Sandvold, T. (2001). Groupings of National Oil Companies. the oxford energy forum, 57,12. 
140 Bai, C. -E., Li, D. D., Tao, Z., & Wang, Y. (2000). A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform. Journal 
of Comparative Economics 28(4), 716-738. 
141 McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski 
& A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 
184-204). Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. 
142 Ibid 
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French NOCs Total and Elf had tailored public policy to "their own benefit", sacrificing 
the interests of French consumers in 1970s. 143 
For NOCs with social and economic responsibilities, there is a "multi-task effect" when 
financial resources and managerial capacities of NOCs are drained and managements 
are distracted. For example, a large amount of money from NOCs in Gulf countries has 
been channelled towards infrastructure such as highways, telecommunications, housing, 
education and medical care. 144 The treatment of NOCs as a cash cow, as the Pemex 
case shows, damages the long-term development of the petroleum sector and causes the 
decline of reserves and production levels in the country. 145 As a result, NOCs are 
running out of capital to invest as they are not properly compensated by their 
governments for their non-commercial responsibilities. 146 The existence of these 
non-commercial responsibilities also makes it difficult for the government to measure 
the performance of NOCs, and therefore results in NOCs with insufficient check and 
balance mechanisms, which has a further negative impact on the performance of NOCs 
and push goverment to reform. 
143 Noreng, 0. (2001). Liberalisation, Integration, and Specialisation: the Restructuring of the European Oil 
Industry Journal of Energy and Development, 26(1), 35-54. p. 36. 
144 AI-Mazeedi, W. (1998). 'Back-door' Privatisation Initiatives in the Gulf: An Inadequate Step in the Right 
Direction. In P. Stevens (Ed. ), Strategic Positioning in the Oil industry (pp. 100-116): The Emirates Centre for 
Strategic Studies and Research. 
145 Gallardo, J. R. F. (2003). Fiscal Liabilities and their Influence on the Performance of a State Oil 
Company: the Case of PEMEX. Unpublished Research paper University of Dundee, Dundee. p. 31. "Heavy 
financial burden 'has left the company without resources to make its own strategic investments. The final 
effect has been a significant decrease in the proved oil and gas reserves" 
, 46 Gallardo, J. R. F. (2003). Fiscal Liabilities and their Influence on the Performance of a State Oil 
Company: the Case of PEMEX. Unpublished Reserch paper University of Dundee, Dundee. p. 31. 
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3.3.2 Domestic political situation 
As important providers of revenue, foreign currency and employment, NOCs are 
normally a battlefield for vested interest groups competing for influence. Political 
struggle among them and changes in domestic political situation, such as changes of 
political regime, and in the nature and agenda of ruling parties, are common drivers for 
NOC reform. 
The commercialisation of NOCs may be a result of political struggle among vested 
interest groups, including central or regional politicians, bureaucrats, labour unions, 
ambitious senior managers in NOCs, and the public, whose cause may be championed 
by the media. In many cases, the contents of proposals for reforming NOCs are an 
outcome of complicated interactions, conflicts and compromises between interested 
parties. Frequently, NOC reform is a central government response to threats from NOCs 
behaving like a "state within a state", with too much power and ambition, or from state 
or provincial government seeking power to control the revenue. 
For example, the establishment of the Chinese NOC Sinopec in 1980s is an example of 
a central government attempting to wrest control of the profit generated in the oil 
refining sector from provincial governments. The Chinese government also opted out of 
a reform proposal in 1998 which envisaged the breaking of the NOCs into a number of 
regional NOCs. The reason for this was to retain power in the hands of central 
government rather than letting it devolve to provincial governments through their 
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control or influence on the regional NOCs. 147 The commercialisation of Statoil in the 
1980s and 1990s was partially because the Norwegian government realised the scale of 
the power accumulated by Statoil through its easy access to resources and its close 
relationship to local communities as the largest employer. 148 In Malaysia, the political 
pattern, with power focused in the hands of the prime minister, resulted in the specific 
petroleum regime where controlling power lay in the hands of the prime minister in 
order to prevent other ministries and local state governments from intervening. '49 
Changes in the nature of the government also remain a major driver of NOCs reforms, 
especially when different political regimes hold completely different economic policies. 
Arguably, a more transparent government with a good governance record faces more 
political pressure from the economic performance of a country and therefore has less 
incentive to control NOCs and is more likely to commercialise its NOCs. This is 
demonstrated to some extent in the commercialisation of NOCs by almost all 
democratic industrialised countries such as Canada, Britain and Norway. On the other 
hand a less transparent government may be more reluctant to commercialise its NOCs, 
in order to seek political patronage or other interest through NOCs. ' 50 
"' Nolan, P. (2001). China and the Global Business Revolution: Palgrave. p. 446 
148 Richardson, J. J. (1981). Problems of Controlling Public Sector Agencies: the Case of Norwegian Oil 
Policy. Political Studies, 29(1), 35-50. 
149 Mehden, F. R. V. d., & Troner, A. (2007 ). Petronas: A National Oil Company with an International Vision: 
The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. 
150 Lahn, G., Marcel, V., Mitchell, J., Myers, K., & Stevens, P. (2007). Report on Good Governance of the 
National Petroleum Sector. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
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Changes in the agenda of ruling parties also drive reforms of NOCs. For example, 
during the low oil price stage in 1990s, countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Venezuela all employed a commercially driven petroleum policy, which emphasised on 
attracting foreign direct investment in order to explore their vast resources. However, 
under the high oil price scenario since 2000, rich with petroleum revenue, these 
countries all started to pursue a less commercially driven petroleum policy and sought 
to use the petroleum sector as a tool to achieve certain foreign relations goals or to 
reinforce the country's regional and global influence. For example, the determination of 
the Russian government to use petroleum exports to consolidate its domestic and 
international influence is part of the rationale for the President Putin's administration to 
renationalise the petroleum sector and to reinforce government control over Gazprom 
and Roseneft. 15' 
3.3.3 Domestic economic situation 
The economic situation of a country and its petroleum sector is also an important factor, 
changes in which often drive NOC reforms. 
The petroleum sector is part of the national economy, to a large extent influenced by the 
general economic policy and overall situation of the latter. A country's overall economic 
policy influences the way in which the government structures and manages its 
petroleum sector. For example, the globalisation and free market policies adopted in 
151 Norling, N. (2007). China and Russia: Partners with Tensions. Policy Perspectives, 4(1), 33-48. 
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some countries are important factors influencing the nature of NOCs and their reforms. 
China's entry in the WTO played an important role in increasing the pace of 
commercialisation of the NOCs. 152 
The scope and nature of the economy, the rate of economic growth, dependency of 
domestic economy on petroleum sector, and role of markets in the economy are 
important factors driving NOC reforms. Therefore, it is observed that NOCs are often 
under reforms when countries run into extreme economic difficulties. 
Commercialisation of NOCs could be one of the measures to alleviate the financial 
burden of a country. However, some countries with limited economic resources, may 
seek to nationalise NOCs in order to control and utilise their limited resource on high 
priority projects. The organisation of the petroleum sector under strict government 
control during Cultural Revolution in China illustrates this. 
On the other hand, changes in the economic situation of the petroleum sector also 
frequently drive reforms. The co-relationship between the petroleum sector and the 
national economy lies in the ability of the petroleum sector to provide fuel, foreign 
currency, revenue, profit, employment and other services to the government. The higher 
the contribution of the petroleum sector to the GDP, revenue, fuel, and foreign currency 
earnings and other contributions, the higher is the likelihood of governments choosing 
152 Qiu, B. (2000). Chinese Petroleum sector challenging WTO. Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing 
House. 
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to control the sector through NOCs. The most important parameters impacting the 
importance of the petroleum sector in the national economy are proven reserves, 
production capacity, production cost, domestic consumption level, domestic price policy, 
nature of the international petroleum sector, and the level of international price. 153 
The proven reserve and production capacity of a country are influenced by the resource 
endowment and past investment in production capacity in the country. An NOC in a 
country with a depleting resource base faces stronger commercial pressure. It also 
hinders future expansion of NOCs and their survival, bringing higher pressure on them 
to seek changes. The example of NOC reforms in China since the 1980s is partially 
caused by the depleting resource base in the country. This was also the case in Brazil 
and Indonesia in 1980s and 1990S. 154 
The cost of production is another core factor deciding the importance of the petroleum 
sector in the domestic economy. The higher the cost of extracting and producing oil, the 
lower the amount of the rent realised, and the greater is the pressure governments face 
to reform NOCs. Cost is not only a function of the quality of resource, but also a 
function of operational and investment performance of a company. 
The consumption level and pricing policy, especially subsidy policy of a country, are 
153 The Economist, All this and Oil too (2007). The Economist, PP 57-58. 
154 Reduction of production in Mexico also drove the recent government initiative to reform their petroleum 
sector. 
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also important factors influencing the petroleum sector. Many developing countries 
especially those with petroleum production of their own, choose to subsidise their oil 
prices under political pressure to satisfy the needs of the poor, despite the the 
unsustainable nature of the policy. 155 On the one hand, the implementation of such 
policy measures requires the support of NOCs, especially when government lacks 
regulatory capacity to enforce the policy on its own. Thus drive government to remain 
control over NOCs. On the other hand, the scale of subsidy is a financial burden on 
government and NOCs. The higher the consumption level and extent of subsidy, the 
higher pressure the government and NOCs bear, and therefore face higher pressure to 
commercialise. This explains why commercialisation taken place more frequently in 
countries such as China, Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia when domestic consumption 
and subsidy eroded a large percentage of economic rent. Even in oil rich country such as 
Iran, the government started to increase the price of oil products for similar reasons. 
For a country exporting their oil, the domestic economic situation is also influenced by 
the nature of the international petroleum market and the price level prevailing in the 
market. The more developed the international petroleum market; the lower is the 
transaction cost, and the less likelihood of the market being manipulated. "' As a result, 
155 Heaton, C. (2005). Paying the Price. Petroleum Economist (January). 
'56 Parkin, M., Powell, M., & Matthews, K. (1998). Economics (4 ed. ): Pearson Education Limited. 
p. 270-288. The concept of perfect market could be defined a market with competition and no market failure, 
which could be defined as'a market characterised by a large number of buyers and sellers, who are rational 
and aiming at utility-maximisation; market is transparent and information are available to everybody; and 
competition is open with no entry barrier, and there is no collusion among firms in the industry'. James, T. 
(2007). Energy Markets: Price Risk Management and Trading John Wiley & Sons Ltd. p. 91 
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both producer and consumer countries will have higher tendency to employ market 
measures in achieving their special concerns. Lack of a well-developed and 
well-regulated international petroleum market justified the large-scale establishment of 
NOCs in 1960s to 1970s and the commercialisation of NOCs since 1980s. 
In addition to general level of development of the international petroleum market, the 
specific international price level is also a critical driver for NOC reforms. High price 
level triggers a tendency to nationalise and a low price level triggers a tendency to 
commercialise. This is because, under a high price scenario, there is more rent generated 
by the petroleum sector in producer countries, which makes NOCs more attractive to be 
controlled. Meanwhile, for governments of consumer countries, higher prices imply a 
higher concern for security of supply. As a result, governments tend to have NOCs as 
their agents to pursue security of supply. By the same token, when oil price level is low, 
there is a higher possibility for both producers and consumer countries to conduct 
reforms and to commercialise their NOCs. 
3.3.4 National capacity 
There is another set of factors that are important in driving reforms of NOCs. To 
simplify, the thesis calls them national capacity. The national capacity of a country 
could be defined as a combination of (1) government regulatory capacity in terms of 
regulation of general economy and regulation of the petroleum sector; (2) general or 
petroleum specific market capacity; and (3) general or petroleum specific industrial 
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capacity. 157 The national capacity of a country is an important factor to drive reforms of 
many NOCs because the establishment of NOCs in the first place is often caused 
partially by a lack of national capacity. Most of the non-commercial responsibilities of 
NOCs introduced in section 2.2 could in theory be achieved by indirect approaches such 
as laws and regulations, through the actions of government agencies and through 
activities of private sectors and the market. 158 However, due to the lack of all or some 
capacities, in many countries the model of the commercialised and liberalised sector is 
perceived to be inappropriate. 1 59 As a result, NOCs are established by governments to 
conduct certain non-commercial responsibilities when the governments lack regulatory 
or administrative capacity, or when the private industry lacks commercial capacity, or 
when the market lacks the capacity to function effectively. As countries acquire relevant 
capacity they can gradually reform their NOCs accordingly. 160 
Government regulatory capacity means laws, regulations, policies, institutional capacity 
and qualified staff to regulate. There are two types of capacity relevant to NOCs, 
namely the general economic regulation capacity and specific capacity to regulate the 
157 Al-Kasim, F. (2006). Managing Petroleum Recourses: The "Norwegian Model" in a broad Perspective 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. p. 27,139. The concept of 'enterprise capacity' is defined in the book as 
the capacity of a given country or a commercial entity to mobilise institutional, financial and technological 
resources to make the best out of a given set of resource and market expectations. United Nations Centre 
for Natural Resources, Energy and Transport Dept of Technical Co-operation for Development (1980). State 
Petroleum Enterprises in Developing Countries. New York: Published for the United Nations by Pergamon 
Press. p. 5 
, 58 Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1998). The Grabbing Hand, Government Pathologies and Their Cures. 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. p. 2 
159Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet Journal 
(14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/journal/htmINoll4Noll4_10. pdf. 
p. 5,7 
160 Bentham, R. W., & Smith, W. G. R. (1986). State Petroleum Corporations: Corporate Forms, Powers and 
Control Dundee, Scotland: The Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies, University of Dundee. p. 3 
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petroleum sector. Many developing countries lack this capacity due to insufficiency of 
relevant laws, regulations, institutional structure and qualified staff to regulate both their 
economy and their petroleum sector efficiently. For example, the capacity to collect and 
interpret economic information, and the capacity to asses tax are important aspects for 
governments. 161 Owing to a lack of such capacity in some developing countries, 
governments are constrained to keep NOCs as information and tax collectors as well as 
training and local linkage providers. NOCs can help their governments to build such 
capacity through "learning by doing". NOCs can also act as windows for governments 
to acquire key information on the industry, gain insight into the industry, and to develop 
human skills to analyse and interpret information, necessary for operating and 
regulating the petroleum industry. 162 It is argued that the bargaining power of 
government over private oil companies has a negative correlation with the amount of 
information involved in the operation. Lack of information on the part of host 
government places the government in a weak-negotiating position. 163 Governments 
may launch reforms to remove these mandates from NOCs once these capacity 
constraints in governments have been addressed. 
161 Although this practice often accompanies with high economic cost, but for a government with weak 
capacity, there may not have much choices. 
'62 Grayson, L. E. (1981). National oil companies. Chichester: Wiley. p. 10. Noreng, 0. (2001). The New 
Balance of Private and Public Interests in the Restructuring of the Petroleum Industry- a European 
Perspective. The Journal of Energy and Development 25(2), 187-202. p. 190. Bentham, R. W., & Smith, W. 
G. R. (1986). State Petroleum Corporations: Corporate Forms, Powers and Control Dundee, Scotland: The 
Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies, University of Dundee. p. 5 
163 Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet 
Journal (14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, from 
http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/joumal/html/Voll4/Voll4_10. pdf. p. 7. Not only was the split of revenue in 
favour of private companies but also the information will be held inside the company making it even more 
difficult to regulate. This creates the problem of information asymmetry. 
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Rich developed countries normally do not have problems with general economic 
regulation capacity. However, they may lack sector specific capacity in the early stage 
of their petroleum sector due to lack of experience. NOCs are frequently used as a tool 
to build these capacities gradually and acquire information. 164 This was the case in 
Norway when oil was first found in the North Sea Continental Shelf 165 For developed 
countries, once the training process is finished and relevant regulation capacity is 
developed, NOCs may not be necessary any longer. Very often, they will be privatised 
or commercialised and made more similar to private players. 
General or petroleum related market capacity refers to the development of a market 
system for allocating capital and commodities. A well-developed market system should 
be well-regulated involving a large number of players. It discovers price in an efficient 
and transparent way, reflecting the supply and demand, and is hard to be manipulated. 
In many countries, during the transition from the non-market economy to market 
economy, the lack of market capacity, especially in terms of laws, regulations, 
institutional capacity to monitor the role of market, lack qualified staff, and lack of 
market volume, may justify the use of NOCs by government to allocate resources and to 
164 Noreng, 0. (2001). The New Balance of Private and Public Interests in the Restructuring of the 
Petroleum Industry- a European Perspective. The Journal of Energy and Development 25(2), 187-202. 
p. 192. The petroleum industry by its nature is difficult to be regulated given the fact that the petroleum 
industry is a vertically integrated industry with sophisticated technology and complex information, especially 
for an inexperienced government lack of qualified staff. United Nations Centre for Natural Resources, 
Energy and Transport Dept of Technical Co-operation for Development (1980). State Petroleum Enterprises 
in Developing Countries. New York: Published for the United Nations by Pergamon Press. p. 5 
165 Ibid p. 6 
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extend monitoring and administrative functions. 
Petroleum related industrial capacity means the productive capacity, investment capacity, 
financing capacity and marketing capacity of the petroleum sector. Productive capacity 
emphasises on the ability of petroleum sector in reducing operational cost, and investing, 
financing and marketing capacities emphasises on the ability of petroleum sector in 
making good investment, marketing and financing decisions. By having NOCs, a 
country can train domestic employees with suitable skills to foster industrial capacity. 166 
The effectiveness of the industrial capacity a petroleum sector could develop is highly 
dependent on the extent of autonomy granted to it by the government and on the 
effectiveness of supporting system in facilitating the capacity building. For example, the 
domestic petroleum sector in the FSU was relatively well equipped with productive 
capacity, but had poor investment, marketing and financing capacity due to lack of 
autonomy in these areas. 
To conclude, NOC reforms are normally driven by a variety of factors as illustrated in 
figure 3-1, ranging from more ideological factors to the left of the diagram and more 
practical factors to the right. 
166 Noreng, 0. (2001). Liberalisation, Integration, and Specialisation: the Restructuring of the European Oil 
Industry Journal of Energy and Development, 26(1), 35-54. p. 36. Stevens, P. (2004). National Oil 
Companies: Good or Bad-a Literature Survey. CEPMLP Internet Journal (14) Retrieved 02 April, 2008, 
from http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/joumal/html/VoI14/Voll4_10. pdf. p. 6. United Nations Centre for 
Natural Resources, Energy and Transport Dept of Technical Co-operation for Development (1980). State 
Petroleum Enterprises in Developing Countries. New York: Published for the United Nations by Pergamon 
Press. "there are also the ideology that big is beautiful in the oil sector which driven governments to have 
their own NOCs when private sector lacks the capacity. " 
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Figure 3-1 Drivers of NOC reform 2.3 
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3.4 The measures of NOC reforms 
Due to different drivers of reforms, and also specific cultural, political, social and 
economic settings differ widely among countries, the reforms measures employed by 
governments are also diverse. The aim of this section is to examine the major elements 
of reform measures used by governments to enhance their regulatory framework, to 
liberalise their markets and to commercialise their NOCs. The thesis views NOC 
reforms from a broad perspective, covering all the major reforms measure that changes 
the relationship between government and NOCs, including reform of regulatory 
framework, reform of industrial structure, reform of pricing and distribution system, and 
reform of fiscal and financial regimes. 
3.4.1 The reform of regulatory framework 
The regulatory framework of a country includes the government's institutional structure 
in terms of regulating and governing the petroleum sector. It normally includes the 
cabinet of a country, general ministries such as Ministry of finance, and specific 
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petroleum ministries and agencies that may comprise one specialised ministry to make 
policies of the petroleum sector exclusively or together with other sectors such as 
mining and energy. It is also common practice to have an independent entity or an entity 
within the ministry to provide technical and professional support or regulate the 
enforcement of policies or collection of information. 167 The Norwegian regulatory 
framework is believed to have been modelled on these lines. 
The core measures for reforming regulatory and administrative frameworks include the 
divesting of policy-making, regulatory, administrative and social functions from NOCs 
and to put them under relevant government ministries or independent regulators, so as 
to address the "multi-task effect" and "conflict of identity effect" of NOCs. According 
to a joint study of UNDP and World Bank statistics, during 1990s, among 49 sampled 
countries with upstream oil and gas sector, 31% had established an independent 
regulator. 168 
A successful reform of regulatory framework has to be supported by the enhancement of 
respective government regulatory capacity, so as to ensure the new regulatory 
framework functions effectively. Although it is easy to just establish new agencies or 
167Taveme, B. (1999). Petroleum, Industry and Governments - An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics and Government Policies: Kluwer Law International. p. 92. AI-Kasim, F. (2006). Managing 
Petroleum Recourses: The 'Norwegian Model' in a broad Perspective Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
p. 173. Many claims that the entity should be independent if capacity permits, as it will avoid the negative 
impact of petroleum ministry to manipulate information for their own benefit. 
168 ESMAP (1999). Global Energy Sector Reform in Developing Countries: a Scorecard, Joint UNDP/ World 
Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme. p. 19 
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transfer functions of NOCs to existing government agencies, the building up of capacity, 
such as drafting laws, regulations and training qualified staff, takes a long time and are 
of great importance for the effectiveness of reforms. This is especially true for 
developing countries with weak regulatory capacities. 169 
3.4.2 The reform of the industrial structure 
The reform of the industrial structure of the petroleum sector includes reforms that 
change the nature, structure, and NOCs' mandates or domestic or international private 
entities operating in the petroleum sector. Measures for reforming the industrial 
structure are highly varied. Common measures include commercialisation and the 
introduction of competition. The former measure is mainly for the purpose of removing 
non-commercial responsibilities of NOCs in order to address the "multi-task effect" and 
"conflict of identity effect" of NOCs. It was often conducted as a package together with 
the reforms of regulatory framework as analysed in section 3.4.1. The latter measure is 
mainly for the purpose of putting NOCs in a competitive environment, to address the 
negative impact of monopoly on performance. According to the United Nation 
Development Programme and the World Bank study cited in the above section, during 
1990s, 67% of the 49 sampled countries having upstream oil and gas sector had 
corporatised their NOCs. 170 
169 Ascher, W., & Healy, R. (1990). Natural Resource Policymaking in Developing Countries: Environment, 
Economic Growth, and Income Distribution: Duke University Press, Durham and London 1990. p. 3-4,160 
10 ESMAP (1999). Global Energy Sector Reform in Developing Countries: a Scorecard, Joint UNDP/ World 
Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme. p. 19 
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3.4.2.1 Commercialisation 
Commercialisation is a common measure in reforming NOCs. Commercialisation is a 
process where non-commercial responsibilities are removed from NOCs and to be 
transferred to governments or other entities. The measure is normally conducted along 
with relevant reforms in the regulatory framework. 
Most frequently, the commercialisation entails corporatisation, to remove regulatory and 
administrative functions from NOCs, and further commercialisation includes removal of 
other social and economic liabilities from NOCs. The corporatisation measure normally 
involves changing of legal status of an NOC from a ministry of the government into a 
corporation with more autonomy and a higher responsibility towards profitability. 
However, corporatised NOCs may still take social or economic responsibilities. 
Privatisation is also a specific measure to commercialise NOCs by removing the 
involvement of the state in NOCs through complete or partial divestment. As has been 
discussed in section 2.3, governments, by nature, are not good at cost management and 
innovation, tasks that are better performed by commercial and private sectors. 171 
Therefore, it is argued that that the private sector out-performs the public sector in 
keeping costs low and being innovative due to the existence of soft incentives and 
incomplete contracts in the public sector. '72 As a result, NOCs should be privatised to 
'' Shleifer, A. (1998). State Versus Private Ownership. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4), 133-150. 
172 Ibid. p. 137. "When assets are publicly owned, the public manager has relatively weak incentives to 
make investment in both cost reduction or innovates they only gets a fraction of the return. " 
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accept capital injection from the private sector, to provide better incentives and increase 
the accountability of managers, and to provide them "with clearer and unequivocal 
targets" in order to bring in investment and operational efficiency. 173 Not all 
privatisation is complete. In practice, owing to its controversial nature or difficulties in 
privatising NOCs, many governments choose to partially privatise their NOCs by 
selling part of the NOCs to private players while generally retaining a dominant 
share. 174 In some countries, privatisation is conducted privately by striking of deals 
between the government and the final buyer. In others, privatisation is conducted 
through an open process, when NOCs are partially or fully sold through public listing. 
3.4.2.2 Competition and restructure 
Introduction of competition is another commonly used measure for NOC reform, 
particularly during the 1990s. 175 Competition is an important element of free-market 
ideology, on the strength of the argument that perfect competition delivers efficiency. 176 
It is believed that "lack of competition is a key factor for poor performance of 
enterprises in developing countries' and competition brings in competence". 177 In 
173 Stevens, P. (1998). Energy Privatisation: Sensitivities and Realities. Journal of Energy and 
Development, 23(1), 1-14. p2-3 
174 Economist. (2007). Running Just to Stand Still. Economist 385(8560), 77-78. Stevens, P. (1998). 
Energy Privatisation: Sensitivities and Realities. Journal of Energy and Development, 23(1), 1-14. pl 
175 Jr., H. Q. P. (2004). Institutional Designs and Regulatory Reforms in the Energy Industries. Oil, Gas and 
Energy Law Intelligence, 11(3). p. 386. Noreng, 0. (2001). Liberalisation, Integration, and Specialisation: the 
Restructuring of the European Oil Industry Journal of Energy and Development, 26(1), 35-54. p. 36. 
176 Parkin, M., Powell, M., & Matthews, K. (1998). Economics (4 ed. ): Pearson Education Limited. 
P. 286-288 
177 McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski 
& A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 
184-204). Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. p. 188. Aharoni, Y., & Ascher, W. (1998). 
Restructuring the Arrangements between Government and State Enterprises in the Oil and Mining Sectors. 
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contrast a competitive environment could foster realisation of the potential of an 
organisation and measures could also be taken to reduce cost, improve technology, 
managerial skills, and to make appropriate decisions on strategic and operational issues. 
The lack of competition is claimed to be one of the key factors for the 
under-performance of many NOCs, as many of them hold a monopoly over high quality 
reserves, exploitation rights, rights over transportation infrastructure, and domestic 
markets. 1' Monopoly power ensures income, and thus NOCs and their staff do not 
have the incentive or pressure to improve performance in such situation. 
Measures for bringing in competition are highly variable in different countries. Some 
governments split their NOC or adjust the functions of NOCs in order to enhance 
competition among these NOCs. Others enhance competition by allowing domestic or 
international private players to participate in petroleum activities. 
Natural Resources Forum, 22(3), 201-213. p. 209. Stevens, P. (1998). Energy Privatisation: Sensitivities and 
Realities. Journal of Energy and Development, 23(1), 1-14. p. 3. Noreng, 0. (2001). Liberalisation, 
Integration, and Specialisation: the Restructuring of the European Oil Industry Journal of Energy and 
Development, 26(1), 35-54. p. 36 
178 McPherson, C. (2003). National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook. In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski 
& A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 
184-204). Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. Stretton, H., & Orchard, L. (1994). Public Goods, 
Public Enterprise, Public Choice: Theoretical Foundations of the Contemporary Attack on Government: 
Basingstoke : Macmillan. p. 92. Nicholls, T. (2005). "NOCs 1 -IOCs 0. " Petroleum Economist April: 6. Lack of 
external competition does not necessarily cause inefficiency. Competition is one of the incentives for NOCs 
and their staff to improve their performance but not the only incentive or motivation. Theoretically, an 
effective incentive mechanism, or monitor and control system may be more important than the form of 
monopoly or competition. For example there are companies with good cost and technology records such as 
Saudi Aramco who enjoy a monopoly position in Saudi Arabia. Oil industry experts said "the company is 
well run and efficient. Few, if any, IOCs are thought to be capable of doing a better job than Aramco when it 
comes to complex onshore oil projects'. 
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3.4.3 The liberalisation of the market system 
Liberalisation is the process by which government reduces its direct control in the 
economy and increases the autonomy of enterprises in participating in transactions as 
well as the role of market in allocating resources and determining prices. Competition, 
as discussed in the previous section, could be seen as a reflection of liberalisation from 
the firm's perspective, whilst liberalisation of market system could be seen from the 
perspective of pricing of petroleum and the rules governing flow of petroleum in an 
economy. The pricing system pertains to the methods for determination of prices in a 
country, whether by governments employing administrative means or by buyers and 
sellers in a free market operating in a robust regulatory environment. The distribution 
and allocation system comprises players and rules for allocating and distributing 
products, including natural gas, crude oil and oil products. The petroleum market 
system thus determines whether there are high barriers to entry of new players in 
relevant activities and whether products can be freely allocated. 179 
A liberalised and properly functioning market system provides an atmosphere 
conducive for efficient allocation of resources, investment and cost control and it thus a 
pre-requisite for commercialised NOCs to function efficiently. A liberalised market 
system is also critically co-related with fiscal regime. Where a government regulates the 
pricing system and artificially lowers or increases prices, these prices become either a 
179 Gupta, S., Clements, B., Fletcher, K., & Inchauste, G. (2003). Issues in Domestic Petroleum Pricing in 
Oil-Producing Countries In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and 
Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 383-415): International Monetary Fund. p. 402-408 
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financial burden or a privilege for the oil companies. However, a liberalised market 
system, though a desirable goal, is very difficult to achieve in developing countries due 
to strong opposition from the poor and the weak administrative capacity of 
governments. ' 80 
A government regulated price system is a major barrier to the introduction of a 
liberalised market system for petroleum in many developing countries. In these 
countries, the gradual removal of subsidies is a major measure of liberalisation. 
Pre-requisites for the liberalisation of allocation and distribution systems include the 
existence of enough players qualified for petroleum-related activities and the 
government's capacity to collect information and to regulate the market so that the 
market system is not prone to manipulation. '8' In many countries, before a fully 
liberalised market system is ready, direct control by governments may coexist with 
market forces and they combine to set prices and allocate resources. 
180 Gupta, S., Clements, B., Fletcher, K., & Inchauste, G. (2003). Issues in Domestic Petroleum Pricing in 
Oil-Producing Countries In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and 
Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 383-415): International Monetary Fund. p. 402 
181 Gupta, S., Clements, B., Fletcher, K., & Inchauste, G. (2003). Issues in Domestic Petroleum Pricing in 
Oil-Producing Countries In J. M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino (Eds. ), Fiscal Policy Formulation and 
Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (pp. 383-415): International Monetary Fund. p. 402-408. 
Mayorga-Alba, E. (1995). Deregulation and Reform of Petroleum Markets: From Monopolies to New 
Regulated Markets (No. 6): The World Bank Group. Chen, S. (2006). State-Regulated Marketisation: 
China's Oil Pricing Regime. Perspectives, 7(3), 151-172. "Market solutions only wreak chaos due to the 
petroleum markets underdevelopment in China. When market disorder arises, the government has to 
resort to administrative means. To get out of this vicious cycle, the government should focus on developing 
the oil market". 
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3.4.4 The reform of fiscal and financial regimes 
Reform of the fiscal regime is another major component of the reform of NOCs, which 
deals with the financial relationship between government and NOCs, and is a critically 
important part of commercialisation of NOCs. The concept of fiscal regime in this thesis 
is different from the conventional concepts of fiscal regime, which deals only with 
taxation. The fiscal regime in this thesis involves not only financial flow from NOCs to 
governments, such as taxation, profit submission, dividends, and other financial burdens, 
but also financial flow from governments to NOCs, such as capital injection, subsidy 
and other financial support from governments. Fiscal regime is a core incentive or 
disincentive in the performance of NOCs. As a result, it is a frequent target of NOC 
reforms. 
A good petroleum fiscal regime should be transparent, fair, efficient, and stable. 182 
However, it also has a high requirement for capacity of a country, especially the 
capacity of government to collect information and measure the performance of NOCs 
based on which tax is collected or fund is allocated. The government should also be well 
equipped to spot manipulation of accounting information by companies for tax reasons. 
As has been discussed in section 2.4.3, a liberalised market system is a pre-requisite for 
a good petroleum fiscal regime. This is because, an effective taxation system should 
focus on the economic rent generated, and therefore performance of NOCs has to be 
182 Johnston, D. (2003). International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis (1st ed. ). Tulsa, 
Oklahoma: PennWell Corporation. p. 57 
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measured by using price that implies fair value. 
To conclude, measures for reforming NOCs are focused mainly on two institutional 
structure aspects, namely regulatory framework and industrial structure. They are also 
focused on the market system and fiscal regime, which are rule-based aspects. There are 
complex interactions between these aspects that have been analysed in this section, 
including the interaction between fiscal and financial regime and market system. The 
above four aspects of reforms may be introduced as a package or individually, 
depending on the institutional setting of a country and the interplay of vested interest 
groups. 
3.5 The framework for analysing NOC reforms 
The aim of this section is to crystallise the analytical framework that will be employed 
for analysing the NOC reforms from the perspective of the relationship between NOCs 
and governments. This will be applied in the China case study in chapters 4-7 and could 
also be applied to analyse studies of general NOC reforms in other countries. The 
framework provides mechanisms for analysing three distinct elements of the process of 
NOC reforms, namely, the drivers, the measures and effectiveness. 
Analysis of the drivers of reforms would entail, in the first step, an analysis of a range 
of ideological and practical factors, as mentioned in section 3.3. The second step will 
involve an analysis of the implications of these drivers on the government and the 
85 
NOCs and analyses the major objectives of government in reforming NOCs. 
The second component of the analytical framework is designed to analyse the measures 
adopted by governments to reform NOCs. This component is divided into two principal 
steps, the first involving an analysis of the regulatory and industrial structures, the 
market structure including pricing and distributing systems, and the fiscal and financial 
regimes. Thereafter, the new P-A relationship between governments and NOCs 
established by NOC reforms are to be examined in the next step. 
The third component of the analytical framework is designed to analyse the 
effectiveness of the reform measures examined in the previous step. Due to the 
difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of NOC reforms using sufficient quantitative 
date, the thesis, as discussed in chapter 1 and 2, measures the effectiveness of reforms 
by examining the effectiveness of the new relationship between government and NOCs 
established by reforms. 
A pictorial representation of the design of the analytical framework is shown in figure 
3.1 
86 
Figure 3-1 Framework for the analysis of NOC reforms in China 
Part -1A Analyse changes, if any in 
- Economic and political ideologies; COMPONENT -I 
- Economic and political situations; Drivers of 
- Petroleum related factors; Reforms 
- National capacity. 
Part - IB Analyse implications of changes, if 
any, in Part - IA, on: 
- Governments and NOCs 
And analyse the objectives of reforms 
Part - IIA Analyse reform measures, targeting 
COMPONENT - II 
(wherever applicable): 
Reform - Regulatory framework 
Measures - Industrial structure 
- Market system (pricing and 
distribution systems) 
- Fiscal and financial regimes 
Part - IIB Analyse: 
- Interactions between government and 
NOCs in selecting reform measures; 
Nature of the new P-A relationship 
effected by reform measures (tasks, 
P-A problems and supporting system) 
COMPONENT - III 
Analyse effectiveness of reforms 
Effectiveness of measures, in terms of achieving specific 
Reform reform targets of the government by 
analysing the effectiveness of the new 
P-A relationship between NOCs and 
governments 
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4 NOC REFORMS IN CHINA-THE BACKGROUND STAGE 
(1949-1978) 
This chapter analyses the evolution of the petroleum sector in China from 1949 to 1978, 
when the modern petroleum industry in China was established and a new institutional 
arrangement was set up. It served as the background for later analysis of the creation of 
the NOCs and reforms of the NOCs in chapters 5-7. 
This chapter first analyses the general background of the petroleum sector during this 
period by looking at the wider political, social and economic context of the country and 
the resource base and productivity of the petroleum sector. This is followed by an 
introduction to the institutional arrangement established during this stage, including the 
regulatory framework, the industrial structure, the pricing and distribution systems, and 
the P-A relationship between the government and the petroleum sector. The chapter 
concludes with an evaluation of the relationship established during this stage. 
4.1 The general background 
This section deals with major background factors between 1949 and 1978, including 
Chinese foreign relations, the domestic political and economic context, the nature of the 
petroleum sector in terms of reserve, productivity and role in the national economy, and 
the national capacity, both at the outset as well as during the process of development. 
The period represents the evolution of the political, social and economic systems and 
situations in China from the nascent stage. State capacity in these spheres was very 
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weak and the national situation as well as the process of evolution was chaotic. The 
modern petroleum sector, which barely existed in the beginning of this stage, was 
initiated and developed during this period. These economic, social and political settings 
strongly influenced the structure and nature of the petroleum sector, and the way the 
government regulated it, refereed as the institutional arrangement in the thesis. 
4.1.1 The foreign relations 
As a newly established socialist republic in 1949, the People's Republic of China 
("PRC") faced an extremely hostile external environment. It was shunned by most of 
the developed countries and there were barely any diplomatic and economic relations 
with them. For example, the Paris-based Coordinating Committee composed of the 
United States and its allies, which controlled exports to communist countries, banned 
the export of advanced equipment and technologies to China during this period'. 183 The 
former Soviet Union was the major ally of China in the beginning of 1950s, providing it 
with financial aid and technological support, and also contributed political and 
economic ideas for governing the country. However, even this sole source of support 
was unstable as the two respective leaders of governments had some critical ideological 
differences. The relationship between the two nations eventually worsened and finally, 
in 1960, the Soviet Union withdrew its aid as well as advisors from China, resulting in 
an abrupt breakdown of the relationship. China was left with very little international 
183 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 173 
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assistance, thereby compelling it to pursue self-sufficiency. 184 
4.1.2 The political background 
The political system of governance introduced in the country, though theoretically 
sound, remained practically weak in as much as Chairman Mao Zedong (Chairman Mao) 
dominated all core political and economic decision-making due to his great control over 
the party, and iconic status among the people. The political environment often verged on 
being unstable. It was characterised by frequent clashes of ideas and thus instability in 
the composition of the top leadership. 
The single party political system comprised of four corresponding levels in the 
government and party at the central, provincial, city or county and local (township or 
village) levels. The structure of the government was similar to that in the Soviet Union, 
with the State Council being the highest government body with subordinate 
commissions and Ministries. Most of these commissions and ministries had their 
subordinate branches all over the country. 115 
The organisation of the government and the party in corresponding levels presented the 
party with ultimate authority over their government counterparts. 186 As a consequence, 
184 Morton, W. S. (2004). China: Its History and Culture. OH, USA: McGraw-Hill Companies. p. 210. 
Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 172 
185 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 81 
186 Due to the nature of the country's political system with one dominant leading political party, the term "the 
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the party usually held the real power throughout the whole political system except during 
the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976). '87 Furthermore, in practice, political power 
was highly centralised in the hands of Chairman Mao, giving him a dominant say in the 
country's political and economic policies)88 Chairman Mao from time to time bypassed 
the Party, the control of which lay with Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi 189, who had 
economic ideologies different from Chairman Mao, as will be discussed in the 
following paragraph. 
Despite the dominant influence of Chairman Mao, conflicts erupted from time to time 
between him and other leaders such as Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping190 
Chairman Mao placed emphasis on the political exigencies, on upholding social, 
political and economic ideologies, and on measures perceived to place power in the 
hands of peasants and workers. Other leaders, though subservient to these ideologies, 
argued for increasing the relative focus on the economic development of the country. As 
a result, massive governmental programmes with short politicised targets were carried 
out frequently across the country. Some of these campaigns played a positive role in 
enhancing economic development, but a majority of them turned out to be mere 
diversion of scarce resources and distorted the national economy. Examples include the 
party" and the government" in this thesis are used interchangeably unless otherwise specified. 
187 Morton, W. S. (2004). China: Its History and Culture. OH, USA: McGraw-Hill Companies. p. 209 
188 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 62,79 
189 The first Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party from 1945-1966. 
190 The General Secretary of the Communist Party between 1956-1966 
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"Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution". 191 
4.1.3 The economic background 
China's economic foundation was extremely weak during this period as a result of 
preceding a long lasting imperial system, a close door policy and years of war. All the 
new leaders, including Chairman Mao, emphasised the importance of economic 
development and industrialisation in restoring the national economy. 192 However, as 
discussed in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, the hostile international environment and unstable 
domestic political situation and the resultant actions constantly distorted or hindered 
economic development. 193 For example, the failed "Great Leap Forward" campaign 
from 1958 to 1960 caused severe economic recession. However, when Liu Shaoqi and 
Deng Xiaoping took an upper hand during 1960-1965, the economy managed to recover 
well from the depression. This trend is shown in figure 4.1 and 4.2 on the Gross 
191 AIIRefer. (1987). China. Retrieved 10Apr, 2007, from 
http: //reference. allrefer. com/country-guide-study/china/. "The Great Leap Forward is a militant approach 
toward economic development aiming at accomplishing the economic and technical development of the 
country at a vastly faster pace and with greater results. Among the Great Leap Forward's economic 
consequences were a shortage of food (in which natural disasters also played a part); shortages of raw 
materials for industry; overproduction of poor-quality goods; deterioration of industrial plants through 
mismanagement; and exhaustion and demoralization of the peasantry and of the intellectuals, not to 
mention the party and government cadres at all levels. " . 
"The Cultural Revolutionary was launched in 1966 
by Chairman Mao under the support of "Gang of Four" to purge capitalist and bourgeois in The Communist 
Party. To confront the party machine led by Liu shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao resorted to the People's 
Liberation Army and Youth in the country, who were mobilised by Mao as Red Guards" 
192 Yuan, B. -H. (1999). The Review of a Few Issues of Socialism Economic of China in the Last 50 Years (In 
Chinese). The Research of Modern China History, 5-6. p. 2. Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from 
Revolution through Reform. New York, London: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 60-64. Chiu, B., & Lewis, 
M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, UK. Northampton, MA, 
US: Edward Elgar. p. 22 
193 Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
London, England. The MIT Press. p. 62-79. Influenced by the unstable political system, the economic 
system was also very unsteady during this stage, with direction of the national economy, the arrangement of 
national budget and the economic policy constantly being targets of political arguments and was under 
constant adjustments 
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Domestic Production ("GDP") figure of the country. 194 
Figure 4-1 GDP at current prices (1952-1983) 
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Figure 4-2 Real Annual Growth Rate of GDP (1952-1983) 
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During this stage, a soviet-style, highly centralised economic system was established in 
the country. It was characterised by "public ownership of industry, centralised planning 
194NBS. (2006). GDP Growth 1952-2006 (in Chinese). In China Statistical Yearbook 2004: National Bureau 
of Statistics, China. 
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system on allocation of resources and setting prices, a centralised and passive banking 
system, and a development strategy emphasising industrial, especially heavy industrial 
growth". 195 Under this system, the government was the major player in the economy 
and literally owned the economy through State Owned Enterprises ("SOE"), and ran the 
economy. It also "guided and organised the production and distribution of major 
commodities as well as the construction of significant capital-intensive projects". 196 
Moreover, prior to 1978, it set nearly all prices in China through its Price Bureaus. 197 
Due to the lack of regulatory capacity, the taxation system in China was very simple 
during this stage and played only a minor role in collecting revenues. Instead, 
remittances from state and collective sectors were very important sources of revenue, 
sometimes surpassing the revenues from taxation (see Table 4.1). 198 Also, the 
administrative price system was one tool used by the government to collect revenues. 
By setting prices of raw materials and agricultural goods very low on the one hand, and 
the prices of industrial products produced by SOEs very high on the other, the 
government was able to secure its revenue income through SOEs' remittance. 199 
195 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana 
& N. Hamid (Eds. ), From Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's 
Republic of China and Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 15 
196 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 64 
197 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 24 
198 Ibid. p. 113 
199 Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
London, England, The MIT Press p. 304-305. `SOEs had a high profit margin and they transfer almost all 
their profit to the state. In 1978, SOEs profit accounted 14% of overall GDP. " 
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It was the government rather than the SOEs or the banking system that made decisions 
on capital investments of enterprises and monitored their implementation. The state 
provided almost all capital needed by SOEs as part of the "Big Push" industrial 
investments (funds for investment in economic development comprised 50% of 
government budgets during this stage). 200 The financial sector was passive and played 
only a minor role in long-teen investment. Instead, they provided mainly "short term 
financing for inventories, mainly to commercial sectors". 201 
Table 4-1 Sources of Revenue by Type (1952 to 1978) 202 
(Unit: °/, of total revenue) 
Tax Revenue Enterprises Incomes 
1952 56.1l; 32.93 
1957 51.06 47.55 
1965 38.65 49.99 
1970 38.99 52.55 
1975 42.59 42.32 
1978 41.63 45.85 
4.1.4 The nature of the petroleum sector 
The nature of the petroleum sector changed significantly in terms of reserve, 
productivity and role in the national economy during this stage. It was relatively small 
and trivial during the 1949- 1963 period but grew significantly from 1963 to 1978, as 
evidenced by figure 4.3, which shows the domestic oil production. 
200 Ibid. p. 21 
201 Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
London, England The MIT Press p. 304-305 
202 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 113 
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Figure 4-3 The domestic oil production (1949-1978) 203 
(Unit: Million tons) 
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4.1.4.1 A stage of growth under the policy of fostering national capacity 
(1949-1963) 
Prior to 1963, China was keen and desperate to foster a domestic petroleum sector from 
almost scratch. It barely had a domestic petroleum sector in 1949, having an annual 
domestic crude oil production of only 120,000 tonnes, and a refining capacity of 
170,000 tonnes, 204 with roughly 90% of the total territory yet to be explored. 205 Thus, 
it relied heavily on imported oil, mainly from FSU. 206 
The country had an urgent need for a domestic petroleum sector for several reasons. 
Firstly, the country needed oil to fuel its economy and to satisfy military needs. The 
203 CNPC internal data, 2006, Finance Department 
204 AllRefer. (1987). "China. " Retrieved 10Apr, 2007, from 
http: //reference. allrefer. com/country-guide-study/china/. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and 
Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 7 
205 Yan, X., & Yang, J. (1999). Fuelling the 21st Century China: the Report on Improving the International 
Competitiveness of Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing: The Enterprises Management 
Publishing House. p. 170,185 
206 Zhang, L. (1999). The Adjustment of the Strategy of China's Energy Supply (In Chinese). China 
Energy, 3. p. 13. Nolan, P. (2001). China and the Global Business Revolution, Palgrave. p. 433 "In 1959 60% 
of china's oil consumption was imported" 
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latter was felt particularly crucial for national security by the Chinese government due 
to the hostile international environment and perception of military threat from 
neighbouring countries like India. 207 Secondly, the demise of the Sino-Soviet 
relationship cut the only major source of imported oil. 208 Thirdly, there was an urgent 
need for foreign currency to import advanced technology and equipments and to repay 
the heavy debt owed to the Soviet Union in the 1960s. 209 The only alternative source of 
hard currency was export of food and agricultural products. However, the value of these 
products was low and there was the issue of domestic food security. The country was 
plagued by famine and casualties from starvation in the 1960s, which could in turn 
threat the political survival of the party and the government if it relied too much on 
foreign currency generated from food exports. 210 
Thus, driven by the urgency to increase domestic production of oil and an optimistic 
assessment of potential domestic reserves, the government placed the sector in a highly 
important position. In 1953, Chairman Mao stressed the importance of the petroleum 
industry by establishing it as a high priority industry together with few other industries 
such as coal and water. 21 ' The government also put significant efforts into promoting 
207 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 172 
208 Ibid. p. 177. Oil import from USSR reduced from 2.96 million tons to 1.41 million tons from 1960 to 1963 
209 Li, J. (2006). The Truth of Three Year Famine (In Chinese). Retrieved 12 Apr, 2007, from 
http: //www. phoenixtv. com/phoenixtv/83931275940855808/20060505/790687. shtml. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 7. The so called "xian xing gong ye" in Chinese. Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand 
Restructure of the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The Petroleum Industrial Publishing 
House. p. 9 
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exploration and production, and fostering domestic industry. 212 This policy led to a few 
"massive campaigns"213 and resulted in significant discoveries and rapid development 
of production capacity and infrastructure. 214 By 1963, the domestic production of crude 
oil had increased to 6.48 million tons from 120,000 tons in 1949.215 
4.1.4.2 The petroleum sector as a special agent of the government (1963-1978) 
China attained self-sufficiency and also became a modest exporter of oil during the 
1960s and 1970s when oil production increased from 6.48 million to 104.1 million tons 
from 1963 to 1978 as illustrated in figure 4.4.216 The industrial capacity of the 
petroleum sector also enhanced significantly as it had accumulated a substantial amount 
of capital, human and technological resources, as well as managerial skills through 
several rounds of massive campaigns. This provided the sector with the capacity to 
address the wider economic and political challenges facing the government, which had 
very few alternative sectors to rely on. 
212 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 172. Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution 
through Reform. New York, London: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 76 
213 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 8. "The massive campaigns was a special way organised by the government to use 
intensively resources such as capital, human recourses, equipments and other core commodities in order to 
booster the petroleum reserve and production of the country. The most notable one was Daqing oil 
Campaign, where not only large number of technicians (2000) was deployed from other oilfields to support 
Daqing, but also 30,000 personnel from the People's Liberation Army were transferred to the site. The 
production in the oilfield increased quickly. In 1959, large amount of commercial reserve was found in the oil 
field. " 
214 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 169-175. "Air freight was not highly developed in China in the 
late 1950s and its use in the oil industry highlighted the priority which the government had clearly assigned 
to this effort" 
215 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 175 
216 PetroChina Internal sources, 2006 
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Figure 4-4 The production and consumption of the petroleum (1965-1983) 
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Economically, oil surpassed other fuels and became the vital fuel of the country, as other 
energy sectors were easily disturbed by political campaigns. For example, the coal 
industry was severely disrupted during the "Great Leap Forward" campaign in early 
1960s and during the Cultural Revolution period from 1966-1976.217 Accordingly, the 
government launched an "oil for coal" project to promote the use of oil to substitute 
coal. 218 The importance of the petroleum sector also increased incidents of political 
leaders vying to gain control over the sector. For example, in 1965, Chairman Mao 
promoted Yu Qiuli, who headed the Ministry of Petroleum, to additionally take charge 
of the third Five Year plan, bypassing the authority of the State Planning Commission 
(SPC). The petroleum sector was also used as an effective tool in political propaganda 
21 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 172. "This was because the operations of coal SOEs, where 
most of them near large cities and could not avoid the severe impact of social chaos. Most of the oilfields 
were located in remote region and were far away from central cities where the chaotic situation was out of 
control. " 
218 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 8 
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by the Chinese leaders. To reinforce his ideological values in the country, Chairman 
Mao formulated the slogan of "Industry Study Daqing", praising the success of the 
Daqing oilfield and calling the entire industrial sector to follow its example. 
4.1.5 The national Capacity 
The country's national capacity was weak during this stage. 
In terms of regulatory capacity, most of its government officers did not have proper 
education and had little experience in regulating the economy. The country had limited 
or no historical experience in regulating a socialism economy, since prior to this, the 
country was largely governed by feudal and imperial systems, lasting for more than 
2500 years. 219 Thus the regulatory structure had to be established from the scratch and 
hence was in its infancy during this stage. 
In terms of industrial capacity, the country was weak on technology and skilled labour 
in the beginning of this period. The total labour force in the oil industry comprised only 
about 10,000 people in 1949, with a mere 20 people as skilled technical staff. 22° 
However, the situation was largely enhanced since mid 1960s as a result of large inputs 
by the government. 
219 Kynge, J. (2007). China Shakes the World : the Rise of a Hungry Nation. London: Phoenix. 
220 Yu, Y., Li, C., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 8 
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The market in the country was also in its formative stage. Prior to this, the feudal 
system existed in the country for thousands of years. Peasants practicing subsistence 
farming accounted for almost 90% of the population. The market was small and a 
merchant culture was suppressed by rulers of the country. During this stage, the country 
adopted the Soviet Style economic model, with the government literally running the 
economy, allocating goods and setting prices. There was almost no large-scale market 
mechanism developed. 
To conclude , China was at a special stage facing challenges in terms of hostile foreign 
relationships, threats to national security, constant political struggle and instability, and 
weak economic and institutional capacity. The petroleum sector played a significant role 
in the Chinese government's response to these challenges, in terms of delivering oil, 
generating foreign currency, as well as providing political patronage and social services. 
A Soviet style autocratic political system and a socialist economic system were also 
established in the country during this stage. These systems had a great influence on the 
way the government managed the petroleum sector. The above factors largely 
influenced the institutional arrangement of the petroleum sector established during this 
stage as will be analysed in more detail in the next section. 
4.2 The institutional arrangement 
The main aim of this section is to analyse the institutional arrangement for petroleum 
sector established during this stage under the influence of the background factors 
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introduced in the previous section. 
4.2.1 The regulatory framework 
Largely influenced by the Soviet style economic system, the regulatory framework of 
the petroleum sector was highly centralised with dominant government control present, 
through various general ministries, and petroleum "line ministries". The regulatory 
framework of the petroleum sector (see figure 4.5) contained three types of government 
commissions and ministries, namely, comprehensive commissions that dealt with 
general economic issues, such as State Planning Commission ("SPC") and State 
Economic Commission ("SEC"), the general ministries that dealt with general issues, 
such as the Ministry of Finance ("MOF"), and narrowly focused "line ministries" that 
dealt with the petroleum issues, such as the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry ("MPI"), 
which took different forms and names at different points in time (Table 4.2)221. Through 
this system, the government was able to own all assets of the sector, to retain tight 
control over planning, investment, production level of the sector, pricing and 
distribution of petroleum produced by the sector, and to control the financial resources 
of the sector by collecting all the profit generated by the sector. 222 It also provided 
capital, equipment, personnel and other core requirements to the industry. 223 
22' Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 63-134. To avoid confusion, all these industry will be referred 
to as MPI unless otherwise specified. 
222 Ibid. p. 175 
223 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 158. Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large 
Firms in the Oil Industry London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 70 
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Figure 4-5 The regulatory and industrial framework of the petroleum sector 
(1949-1978) 
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Table 4-2 The evolution of the specific Petroleum Ministry (1949-1978) 224 
Year Ministry 
1949 Ministry of Fuel Industry 
1955 Ministry of Petroleum Industry 
1970 Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industry 
1975 Ministry of Petroleum and Chemical industry 
1978 Ministry of Petroleum Industry 
The SPC was the dominant body in assisting government to regulate the petroleum 
sector. It formulated long-term and medium term investment plans, production plans, 
224 CNPC. (2007). The History of CNPC (In Chinese). Retrieved 10 April, 2007, from 
http: //www. cnpc. com. cn/CNPC/gsjs/fzlc/ 
103 
approved large projects, set the prices for oil and gas, and designated the allocation 
plans for commodities needed by the petroleum sector and the oil produced by the 
sector. Most of the petroleum-planning related work of the SPC was conducted by a 
Fuel and Power Bureau established in early 1950s, whereas most investment related 
work was carried out by an Investment Bureau. 225 The discharge of functions by the 
SPC was also closely supported by the MPI, which "generated most requests for new 
projects and studies to buttress those requests" based on the guidelines provided by the 
sPC. 226 
The SEC was another commission, established in middle 1950s, which played a minor 
role in regulating the petroleum industry. It played a role in formulation and adjustment 
of up to one year's planning and helped to organise the implementation of the 
production plans made by the SPC. 227 It also played a role in regulating enterprises, and 
in technology and energy conservation policy of the country. 228 
The MOF was the major government agency in charge of the financial relationship 
between the government and the petroleum sector. It played a vital role in the design 
and implementation of the fiscal policy and finance management of the petroleum sector. 
225 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 70 
226 Ibid. p. 66-67,88 
227 Donnithome, A. (1964). China's Economic Planning and Industry. The China Quarterly, 17(111-124). 
p. 112 in addition to the SPC and SEC, there was also planning organs established within the Ministries 
and different levels governments to exert a double check of national planning". 
228 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 72 
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The Ministry decided the budgetary allocation received by the petroleum sector from 
the government. It also designed fiscal policy and collected revenue and profit from the 
petroleum sector. The Ministry worked closely with the MPI and many policies were a 
product of their negotiations. 229 
The MOF was also responsible for general accounting principles and standards in the 
country. China employed a Soviet style accounting system during this stage, which 
emphasised more on the production aspect of an enterprise's operations and overlooked 
other commercial factors such as investment, financing and marketing, which are 
important activities of an enterprise within a market environment. Furthermore, 
different industries and sectors followed different accounting practices. Even within the 
same sector, there were instances of enterprises with different size and different 
ownership structure having different accounting practice. This segmented approach 
made it nearly impossible to extract useful accounting information to measure the 
performance of enterprises and to benchmark them with each other. This was also the 
case of the petroleum industry. For example, one of the most important accounting 
standards, the depreciation policy was designed and regulated by the MPI. 230 
The MPI was the specific ministry in charge of the operational activities of the 
petroleum sector, to enforce investment and production plans drafted by the government, 
229 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 112 
230 Zhou, M., Lu, L., & Chai, S. (2005). Accounting and Information System (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. P. 10 
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and to regulate the operational entities, being the Petroleum Administrative Bureaus 
("PABs"), within the petroleum sector according to government regulations and policies. 
It therefore was assigned with operational and regulatory roles. It coordinated with the 
government agencies in formulating and implementing petroleum policies, and in 
carrying out operational functions. The major operational task for the sector was to 
conduct exploration, development and production of oil in order to meet the production 
targets set by the government. It planned campaigns and organised human and material 
resources to support them. It undertook and co-ordinated the production, transportation 
and marketing of oil and oil products based on the overall national plan set out by the 
SPC. It allocated funds from the government to its subordinate PABs. In addition to the 
operational functions, the Ministry also supported the regulatory functions of the 
government and other ministries and agencies by providing information and by drafting 
policy proposals. 231 
The above regulatory framework applied from 1949 to 1966. During the "Cultural 
Revolution" from 1966 to 1976, the party systems were paralysed to a large extent, so 
did the government system. A special temporary regulatory framework characterised by 
tight military control was put into force by the central government to stabilise the 
petroleum sector. Several thousand soldiers were deployed at the oilfields from 1967 to 
1971. This measure effectively helped the petroleum production to continue to grow, at 
231 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. P. 77 
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an average rate of 18.6% until 1978, and exceeded 100 mit tones during that year. 232 
4.2.2 The industrial structure 
As has been discussed in the preceding section, the specific "line ministry" took 
operational as well as regulatory roles. As a result, the petroleum sector was almost 
synonymous with the MPI. Despite some cooperation with foreign experts in offshore 
exploration and production, the ministry and its subordinate bureaus were the sole 
operators inside the country and held exclusive access to all domestic reserves. The 
production functions of the ministry were discharged mainly by PABs, which were one 
level lower than the Ministry (see Figure 4.5). These PABs were fully owned state 
entities established in the principal producing regions and reported directly to the 
petroleum ministry. 233 
In addition to the productive responsibilities, PABs also undertook social 
responsibilities through a special "self contained" model. This model was initially 
developed in Daqing, the largest oilfield in China, located in the remote and 
under-populated north eastern China, during a "massive campaign". It was adopted by 
most oilfields afterwards as an effective model. 234 Under the model, PABs provided 
232 Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand Restructure of the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The 
Petroleum Industrial Publishing House. p. 11 
233 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 70 
234 Interview of a former finance officer of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry in Beijing in 2006. Yu, Y., Li, 
Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing 
House. p. 4. Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil 
Industry London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 76-77. "In 1958, exploration in the Daqing declared 
some commercial oil reserve. However, the withdrawal of Soviet expert made it extremely difficult to 
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technological services, engineering and construction (see figure 4.6), infrastructure and 
equipment, and the whole welfare system required by the workers living such as 
"agriculture, crop processing, housing construction, heating system, hotels, restaurants, 
kindergarten, schools, and hospitals". 235 For some PABs, the whole city was centred on 
the oil industry and the governor of the city was also the head of the oil administration 
bureau. PABs not only operated and maintained public infrastructure such as water 
supply, power supply, road, transportation and lighting, but also ran police stations, 
procurators and courts. The petroleum sector provided much wider range of social and 
supporting services than normal SOEs, due to the often remote locations of most PABs 
where there was no social infrastructure to rely on. 
The major measures used by MPI to manage PABs were direct control of production, 
marketing, and financing activities of PABs. There was very little autonomy left to 
PABs. In addition to normal direct administrative measure to control PABs, there was 
one more layer of mechanism to exert monitoring and control over PABs through the 
party system, as shown in Figure 4.6.236 
conduct development given the limited resources, personals and facilities available. Therefore the concept 
of massive campaign was come up with. Experienced technicians from several other fields were deployed 
to Daqing and 30,000 personnel form the People's Liberation Army was transferred to Daqing. The 
government also allocated very precious materials such as iron to the oil fields and organised the 
development in a way of organising a battle. " According to Zhang, The army as 'oil man" has a "strong 
sense of responsibility for the collective and the country. They were highly disciplined and very skilled in 
organization. They were able to mobilize fast to achieve their goals". 
235 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 75-77 
236 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 9-10 
108 
Figure 4-6 The organisational structure of a typical PAB 
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4.2.3 The pricing and distribution system 
Under the strict centrally planned economic system during this stage, there was no 
effective market for almost all commodities, including petroleum. The government 
controlled the allocation and distribution of resources and commodities in the national 
economy and set prices for them. They served as central planner of the country and set 
the prices for oil and oil products, 237 and directly controlled the flow of them. 238 
237 Shi, D. (2006). The Research Report of Marketisation Reform of the Energy Industry (In Chinese). 
Beijing: Economy and Management Publishing House. p. 230. The government set not only factory gate 
prices, but also transfer, wholesale and retail. 
238 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 20 
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4.2.3.1 The pricing system 
During this stage, the prices for petroleum and petroleum products were used by the 
government as a tool to support economic, fiscal and energy policies, and to control 
inflation or re-allocate income, rather than as a tool to reflect value of goods. The 
petroleum pricing system experienced three stages from 1949 to 1978, including the no 
price stage (1949-1955), the high price stage (1955-1971) and the low price stage 
(1972-1978). 
There was no price for crude oil before 1955. Petroleum was produced in only one 
oilfield, Yumen oilfield. All production was allocated by the government to state owned 
refineries and no price was used for this purpose. 
There was a high oil price stage from 1955 to 1971. The government began to establish 
an oil pricing system in 1955 following the development of more oilfields, including the 
massive Daqing oilfield. A high oil price policy (compared to international oil prices) 
was chosen by the Chinese government for the purpose of energy conservation and 
revenue collection. 239 In 1961, the international oil prices were less than $2/bbl whereas 
the Daqing oil price was RMB 130 yuan/ton, 240 which was equivalent to about $8/bbl, 
239 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 10. One characteristic of the Chinese fiscal regime during this stage was that the 
government kept the prices for industrial products purposely high. This was not only for the purpose of 
supporting the development of industry sector, but also for the purpose of rent collection, as the government 
collect all profit of SOEs during this stage. 
240 Ren Min Bi (RMB) is the name of the Chinese currency, means People's Currency 
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four times of the international level. 24' This was sensible for a net importer. 
The period from 1971 to 1978 witnessed a period of low oil price policy. It was mainly 
caused by a stabilisation policy that the government pursued so as to keep the domestic 
price of petroleum relatively stable. As a result of the policy and the surge of 
international price during the two oil shocks, the domestic price level was much lower 
than the international prices by the end of this stage. In 1979, the international oil prices 
were about $29/bbl, nearly four times that of domestic oil price. The ability of the 
country in maintaining its domestic price level stable was attributed to its 
transformation from a net importer into a net exporter during the 1970s. 
The government maintained a similar policy for oil products. During this stage, the 
factory gate prices for oil products were set by the MPI based on the principle of cost 
plus profit margin. The wholesale and retail prices were set by the government. Similar 
to the price level of crude oil during this stage, the price level for oil products remained 
almost unchanged during this stage with the price of gasoline ranging from RMB 400 
yuan/ton to RMB 700 yuan/ton, and diesel from RMB 240 yuan/ton to RMB 430 
yuan/ton. 242 
241 Ibid. p. 1 1 
242 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 23-26 
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4.2.3.2 The distribution system 
During this stage, the allocation and distribution of commodities in the country were 
conducted by the government based on a rigid annual plan, which contained many 
interlocking balance tables for commodities. 243 SOEs had no right to sell their products 
and had to submit all their products to be allocated under the government allocation 
system, at prices set by the government. During this stage, a large share of petroleum 
was exported. The crude oil export increased from 0.3 mit tones to 12.8 mit tones from 
1965 to 1978.244 The import and export of petroleum was tightly controlled by the 
government through China Import Company, an SOE established in 1950s. The name of 
the company was changed into the China Chemical Import and Export Company 
("Sinochem") in 1960s. 245 
To conclude, there was no market system existing during this stage and price setting and 
commodity flows were tightly controlled and were set by the government instead of the 
market. Although supply and demand played a role at the beginning of this stage in 
setting prices, control over inflation, affordability of oil, and the collection of rent, 
became more important rationales in pricing petroleum and petroleum products. As a 
result, price failed to function as an important economic signal to guide the allocation of 
243 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 20 
244 Calculated based on data available from BP statistics review, BP. (2006). BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2006. Retrieved 21 Jan 2007, from 
http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryld=6842&contentld=7021390 
245 SinoChem. (2006). The History of Sinochem Corporation (In Chinese). Retrieved 10 Apr, 2007, from 
http: //www. sinochem. com/tabid/I 38/Default. aspx 
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resources in an effective way. Furthermore, the petroleum sector lacked the autonomy to 
sell its own products and set their prices. It also lacked market signals to organise its 
production accordingly. These factors jointly restricted the sector from developing these 
capacities. 
4.2.4 The fiscal and financial regime 
The financial relationship between the government and the petroleum sector was also 
highly centralised with the government taking an active role and the petroleum sector 
taking a passive role. The government provided all capital and materials needed by the 
petroleum sector and collected rent from the petroleum sector in the form of profit, 
depreciation and taxation. The government also took a direct control of the process to 
ensure smooth and safe transfer of funds. The total financial transfers between the 
government and the petroleum sector during this stage are shown in Table 4.3.246 
4.2.4.1 The fiscal regime 
During this stage, the main measure that the government employed to extract rent from 
the petroleum sector was profit remittance, with taxation playing only a marginal role. 
All profit and depreciation, the net cash flow of the petroleum sector, were collected by 
the government. Many taxes were waived for the petroleum sector. For example, the 
Industrial and Commercial Taxation, one of the most important taxes in the country was 
246 PetroChina internal report received from the Finance department during interview in Beijing in 2006 
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waived from the petroleum sector from 1949 to 1970.247 This was not only because of 
the government's intention to foster the petroleum industry, but also because of the 
general practice of government in collecting most revenue by profit remittance during 
that time. 
To ensure effective collection of rent from the petroleum sector, a direct controlling 
mechanism was employed by the central government. The most notable system was 
called "pocket account". Under the system, all income of PAB was sent directly to a 
special account with access restricted to the government. 248 
4.2.4.2 The financial regime 
All capital needs of the petroleum sector were provided through allocations in the 
government's budget. Government either provided capital by direct injection of core 
commodities such as iron and steel, or by providing interest free capital. During this 
stage, the government capital input in the sector was generous even during the period 
with tight fiscal situation. For example, in the second Five-Year plan period 
(1958-1962), as a result of "Great Leap Forward" and three-year famine, the 
government's available budget was reduced significantly from the previous Five Year 
plan. However, the investment in the petroleum sector from the government still 
doubled the level of the first Five Year plan (1953-1957). From 1949 to 1978, RMB 
247 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 162-164 
248 Interview of a former finance officer of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry in Beijing in 2006 
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28.57 bn was injected from the central government to the petroleum sector. During the 
same period, RMB 105.73 bn was submitted by the petroleum sector (see table 4.3). 249 
Table 4-3 The Financial Transfer between the government and the petroleum 
sector (1949-1978)250 
un; c RMB bn 
Year 
Total government 
investment 
Total oil sector 
submission 
Profit Taxation Depreciation 
1949-1952 0.17 0.12 0.1 0.01 0.01 
First five year 1953-1957 2.17 1.05 0.67 0.23 0.15 
Second five year 1958-1962 4.18 4.12 2.65 0.96 0.51 
1963-1965 2.23 4.89 3.12 1.21 0.56 
Third five year 1966-1970 5.41 18.12 12.84 3.82 1.46 
Fourth five year 1971-1975 14.2 40.27 30.66 8.73 8.8 
1976-1978 18.11 37.15 28.56 7.29 1.3 
Total 46.47 105.72 78.6 22.25 48.7 
4.2.5 The P-A relationship between the government and the petroleum sector 
During this stage, NOCs were not yet established, and the MPI was the de facto NOC 
taking productive, regulatory and social responsibilities. Largely influenced by the 
socialist nature of the country's economic system, the government remained an active 
player during this stage, and controlled the investment, marketing, and financing aspects 
of the petroleum activity. The boundary between the government and the petroleum 
sector was vague and they were often viewed as one entity. The P-A relationship 
between the government and the petroleum sector established during this stage was 
mainly established from the perspective of the government to address the wider 
economic, political and social challenges facing the government. 
249 PetroChina internal report received from the Finance department during interview conducted in Beijing 
in 2006 
250 The major reason for the surge in investment during 1971 to 1978 was the increase in petroleum 
sector's scale of production. 
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4.2.5.1 The tasks of the petroleum sector 
The major responsibilities of the petroleum sector included not only productive tasks 
measured by production and reserves, which was clearly assigned by the government to 
the sector, but also regulatory, administrative, and social responsibilities. The 
government assigned these tasks mainly through administrative orders. The government 
retained the right to make decisions over other important aspects of petroleum activities. 
It became deeply involved in all aspects of the sector, such as investment and 
production planning, marketing and pricing, expenditure management, cost control, and 
financing. The government made decisions directly, either at the SPC level, or at the 
State Council level. Some very large projects were even directly monitored by top 
leaders such as Chairman Mao. This left a very little space for the sector to pursue its 
own interests at the cost of the state and the government. 
4.2.5.2 The supporting system 
The government also established a supporting system characterised by direct control, 
moral incentive system and harsh sanctions system. 
Through a hands-on direct control mechanism, the government attempted to ensure the 
fulfilment of tasks assigned and the orders given to the petroleum sector. On the one 
hand, a strict controlling mechanism was developed to exert a daily monitoring and 
control over petroleum activities. For example, a special "pocket account" which 
116 
collected capital from the petroleum sector and accessed only by the government, could 
prevent the petroleum sector from imprudent use of capital (see section 4.2.4.1). The 
government also employed the parallel party system at all levels of the petroleum 
sector's organisation to exert an extra level of control and monitoring over the daily 
operations of the petroleum sector (see section 4.2.2). The party and the central 
government also retained the power to appoint senior officers of the MPI. The Ministers 
of the MPI were assigned by the central government and were often personally loyal to 
the leaders. 
On the other hand, acknowledging the weak regulatory capacity, the government 
purposely employed a simple monitoring and control system. For example, the revenue 
collection from the petroleum sector by a lump-sum amount of profitability and 
depreciation, instead of using more economically meaningful taxation tools, 
accommodated the weak fiscal regime of the country. 
From the perspective of the incentive system, financial and material incentives did not 
play a major role during this stage. They were negligible in supporting the tasks of the 
petroleum sector. Instead, the government established a moral incentive system to 
enhance the performance of the petroleum sector. For example, during the development 
of the Daqing oilfield, top leaders including Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice Chairman Liu, 
and General Secretary of the Communist Party Deng Xiaoping visited the site and 
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showed great support from the central government. 25 1 The government also used the 
media such as newspapers and propaganda songs to create a strong patriot and heroic 
sentiment closely related to the petroleum sector. For example, a song about Karamay 
oilfield became extremely popular around the country after the commencement of 
production at the Karamay oilfield in 1955. Role models were also established to 
mobilise and invigorate individuals. For example, during the Daqing massive campaign, 
an "Iron man" model was promoted around the petroleum sector to invigorate ordinary 
workers, managers and technicians with a high spirit and a sense of pride. 252 The role 
model of the "iron man" proved to be so successful that it was even promoted at a 
national level and became a household name. 
Although not well documented, there was an extremely strict sanctions system 
prevailing during this stage. The petroleum activities were pictured by the leaders as 
being vital for China as an independent socialist country being able to confront 
imperialist forces. Meanwhile, the political atmosphere was still intense under 
Chairman Mao's constant arguments that there were still plenty of enemies disguised as 
ordinary citizens within the country. As a result, failure to meet production levels or 
production accidents could easily be blamed on the intentional activities of such 
enemies seeking to undermine socialist construction. If the performance of the MPI was 
25' Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 176 
252 The man's name was Wang Jinxi, he was one of the biggest role model established by the Party during 
the Daqing "massive campaign. He was famous in the whole nation for being tireless and hard working 
under extremely harsh conditions. 
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poor, then the head of the ministry could be removed from the position or attacked by 
the opposite political power. Thus the Ministers were under huge pressure to run the 
sector well. 253 
4.3 The evaluation of the effectiveness of the petroleum institutional 
arrangement 
The petroleum institutional arrangement established during this period had many 
positive aspects. However, in a long term perspective it had negative impact on the 
commercial performance of the petroleum sector. 
4.3.1 The positive aspects of the petroleum institutional arrangement 
The petroleum institutional arrangement established during this period was effective in 
achieving the main objectives of the government at the time, in its compatibility with 
the national capacity of the country and between the tasks and supporting system. 
The productivity task which emphasised the availability of physical petroleum 
production was critical in addressing the challenges facing the government during this 
stage, in terms of national security, promoting economic growth, and in acquiring 
foreign currency. The petroleum industry performed well in achieving the tasks during 
253 Wang, S. -S. (1982). Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Asian Survey, 
22(9), 801-822. 
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this stage, which could be reflected by the reserve and production figures. 254 The 
petroleum reserves increased significantly during this stage with the successful 
exploration of more than ten medium to large sized oilfields, although detailed data was 
not available. Annual production increased from less then 0.12 million tons to more than 
100 million tons. 255 
As analysed in section 4.2, in addition to the production tasks, the petroleum sector also 
took on regulatory and social responsibilities. This structure was cost-effective for a 
country with poor national capacity and lacking qualified staff and resources. This 
practice also helped the government in developing its regulatory capacity through 
"learning by doing". 
The production tasks as well as the regulatory and social tasks assigned to the petroleum 
sector were also compatible with the national capacity of the country. The indicator of 
production was simple and easy to measure, which was a positive factor in a country 
lacking regulatory capacity. It was also suitable as the country had no market capacity 
for prices to be formed and for enterprises to compete with each other and conduct 
investment in an autonomous way. 
254 For the international involvement in Chinese petroleum industry from 1949-1978, see Lieberthal, K., & 
Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
255 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 5 
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The petroleum institutional arrangement established during this period was also 
effective in terms of the compatibility between the tasks and supporting system. As has 
been analysed in chapter 3, in theory this co-existence of commercial and 
non-commercial tasks could result in "conflict of identity effect" and "multi-task effect". 
However, the negative effect was not significant in China because of an effective 
supporting system established by the government, which will be analysed below. 
The direct control and monitoring system that the government employed during this 
period was not only suitable for the tasks assigned by the government, but also 
appropriate to the situation of the country. An extremely tight and hands-on control and 
effective incentive and sanction system helped to avoid rent-seeking problem, therefore 
avoiding the negative "conflict of identity effect" and "multi-tasks effect", which was 
common for petroleum sector performing regulatory and social functions. Additionally, 
for a new government with weak institutional capacity, and lack of market capacity, 
direct control could help the government train its staff and build up regulatory capacity. 
The government's direct control was also a positive mechanism during an unstable 
period with higher probability of crisis, as it enabled the goverment to respond 
promptly. For example, when the party system was paralysed during the Cultural 
Revolution, military force was deployed to control and stabilise the production. 
From the incentive system perspective, the use of moral incentives as well as harsh 
sanctions functioned well under these circumstances and was compatible with the tasks 
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assigned to the petroleum sector. First of all, the country in general was extremely poor 
with very limited resources available to support an effective material incentive system. 
Moral incentive could also function well in view of the passion of the people for their 
newly established country. Patriotic, socialist, and communist ideologies prevailed 
across the country, particularly when the people were simple and less materially driven. 
As a result, national pride, patriotism, and loyalty to the Chairman Mao, to the party, 
and the People's Liberation Army were important factors for people working in the 
petroleum industry. 
Meanwhile, the head of MPI had the incentive to perform well for the benefit of the 
country given that her/his next position could be somewhere in the central government. 
Promotion or demotion was thus an effective incentive for the head of the sector. In fact, 
Yu Qiuli was promoted as the head of the SPC after his tenure in the petroleum sector. 
Similarly, senior managers in the sector were rewarded by the government with foreign 
visits if they deliver positive results. 
4.3.2 The negative aspects of the petroleum institutional arrangement 
Despite the short term positive aspects analysed in the previous section, the petroleum 
institutional arrangement had long term negative implications. 
From the perspective of the said framework, the vague line between the government and 
the petroleum sector potentially confused the identity of the petroleum sector with that 
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of the government. This would take years to rectify. As mainstream literature has 
pointed out, the dual role of the petroleum sector as regulator and operator may have 
nurtured rent-seeking in the long run and caused confusion of identity. Additionally, the 
enterprise operating society model might be efficient in the short-term, but may have 
caused inefficiency in the long run, due to the multi-task effect which squandered 
resources and distracted managers. Although the Chinese government managed to 
control these negative effects through a well designed supporting system, as analysed in 
4.3.1 the arrangement and the ideology related with it was institutionalised and could 
have a negative impact in the longer term. 
From the task perspective, the focus on production and highly politicised decision 
making process of setting production target were at the cost of commercial performance. 
Economically unviable petroleum could be produced. It was reported that in order to 
achieve the target required by the government, some oilfields operated at a rate or by a 
method that harmed the long-term interest of the country from the resource 
perspective. 256 It was said that during the several decades of operations, the approach of 
placing emphasis solely on production had resulted in a severe waste of reserves, and 
"as much as 90% of the oil was wasted, left un-recovered underground or spent in 
gushers that coloured the pastures around the wells black". 257 It also impeded the 
petroleum sector from building up investment, financing and marketing capacity, as it 
256 Interview of a former finance officer of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry conducted in Beijing in 2006 
257 Kynge, J. (2007), China Shakes the World : the Rise of a Hungry Nation. London: Phoenix. p129 
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lacked autonomy in these areas, and prevented it from developing a commercial culture. 
This approach has therefore had a negative impact on the commercial performance of 
the sector, the effect of which might take years to overcome as will be illustrated by 
next three chapters. 
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5 NOC REFORMS IN CHINA- STAGE ONE (1978-1993) 
The period from 1976 to 1993 witnessed the corporitisation of the petroleum sector 
characterised by the creation of three NOCs, and the transition of the petroleum sector 
from the central planning system to a market system, comprising of the reforms of the 
pricing and distributing systems as well as the fiscal and financial regimes. These 
reforms were part of a wider transition of the country's general economy, under a new 
leadership and in a relatively peaceful internal and external environment. It also 
reflected the enhancement of national capacity, the changing nature of the government 
agenda, and changes in the productivity and other aspects of the petroleum sector. 
This chapter first analyses the objectives of reforms in the petroleum sector by looking 
at the wider political, and economic context of the country and the nature of the 
petroleum sector. This is followed by an analysis of the new P-A relationship 
established between the government and the petroleum sector by reforming the 
regulatory framework, the industrial structure, the price and distribution systems, and 
the fiscal and financial systems. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the 
reforms conducted during this stage. 
5.1 The general background 
5.1.1 The political background 
The political context of the country went through many changes during this stage. As a 
result, economic development gained firm foothold as the top priority of the 
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government and the party, as will be analysed in section 5.1.2.258 
Externally, the foreign relations of the country were significantly enhanced. The 
relationship with major developed countries such as the US was gradually improved. 
The government resumed its membership of the United Nations ("UN") and gained a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council with the support of a large number of 
developing countries. A relatively peaceful external environment made it possible for 
the country to emphasise on economic development. 
Internally, the death of Chairman Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution brought 
Deng Xiaoping, an advocate of economic development, to power. 259 Furthermore, at 
the beginning of this stage, the political system faced severe challenges, with years of 
political conflicts having undermined both the capacity of the system for decision 
making and the people's trust in the party, which severely challenged its survival . 
260 
The challenges facing the party helped unify different opinions inside the party, and left 
the reformers with less resistance from the leftist faction. 261 
258 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 122-124. "For much of the Cultural Revolution, the party was an empty 
shell. One of the important effects of the Cultural Revolution was that job security for cadres in China was 
very low". Therefore, it was believed that market reform "would in effect strengthen the influence and 
authority of the party and provide new career opportunities for its representatives". Larsson, T. (2006). 
Reform, Corruption, and Growth: Why Corruption is more Devastating in Russia than in China. Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies 39,265-281. p. 273. 
259 Deng formally resumed power in 1977 
260 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 122-123. "'Mao's death left a power vacuum and a degraded state 
system in which those who were politically sainted one day could, the next, be overthrown and dragged 
through the mud, with often horrendous consequences for their families and major supporters". 
261 Larsson, T. (2006). Reform, Corruption, and Growth: Why Corruption is more Devastating in Russia than 
in China. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39,265-281. 
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5.1.2 The economic background 
Economically, there was an ideological change in the country when the party and the 
government adopted a pragmatic ideology, emphasising economic development and 
supporting the "growth at all cost" strategy, and abandoning the "utopian, communist, 
and dogmatist" ideologies prevailing during the Chairman Mao's era. 
Following the ideological change, a market driven economic reform was launched in 
1978 during the milestone third Plenum of the National Party Congress's Eleventh 
Central Committee, which started to build the regulatory capacity of the government, 
the market capacity of the country, and the commercial capacity of enterprises. 262 
Non-public enterprises were encouraged to be developed and positive measures were 
introduced to foster the market and to liberalise prices. Several aspects of the reform 
process, including the fiscal regime, investment policy, market and enterprises reforms, 
and the open-door policy of the government played a major role in influencing the 
reforms of the petroleum sector and shall be discussed in further detail and analysed in 
this section. 263 
5.1.2.1 The reform of the fiscal regime 
The reform of the fiscal regime during this stage comprised of two main elements in an 
262 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 124. Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese Politics and Society: an 
Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf. Wang, H. H. (1999). China's Oil Industry and 
Market: Elsevier. p. 2. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). 
Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 16 
263 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 15 
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effort to enhance the role of taxation in the national economy. 264 
The first one was to enhance the role of taxation in revenue collection and to reduce the 
role of remittances from SOEs by establishing a more transparent and formal taxation 
system. It was argued that collecting revenue through a "large mess of undifferentiated" 
profit from enterprises was much less efficient than collecting revenue through "several 
economically more meaningful categories" of taxes. 26' A more transparent and formal 
taxation system was able to help formalise the financial obligations of enterprise to the 
state, to provide enterprises with more autonomy to retain their after tax profit, and to 
reduce the traditional bargaining process between the government and enterprises. 266 
The government carried out two rounds of "tax for profit" reform in 1982 and 1983 in 
an effort to build a more transparent and formal taxation system. Following these 
reforms, the share of tax revenue in the total government revenue was correspondingly 
increased over the years as shown in table 5.1.267 
264 Ibid. The country had actually already carried out several rounds of economic reforms during the 
previous stage. However, the emphasis was placed on the adjustment of responsibilities between different 
levels of governments. Neither a market was built to provide signals in resources allocation, nor was 
enterprises assigned with autonomy for their own operations. As a result, the previous reforms proved to be 
ineffective in a large country like China' 
265 Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 109 
266 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 120. Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic 
Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 109. Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese 
Politics and Society: an Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf. p. 234,228 
267 Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese Politics and Society: an Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. p. 242 
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Table 5-1 Sources of Government Revenue by Type (1978-1991) 
Tax revenue (%) Remittances from enterprises *(%) 
1979 42.55 39.00 
1980 43.95 33.46 
1981 48.37 27.16 
1982 49.67 21.04 
1983 48.27 14.97 
1984 51.41 15.02 
1985 88.84 1.90 
1986 85.45 1.72 
1987 83.09 1.66 
1988 85.26 1.82 
1989 83.57 1.95 
1990 80.26 2.23 
1991 81.71 2.04 
* Including extra budgetary taxes after 1983 
Source: Ministry of Finance (1992) 
The second element of reform involved the increased autonomy of enterprises, allowing 
them to retain a higher share of the profit. This element will be discussed in more detail 
in section 5.1.2.4 on reform of SOEs. 
Despite the well-intended efforts of the government, the taxation reform remained 
incomplete due to the limitations imposed by the regulatory capacity of the government. 
Firstly, different tax rates and terms were applied to different regions, sectors, and 
enterprises, having different scales and ownership structures. 268 For example, the 
Corporate Income Tax for SOEs included three categories, corresponding to differences 
in scale and ownership of SOEs. Even within each category, different tax rates applied, 
268 Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 229,108 
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ranging from 7% to 55%. 269 As a result, the taxation system was uneven, complex and 
hard to enforce. Secondly, the profit remittance system continued to co-exist with tax 
system during this stage. The enterprise remittance was still used in collecting revenue 
through a newly established Contract Management Responsibility System ("CMRS"). 
According to the system, the government and enterprises signed contracts, designating 
key performance indicators of enterprises and the profit-split between the government 
and enterprises. 270 The contents of the CMRS were arrived at through negotiation and 
bargaining between the government and enterprises. The process was arbitrary and 
subjective, and the process of negotiation could be strenuous. 
The increased autonomy of enterprises, the transitional and complicated taxation system, 
together with the fact that the government lacked the institutional capacity to control 
and monitor its enterprises and local governments, undermined the revenue income of 
the central government and its ability to control the economy. 27 By 1993, the share of 
central government revenue in the total government revenue was reduced to only 22%, 
and the central government was at risk of losing control of the macro economy, with 
severe surplus investment made at local and enterprise level, while local protectionism 
289 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 120. "large and medium-sized enterprises pay a flat 55% rate on 
profits, small enterprises are taxed on an eight grade progressive schedule, which rises from 7% to 55%. 
Enterprises in the catering and service trades pay a flat rate of 55%. ° 
270 Naughton, B. (1996). Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 
1976-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 204-209. The responsibility contract was first 
introduced in the agriculture sector and was expanded to the urban enterprises sector. 
Z" Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese Politics and Society: an Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. p. 235,243. 
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policies became rampant. 272 
5.1.2.2 The reform of the investment system 
The central government also reformed the investment system to enhance the role of 
SOEs in making investment decisions and in raising capital, while to reduce the role of 
the government in such activities. From 1979 to 1991, capital expenditure as a 
percentage of the overall government expenditure declined from 35% in 1979 to 17% in 
1991, nearly shrinking to half (see table 5.2). 273 The retained funds and commercial 
bank loans (domestic and international) became the primary means of fund-raising by 
SOEs by the end of 1992.274 Additionally, even where the government continued 
financial assistance in some measure, the same was provided way of a loan under a 
"loan for grant" initiative, requiring enterprises to pay interest to the government. 275 
272 Bahl, R. (1998). Central-Provincial-local Fiscal Relationships' In D. J. S. Brean (Ed. ), Taxation in Modern 
China (pp. 125-150). New York: Routledge. p. 130 
273 Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 106. In the previous stage, more than 60% of the capital needs of enterprises 
were provided by the government and were interest-free. 
274 This is also because of the increase of the enterprise autonomy, and the increasing profit retained by 
these enterprises, government has a strict regulation for the usage of the retained profit, with bones, welfare 
and retained funds rate fixed and accounts separated. 
275 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 166 
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Table 5-2 Government Budgetary Expenditure (1979-1991) 
Unit: % of total 
Capital Construction CESH* 
1979 35.02 8.99 
1980 28.51 9.94 
1981 23.60 12.23 
1982 20.31 12.94 
1983 22.13 12.92 
1984 24.89 13.40 
1985 24.68 13.39 
1986 25.30 14.31 
1987 22.24 14.26 
1988 20.09 15.42 
1989 17.19 15.20 
1990 17.66 15.02 
1991 17.20 16.40 
* Culture, Education, Science, and Health 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China (1991,1992) 
Despite the above reform measures, the nature of the investment system did not change 
significantly. In theory, enterprises would be more concerned about investment 
efficiency if their capital was borrowed from commercial banks, or from government 
bearing interests. However, the banking system was still passive, owned and controlled 
by the government. Hence, SOEs still had easier access to bank loans with few checks 
and balances from the latter. 216 This together with increased autonomy and financial 
incentive to SOEs and poor regulatory capacity of the government to monitor their 
performance gave rise to serious bad debts in the mid 1980s, resulting in severe 
276 Gamaut, R., Song, L., & Tao, Y. (2006). Impact and Significance of State-Owned Enterprise 
Restructuring in China The China Journal 55,35-63. p. 36. "Although reforms during this stage, hardened 
budget constraint with banks, but has not been effective in hardening firms' budget constraint with the 
government. " 
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problems for the national economy. 27 
5.1.2.3 The liberalisation of the market 
The government also started to build up market capacity of the country by liberalising 
commodity prices and distribution systems gradually. 278 Two main measures were 
taken by the government, firstly, to increase the share of non-public owned enterprises 
in the overall economy, and secondly, to reduce the number of centrally planned 
commodities. By doing so, the government tried to build the market capacity, while still 
maintaining control over the economy through its control over SOEs and major 
commodities. 
Non-public owned enterprises, most of them township and village enterprises (in 
Chinese term `individual economy' and `collective economy'), were encouraged to 
develop alongside SOEs at a fast pace. 279 With support from local governments, they 
quickly occupied markets where SOEs failed to fill in. 280 These enterprises normally 
operated in less strategically important sectors and were permitted to sell their products 
in the market at relatively liberalised prices. In many sectors, non-public enterprises 
277 Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, 
UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 37-39. Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese Politics and Society: an 
Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf. p. 243 
278 Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 109 
279 Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese Politics and Society: an Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. p. 225. Belden, J. (1950). Kynge, J. (2007). China shakes the world: the rise of a hungry 
nation. London: Phoenix. 
260 Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese Politics and Society: an Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. p. 225 
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even substituted SOEs and became the dominant players. 
Due to the prosperity of non-SOE enterprises and increasing competition from them, the 
prices for inputs were increased and prices for final products reduced, 281 In the situation, 
the government started to liberalise prices for commodities formerly allocated by the 
central planner, and allowed the market to play a bigger role, particularly in less 
strategically important commodities. 282 A dual-price and multi-price system was 
adopted to minimise the negative social and economic impacts of liberalisation. Thus 
some goods were subject to two or more prices, including the government planned 
prices and market prices. 283 The pros and cons of this dual price system were obvious. 
These measures helped to establish a market system in a relatively stable and smooth 
manner in a large country with imbalances in socio-economic conditions. However, it 
gave rise to speculation and rent-seeking, and increased the cost of regulation, 
especially when the government still lacked the institutional capacity to regulate the 
economy. 
5.1.2.4 The reform of SOEs 
The government also started to reform SOEs in order to reduce its intervention and to 
281 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 118 
282 Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, 
UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 39-41. Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese 
Economic Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 112 
283 Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 220 
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provide them with more autonomy in a wider range of activities. The major measures of 
SOE reforms during this stage were the adoption of "Contract Management 
Responsibility System" ("CMRS"), "Factory Manager Responsibility System" 
("FMRS"), and human resource reform, in order to increase the autonomy of SOEs. 284 
Through the CMRS, the government formalised tasks of the SOEs and assigned them 
with more autonomy on investment, human resource management, financial 
management, procurements management, and marketing. Another significant element of 
the contracts system was the selection of performance indicators. According to a survey, 
the number of enterprises able to control their own production plan increased from 25% 
in 1984 to 90% in 1988.285 Different from the previous stage, when production was the 
main performance indicator, profitability gradually replaced the former, though the 
effectiveness of profitability as an indicator in measuring performance of SOEs is 
highly depended on how well the market of certain sector had been developed. 
Through the FMRS, the government ensured through law that managers of SOEs took 
greater responsibility for the performance of their enterprises and were provided with 
performance-linked incentives. 286 Another remarkable characteristic of the system was 
that the party committees which used to take a superior position to managers in 
enterprises were gradually removed. 
284 Ibid p. 207-209 
285 Ibid. p. 205 
286 The system was put into force since 1984. By 1988, a basic law on industrial enterprises SOEs put the 
system as one of its "fundamental tenets. 
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The human resource systems of SOEs were also reformed during this stage. 287 
Permanent employment was abandoned gradually and employees were required to sign 
term contracts with employers, the so called "smash iron rice bowl". 288 Although, in 
practice, few people were fired for poor performance, a mechanism of "unemployment 
within factories" was widely applied in SOEs in early 1980s. Through the system, 
enterprises were allowed to remove workers with poor productivity from their work 
units without firing them. 289 The national unified salary system was also abolished 
gradually. Total wages paid by enterprises was allowed to be linked with profit or 
general performance. By 1988, the system was applied in about 60% of the 
enterprises. 290 
Through enforcement of the CMRS, the FMRS and human resource reform, the 
relationship between the government and SOEs was different from the previous stage. 
Increased autonomy, better sanction and incentive mechanisms were formalised by law 
and contracts. 2' SOEs and their managers were allowed a higher level of autonomy, 
including the possibility to retain more profit for their own use, to enjoy an accelerated 
28' Kynge, J. (2007). China Shakes the World: the Rise of a Hungry Nation. London: Phoenix. This was 
partially selected by the government as one of the measures to improve individual productivity, and partially 
because the old system that the government provide employment and certain level of payment was under 
huge challenges along with the industrial structure adjustment and employment pressure caused by large 
number of people sent to countryside rushing back to cities. 
288 Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese Politics and Society: an Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. p. 234 
289 Ibid. 
290 Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 205 
291 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 15 
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depreciation policy, to sell an increasing part of their products out of central-planned 
system at market prices, and were also granted more autonomy in managing their 
human resources. Further, performance-linked material incentives were allowed to be 
provided to workers, and theoretically, poorly performing workers could be subject to 
sanction or even redundancy. 292 Despite the positive aspects of these reforms, the 
effectiveness of the SOE reform was largely restricted by the poor national capacity, 
especially the poor regulatory and market capacity of the country. Due to these 
deficiencies, the government still assigned to the SOEs a wide range of social 
responsibilities. This together with the lack of market signals made it difficult for SOEs 
increase their profitability. 
5.1.2.5 The open-door policy 
This stage also witnessed the beginning of the open-door policy of the country, after it 
had been closed to the rest of the world for hundreds of years. Deng Xiaoping, who was 
educated in France, realised that successful economic reforms required an open door 
policy with full engagement with the rest of the world, and not a closed door policy, as 
pursued by Mao. 293 The main driver of the policy was the need to attract foreign capital 
and technological investments. "The Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Law of the People's 
Republic of China" was enacted in 1979 and two special economic zones were 
292 Naughton, B. (1996). Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1976-1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 99 
293 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 124 
137 
established in Guangdong and Fujian, 294 marking resumption in the inflow of foreign 
investments as well as exports on a larger scale. The relevance of the policy to the 
petroleum sector was that the import of petroleum became possible therefore reduced 
the need to promoting domestic production when it was not economically viable. 
5.1.3 The petroleum background 
The nature of the petroleum sector also changed considerably in terms of reserves, 
productivity, the level of consumption and the role of the petroleum sector in the 
national economy. The dominant themes in the petroleum sector during this stage were 
the rising domestic demand, decreasing supply, and severe financial crisis facing the 
sector. These factors undermined the ability of the sector to provide production, profit, 
government revenue and foreign currency and therefore reduced the attractiveness of 
the sector to be controlled by the government, and increased the urgency of the 
government to enhance the commercial performance of the NOCs. . 
Economic growth (real annual growth rate averaging 9.7% between 1977 and 1993), 
industrialisation, and urbanisation processes increased the domestic consumption of oil 
(see Figure 5.1). 295 This fast growth of domestic demand for oil was coupled with a 
slow growth of production, as most of the major oilfields in the country had matured 
294 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 16 
295 Wang, H. H. (1999). China's Oil Industry and Market: Elsevier. p. 3. The average growth rate for the 
industry sector from mid 1980s to 1990s was 12%, The industrialisation process needs petroleum, both as 
fuel and as input materials 
138 
(see figure 5.1 and table 5.3,5.4). 296 Strong domestic consumption and slow production 
growth retransformed the country from a major producer into a net importer of oil in 
1993. 
Figure 5-1 The production, Consumption and International Price of crude oil 
(1976-1993) 
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296 BP. (2006). "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. " Retrieved 21 Jan 2007, from 
http: //www. bp. com/prod uctland ing. do? categoryld=6842&contentld=7021390. 
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Table 5-3 The Crude oil production and consumption (1976-1993) 
Production297 
(thousand bbl/d) 
Consumption 298 
(thousand bbl/d) 
Export/ import 
Dependency (%) 
1976 1743 1546 -13% 
1977 1878 1638 -15% 
1978 2087 1825 -14% 
1979 2129 1833 -16% 
1980 2119 1694 -25% 
1981 2030 1616 -26% 
1982 2048 1601 -28% 
1983 2127 1642 -30% 
1984 2292 1700 -35% 
1985 2505 1825 -37% 
1986 2621 1941 -35% 
1987 2690 2062 -30% 
1988 2741 2211 -24% 
1989 2760 2340 -18% 
1990 2774 2323 -19% 
1991 2828 2524 -12% 
1992 2841 2740 -4% 
1 993 2888 3051 5% 
297 Includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (natural gas liquids - the liquid content of natural gas 
where this is recovered separately). 
298 Inland demand plus international aviation and marine bunkers and refinery fuel and loss 
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Table 5-4 The growth of GDP, and the production and consumption of oi1299 
Year GDP growth % Oil production growth% Oil consumption growth % 
1976 -5.4 13.1 14.9 
1977 7.9 7.4 7.6 
1978 11.7 11.1 9.7 
1979 7.6 2 -1.7 
1980 7.8 -0.3 -2 
1981 5.2 -4.5 -5.2 
1982 9.1 0.9 -0.2 
1983 10.9 3.7 1.1 
1984 15.2 8.2 3.3 
1985 13.5 9 6 
1986 8.8 4.6 8.7 
1987 11.6 2.6 4.4 
1988 11.3 1.9 3.4 
1989 4.1 0.8 5.1 
1990 3.8 0.5 -0.2 
1991 9.2 1.9 6.5 
1992 14.2 0.3 5.5 
1993 13.5 2.5 7.6 
*Total oil consumption includes total petroleum product consumption and crude direct bum 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1997 
The slow growth in production soon revealed the serious commercial inefficiency, 
which had resulted from the emphasis of the previous stage on production rather than on 
profitability. The petroleum sector soon faced a severe financial crisis during this stage. 
Several additional factors were believed to have contributed to this. First of all, as a 
relatively mature industry, the capital need of the sector was naturally increasing fast. 
During the period from 1981-1985, the capital needs estimated by the MPI increased 
299 Wang, H. H. (1999). China's Oil Industry and Market: Elsevier. p. 5 
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significantly from RMB 2.75 bn in 1981 to RMB 9.71 bn in 1985.300 Second, the oil 
price was kept low by the government during this stage in order to control inflation 
whilst the cost of extracting oil had increased as the oil fields matured. 301 Additionally, 
the price level for core inputs such as steel, power, and land had risen significantly. 302 
Third, the government significantly reduced investment to the petroleum sector as the 
energy policy started to emphasise non-oil sectors such as coal and power. 303 In 1981, 
the government established the new policy of "Coal for Oil" to promote the use of coal 
in previous oil-fuelled power plants. 304 In 1981, the government's investment in the 
petroleum sector was drastically reduced to only half of the level in 1980.305 From 1981 
to 1985, the share of the government's budgetary grants towards the total capital needs 
of the petroleum industry was reduced from 57% in 1981, to 31% in 1984, and 25% in 
1985.306 Fourth, the existing Soviet style accounting, system which emphasised the 
productive activities and overlooked investment activities failed to allow the petroleum 
300 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 168. The main reasons for the fast-growing capital needs were: (1) production 
depleting; (2) market reform increased the prices for input while oil prices was remained mostly unchanged. 
301 Ibid. p. 6 
302 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 25 
303 Wang, H. H. (1999). China's Oil Industry and Market: Elsevier. p. 3. In 1978,20% of industrial capacity 
remained unused due to shortages of energy, especially electricity and coal 
304 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 8,26. This released the pressure shortly on the demand of oil and resulted in a short 
period of drop of consumption during 1980-1985. Yan, C. -L. (1997). China's Energy Development Report 
(In Chinese). Beijing China Economic and Management Publishing House. p. 2-3. "By 1993, the share of the 
petroleum sector production in the overall energy sector had decreased from 23.75% in 1980 to 18.7% in 
1993. The share of the petroleum consumption in the overall energy sector reduced from 20.7% to 18.2% in 
the same period". Wu, D. (1989). Modern China's Coal industry (In Chinese). Beijing: China Social Science 
Publishing House. p. 88. The investment to coal industry had also increased. As a result, the coal production 
increased dramatically, from 350 million tons in 1975 to 550 million in 1977 and 827million ton in 1985. 
305 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 77 
306 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 168 
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sector to recover investment through cost accounting. This started to present severe 
problems for the petroleum sector when the government reduced its financial support to 
this sector. 
5.1.4 Changes in national Capacity 
The country's absolute regulatory capacity was enhanced during this stage due to 
younger and better educated individuals being inducted in the workforce, to the 
development of new laws and regulations, and to the experience that the government 
machinery had acquired. 30' However, the relative regulatory capacity of the central 
government remained weak and insufficient. This was mainly due to the increased size 
and complexity of the national economy, the reduction of the central government's 
controlling power due to the decentralised fiscal regime, and the removal of the 
dominant control of Party in the daily operations of SOEs. 
The market capacity was also enhanced compared to the previous stage, with more 
commodities being allowed to be traded freely in the market at more flexible prices. But 
the market was still in a relatively primitive stage, with most core commodities and their 
prices under the control of the government and the prevalence of dual or multi price 
system. This increased the challenge for the government to regulate and confused the 
market players in their decision making. 
307 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 178,204. During the reforms the state planning officials are losing power, 
and the localities and ministries were accordingly empowered. 
143 
From the perspective of the petroleum sector, there was a significant increase in the 
productive capacity. However, the industrial capacity of the industry in terms of 
investment, marketing and financing was still weak due to the sector's lack of autonomy 
in these fields, as analysed in section 5.2. 
5.1.5 The objectives of reforming the petroleum sector 
Influenced by the above factors, the objectives of the government in terms of regulating 
the petroleum sector had changed significantly. The emphasis had been placed on 
profitability and commercial performance, instead of production. However, restricted by 
the weak national capacity, the government had to take a conservative approach in 
reforming the sector in order to maintain stability. 
First of all, the availability of domestic oil production became less relevant due to more 
friendly international relations, a new open door policy and increased foreign reserves 
of the country, which together meant it was possible to import oil from other countries 
(See figure 5.2 for the foreign reserves of the country from 1976 to 1994). 308 As a result, 
308 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. P. 208,216. Kynge, J. (2007). China Shakes the World: the Rise 
of a Hungry Nation. London: Phoenix. Nevertheless, this process did not come overnight. In the beginning of 
the stage during late 1970s and early 1980s, the country actually faced a critical balance of payment 
difficulties. The economy became more open to the outside world, government under the leadership of 
Deng needed more foreign currencies to buy large amount of producing facilities from overseas for a 
number of core industries. The government was gambling that they could have luck with oil which can 
generate foreign currency they needed to finish these purchase. 
Shi, D. (2006). The Research Report of Marketisation Reform of the Energy Industry (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Economy and Management Publishing House. p. 219. The oil export peaked in 1985 when oil export valued 
of US$6.7bn, and accounted for 24.5% of the total export of the country 
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the production was not the top priority of the petroleum sector anymore. 
Figure 5-2 The Foreign exchange reserves 
Forex Reserves (bn $) 
25 1- 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Forex Reserves (bn 
$) 
"Oll --. Iq$l Alp ap -"Cgp -op 
Second, it was less attractive and necessary for the government to retain control and 
keep intervening in the sector. The reduction in production and financial crisis facing 
the sector turned it into a burden for the government rather than a "cash cow". 
Additionally, being a net exporter throughout the stage under a low international oil 
prices scenario, the country had less security of supply concern. Furthermore, the 
general economic reforms also encouraged market-driven economic reforms in the 
petroleum sector. 
However, due to several concerns, the government needed to control the petroleum 
sector in order to prevent it from pursuing its own exclusive interest. This prevented it 
from reforming the sector in a more radical way. The petroleum sector had grown into a 
player with its own separate identity, due to its increasing autonomy. It also developed 
significant commercial and regulatory capacity, which equipped it with the ability to 
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influence the government for higher budgetary allocations and better terms from the 
government. The government, on the contrary, still had a relatively weak regulatory 
capacity, and had to assign the petroleum sector with non-commercial responsibilities. 
The difficulty to measure the performance of the sector and to monitor it increased the 
probability for the sector to pursue its own interests at the cost of the government. 
Additionally, the government continued to retain its control over the pricing and 
distribution systems, as the market capacity of the country was felt to be insufficient, 
and also for social equity considerations. Controlling the NOCs was a critical measure 
to control the petroleum value chain, and therefore it was an effective measure to 
buttress the regulated pricing and distribution policies. 
Furthermore, the segmented accounting standards prevailing during this stage prevented 
the government from collecting qualified information from the petroleum sector. Also, 
the administrative pricing and distribution system denied the availability of a fair 
market price, which was essential in calculating an economically meaningful 
profitability indicator. This also resulted in a situation where the petroleum sector had 
its real commercial performance obscured, thus presenting it neither an incentive nor 
responsibility to better its performance. Under this situation, production had to be used 
continuously as a major performance indicator of the petroleum sector. 
As a result, the government's intention to commercialise the petroleum sector and to 
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liberalise the petroleum market was restricted by the relatively weak national capacity 
of the country. This determined the extremely cautious and transitional natural of the 
reforms of the petroleum sector during this stage as will be analysed in the next section. 
5.2 The reforms of the institutional arrangement of the petroleum 
sector 
The institutional arrangement of the petroleum sector in China underwent major 
changes during this stage mainly driven by the objectives of the government as 
discussed in section 5.1. The major elements of the petroleum sector reforms since 1976 
were, firstly, the corporatisation of the sector by transforming and restructuring the MPI 
into several NOCs and gradually increasing their autonomy, secondly, the partial 
liberalisation of oil price system by the introduction of dual and multi-price system, and 
thirdly, the formalisation of fiscal and financial systems. 
5.2.1 The reform of the regulatory framework 
Driven by its intention to commercialise the petroleum sector, the government 
corportised and restructured the MPI and established three NOCs, in the hope of further 
separating the role of the government and commercial identities, and increasing the 
autonomy of the petroleum sector. The details of the corportisation are analysed in the 
next section on industrial structure. An Energy Ministry was established in 1988 to 
regulate energy related issues (as shown in Figure 5.3). Despite the establishment of the 
ministry, a large amount of regulatory and administrative functions were left with the 
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newly established NOCs. Therefore, the regulatory framework remained similar to the 
previous one, with only a few minor changes such as the vesting regulatory powers in 
the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources ("MGMR") over natural resources. 
Also, several minor adjustments were introduced in the functioning of existing 
government agencies. 
Figure 5-3 The regulatory and industrial framework (1978-1993) 
State Council 
SPC 11 MPI/NIOE 11 MOF 11 MOFTEC 11 MGMR 11 MOC 
CNPC II Sinopec I CNOOC II SinoChem 
SPC: State Planning Commission 
MPI: The Ministry of Petroleum Industry (It actually took different names from different stages, see 
4.2.2.1 
The Ministry of Energy (1988-1992) 
MOF: Ministry of Finance 
MOFTEC: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation 
MGMR: Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources 
MOC: Ministry of Commerce 
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation (from 1988) 
Sinopec: China Petrochemical Corporation (from 1983) 
CNOOC: China National Offshore Oil Corporation (from 1982) 
Sinochem: China National Chemical Import and Export Corporation 
5.2.1.1 The AMGMR / MPI - the resource management 
The Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources ("MGMR") was the government 
agency in charge of resource management. Although it existed during the previous stage, 
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its role in resource management was limited to broad geological and geophysical survey, 
and major functions of resource management remained within the specific MPI and 
comprehensive regulatory bodies. The enactment of a new national resource law, the 
"Mining and Resources Law of PRC", in 1986, introduced the role of the MGMR as the 
primary body in charge of resource management, especially as a registry of exploration 
and development rights over natural resources. However, due to the lack of capacity in 
the ministry, the management of oil and gas resources, which were categorised under 
the Law as special resources, was still managed by the MPI from 1986 to 1988, and the 
Ministry of Energy from 1988 to 1993,309 
5.2.1.2 The SPC - long term planning and projects approval/ production role 
The functions of the SPC remained more or less the same in terms of regulating the 
production, investment and marketing aspects of the petroleum sector. The commission 
still played a key role in long term planning, investment management, setting 
production levels, approving large projects, setting prices and regulating the distribution 
of crude oil and oil products (The detailed distribution and price system will be 
analysed in section 5.2.3). 310 Although the power of the commission in the general 
economy started to reduce slowly during this stage, due to the reduced share of centrally 
controlled commodities and the decentralised investment system, its role in the 
309 Chinamining. (2003). The Oil and Gas Mining Regulatory System in China (In Chinese). Retrieved 4 Apr, 
2007, from http: /Ywww. chinamining. com. cn/report/default. asp? V_DOC_ID=1360 
310 Shi, D. (2006). The Research Report of Marketisation Reform of the Energy Industry (In Chinese). 
Beijing: Economy and Management Publishing House. p. 230. Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price 
and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. 
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petroleum sector was still relatively strong. 311 SPC also undertook other responsibilities 
for governing the petroleum sector, such as the import and export management, through 
a quota system, and input control, as it still retained the right to allocate key 
commodities such as steel and power, although the share of these key commodities in 
the economy was decreasing. 312 
5.2.1.3 The MOF - Financial and fiscal management 
The role of the MOF as the main body of formulating finance and taxation policy of the 
petroleum sector remained unchanged to a large extent as analysed in section 5.1 despite 
reforms of the fiscal and financial regime of the petroleum sector. The major change in 
the financial policy during this stage was a reduction of direct funds that the Ministry 
provided to the petroleum sector. However, the government still played a major role in 
helping NOCs to raise capital, the details of which will be discussed in section 5.2.4 of 
this chapter. Reforms were also conducted in the taxation of NOCs to increase 
incentives and to formalise their relationship with the government, which shall be 
analysed in further detail in section 5.2.5. 
Other changes of policy included the enhancement of the accounting standards by the 
Ministry during this stage in order to increase the quality of information on cost 
accounting. The Ministry improved the cost accounting standards of SOEs in 1984 to 
311 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 204 
312 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 
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curb the rising cost of SOEs and the abuse of cost accounting. Despite this effort, the 
Soviet style accounting was not addressed effectively. This together with the segmented 
accounting practice, with different sectors employing different accounting methods, still 
prevented the government from acquiring high quality financial information from the 
petroleum sector. 
5.2.1.4 The Ministry of Energy 
In 1988, when the MPI was transformed into an NOC named CNPC, along with the 
Ministry of Coal and the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, a new Ministry of Energy was 
established to take some of their administrative functions. Its official responsibilities 
included "formulating foreign cooperation policy, energy policy, approving of bidding 
rounds, devising long-term planning, and approving of large projects". 313 But it never 
played a significant role, as compared to the powerful SOEs with regulatory functions, 
and was abolished a few years later in 1993.314 
5.2.2 The reforms of the industrial structure 
As been discussed in the previous section, a new industrial structure was established by 
the government with the MPI being abolished and three NOCs being established. This 
section will analyse the specific rationales behind the establishment of each NOC. The 
involvement of foreign investment, and the internal structure of NOCs, using the 
313 Chinamining. (2003). The Oil and Gas Mining Regulatory System in China (In Chinese). Retrieved 4 
Apr, 2007, from http: l/www. chinamining. com. cn/report/default. asp? V_DOC_ID=1360 
314 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 78 
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example of CNPC, will also be discussed. 
5.2.2.1 The evolution of the petroleum sector 
During the early years of this stage, from 1976 to 1988, the industrial structure of the 
petroleum sector remained more or less similar to the previous stage with a specific line 
ministry in charge of the petroleum sector. From 1976 to 1978, the Ministry of the 
Petroleum and Chemical industry was in charge of the petroleum sector, which was 
separated into the Ministry of Chemical Industry and the Ministry of Petroleum in 1978. 
Three NOCs were established between 1978 and 1988. In 1982, the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation ("CNOOC") was established to facilitate the offshore foreign 
cooperation under the MPI. In 1983, the downstream activities were separated from the 
MPI, and these together with other refinery and petrochemical activities of other 
industries and local governments were transferred to a new NOC named Sinopec 
Corporation ("Sinopec") under the direct supervision of the State Council. The most 
notable change occurred in 1988 when the government transformed the MPI into a new 
NOC named China National Petroleum Corporation ("CNPC"). Most of the regulatory 
and administrative functions of the previous ministry were retained in CNPC, although 
the Ministry of Energy coordinated the regulation of the energy sector as discussed 
above. The changes in the regulatory and industrial framework are shown in the figure 
5.4. 
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Figure 5-4 The Evolution of the regulatory and industrial framework (1988-1993) 
The Ministry of the Petroleum and Chemical 
Industry 
The Ministry of the Chemical The Ministry of the Petroleum 
Industry Industry (MPI) 
CNOOC was 
established under MPI 
Sinopec was separated 
under the State Council 
CNPC was established based on MPI 
Ministry of Energy established 
Ministry of Energy was abolished 
5.2.2.2 The establishment of CNOOC (1982) 
1976 
1979 
1982 
1983 
1988 
1993 
CNOOC was established in 1982 as a general bureau under the MPI, serving as a 
government agent to regulate the new involvement of foreign companies in China's 
petroleum sector. 315 The establishment of it as a separate entity was called for by the 
foreign players, who were concerned about the complexity of the regulatory framework 
in China as well as possible barriers from different vested interest groups. 316 To ensure 
a less complicated regulatory environment and to free foreign investors from 
315 The rank of general bureau is between deputy ministry and bureaus and was half a level lower then a 
deputy ministry and a half level higher than a bureau 
316 Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 123-124 
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interventions from different levels of government, the government established the NOC. 
The contracts signed between foreign companies and the NOC would be a "binding 
document". 317 The new NOC enjoyed a number of privileges, including the right to sell 
its production in the international market at international prices, retain the foreign 
currencies it earned, and keep the after-tax profit. 318 
In addition to its operational functions, the company was also assigned with the 
regulatory task as the representative of the government. 319 It acted as a government 
agent to ensure the sovereign power over foreign involvements, and exercised 
"exclusive control over the negotiations and licensing around, exploration, development 
and marketing of all oil resources within offshore areas designated by the Chinese 
government". 320 The company soon gained its legal entity and business license and 
separated itself from the MPI and operated relatively insulated from the regulatory 
framework of the petroleum sector. 
5.2.2.3 The establishment of Sinopec (1983) 
Sinopec was established in 1983 based on a small number of refineries belonging to the 
317 Ibid. p. 255 
318 Ibid. p. 125 
319 Ibid. p. 123-124 
320 Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand Restructure of the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The 
Petroleum Industrial Publishing House. p. 185. Yan, X., & Yang, J. (1999). Fuelling the 21st Century China: 
the Report on Improving the International Competitiveness of Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). 
Beijing: The Enterprises Management Publishing House. Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy 
Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 123 
"Norway's Statoil played a significant role in shaping China's thinking on this issue but the MPI also studied 
the experiences of England, Indonesia, and other places" 
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MPI, and a large number of refineries and petrochemical plants belonging to local 
governments. Similar to CNOOC, the NOC was an administrative style corporation 
with both operational activities and regulatory and administrative functions. 
The establishment of Sinopec was mainly driven by the central government's effort to 
regain control of revenue from regional government. By taking over the ownership of 
refineries and petroleum plants that belonged to the local governments, the central 
government ensured itself the access to lucrative revenues generated by these plants. 321 
The lower domestic crude prices regulated by the government could ensure the profit 
level of refineries and therefore the revenue income of the central government. To 
justify the move, the central government also argued that it was a more effective way 
for utilising limited resources and in building a strong national petrochemical 
capacity. 322 
5.2.2.4 The establishment of CNPC (1988) 
CNPC was established in 1988 on the basis of the previous MPI (excluding the assets 
that were transferred to CNOOC). This move was part of the general regulatory reforms, 
in order to reduce the direct governmental intervention in the economy. 323 
32' Nolan, P. (2001). China and the Global Business Revolution: Palgrave. p. 446 
322 Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand Restructure of the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The 
Petroleum Industrial Publishing House. p. 20,209 
323 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 171 
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Although the government claimed that the main objective of CNPC was profitability, 
CNPC was, similar to CNOOC and Sinopec, an administrative NOC with operational 
and regulatory functions. It was a legal person, with administrative status, and was 
under direct control of the State Council. 324 The head of the petroleum sector continued 
to be a political appointee of the central government. This position continued to be of an 
administrative rank, and incumbents expected their next post as cabinet ministers or 
governors of a province. 325 
CNPC played an important role in supporting the SPC in drafting long-term planning, 
and making decisions on investment and production, by providing basic information, 
submitting proposals of major projects, and forecasting of the oil and gas demand and 
supply in the country. CNPC formulated the strategic plans for the whole onshore 
petroleum industry, devised the long and middle-term production planning for the 
industry, and submitted the same for approval from SPC. The headquarters of CNPC 
also supported the SPCs in the marketing of petroleum by formulating transportation 
and allocation plans for the whole country, and was responsible for the coordination and 
enforcement of the approved distribution plans. 326 The headquarters of CNPC had to 
coordinate with Sinopec to allocate crude oil to Sinopec's refineries based on the annual 
oil allocation plan established by SPC, CNPC and Sinopec. 
324 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 78 
325 Ibid. p. 89 
326 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 82 
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The headquarters of CNPC also supported SPC and MOF in financing the petroleum 
sector. 
The CNPC headquarters still played an important role in resource management. Due to 
the insufficient capacity of MGMR, almost all resource licenses were issued to the 
MPI/NOCs over a long period of time, with only negligible number of small blocks in 
Shaanxi province being assigned to the local governments or enterprises. As a result, the 
management of resources to ensure a proper development rate was largely left in the 
hands of the MPI /NOCs. It was also responsible for sector specific standards and rules, 
although most of these were required to be ratified by relevant ministries in the 
government. Examples included the national quality standards for oil industry, the 
policy for environmental regulation and the sector specific accounting principles. 
5.2.2.5 The involvement of foreign companies 
Another notable change of the industrial structure of the Chinese petroleum industry 
was the opening up of a small share of reserves for foreign companies. The Chinese 
government started to bring in foreign oil companies to participate in the petroleum 
activities since the end 1970s, driven mainly by the concerns over reduced petroleum 
reserves and production capacity, and lack of capital investment. 327 Chinese 
327 Shi, D. (2006). The Research Report of Marketisation Reform of the Energy Industry (In Chinese). 
Beijing: Economy and Management Publishing House. p. 219. This move was also underpinned by the 
prevailing optimistic opinion towards the prospects of petroleum reserves in the country. The offshore and 
Western onshore regions were believed to be the top two prospective areas in the country. there was once 
an optimistic predictions that "China's offshore hydrocarbon could be as much as those of North Sea". The 
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government had hoped that the country would be able to develop the technically 
challenging oil reserves in offshore and Western onshore regions with foreign capital 
and technology, to succeed the maturing eastern and northern oilfields. 328 
The petroleum sector was attracted by the capital, technology, and increased production 
that foreign players could bring, but was also concerned about threats posed by foreign 
players. As a result, the NOCs not only opposed the issuance of high quality blocks to 
foreign companies, but also insisted on their dominant roles in joint ventures with 
foreign participants. Therefore, blocks set for foreign cooperation were small and 
remote. All foreign involvement in Chinese petroleum sector had to be conducted 
through cooperation with either CNPC or CNOOC based on Production Sharing 
Agreement ("PSA") system. 329 
5.2.2.6 The internal structure of the NOCs 
During this stage, the internal structure of NOC was similar to the previous stage. 
Taking the example of CNPC, during corporatisation process, the previous PABs were 
transformed into oil and gas production enterprises (will be referred to as business unit 
international players were also eager to involve in the petroleum sectors of China following the deterioration 
of Iran situation and the central government was also prone to an open door policy. 
328 Sun, X. (1999). The Development of China's Petroleum Policy: from Import-Dependency to 
Sustainability. University of Dundee, Dundee. p. 172. The offshore and western onshore opening did not 
happen at the same time. The government stated by opening less controversial offshore operations first in 
early 1980s. It was the failure of the offshore operation to generate prospects that drove the government to 
open up onshore blocks (By mid 1980s, the offshore oil production only account for about 5% of the national 
production. ) In 1985, the government opened the 11 southern onshore provinces for foreign cooperation 
under No. 23 documents issued by the State Council in 1985. 
329 Sun, X. (1999). The Development of China's Petroleum policy: from Import-Dependency to 
Sustainability. University of Dundee, Dundee. p. 173 
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"BU"). Trial measures were adopted to increase the autonomy of them in investment 
and financial management. However these new enterprises still undertook 
responsibilities similar to those in the previous stage, including operational and social 
functions. In theory the relationship between the headquarters of CNPC and BUs 
remained similar to the previous stage, with the headquarters of CNPC still conducting 
a direct administrative style management in governing its subordinate enterprises. 
The company was still organised in a highly decentralised management model. However, 
significant power had been retained by BUs along with the removal of the Party's 
control in their daily investment and productivity activities. This together with increased 
autonomy of BUs resulted in imprudent investment and weak cost control, reflected by 
rapid expansion of assets in irrelevant activities and complicated corporate structures. 330 
This further increased the difficulty of the headquarters in exerting an efficient 
monitoring and control system over the BUs. 331 For example, the Zhongyuan oilfield in 
the 1990s had more than one hundred independent subsidiaries under the direct 
management of this BU. Each had its own bank account and managed its own business. 
Additionally, further divergent interests between the headquarters and the BUs 
intensified the negative effects of the decentralised business pattern, as BUs were more 
likely to pursue their own interests at the cost of the headquarters. 
33° Jia, Y., Xiao, Y., & Guo, T. (2005). Budget and Cash Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 226. 
331 Ibid. p. 227. For example, in 1986, Shengli oilfield imported a water injection facility from UK, at a cost of 
RMB 12.1 mn, which was never put into use due to a miscalculation of input indicators such as power 
pressure during feasibility study stage. 
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5.2.2.7 Conclusion 
During this stage, the industrial structure of the petroleum sector began to change 
during this stage. Firstly, the former specific line ministries had been corporatised and 
transformed into several NOCs with regulatory and operational functions. A new 
industrial structure was established characterised by several NOCs playing a dominant 
role in their respective fields. CNOOC was in charge of the offshore oil and gas 
business, CNPC was in charge of the onshore oil and gas business, and Sinopec was in 
charge of the downstream refinery and petrochemical business. This move reflected the 
intention of the government's to reduce its direct role in the sector. 
The newly established NOCs performed similar regulatory functions, as well as 
productive functions as the previous MPI. BUs still took operational, supporting and 
social responsibilities in the same manner as they did before. However, as the NOCs 
and their BUs enjoyed an increasing level of autonomy during this stage, the negative 
symptoms of the P-A problem when agent pursuing their own interest at the cost of their 
principal started to become serious. 
Furthermore, due to the pattern of strong NOCs and weak government capacity, the 
petroleum sector started to influence the government and to lobby for policies for its 
best interests. For example, similar to many oil producing countries, the Chinese 
government brought in foreign investors for the purpose of technology, capital, and 
managerial skills. However, the foreign involvement in China was never as significant 
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as in many other countries, partially because of the strong objection from the NOCs, 
and partially because of the government's conscious decision of trusting domestic 
players rather than foreigners, especially in the sensitive resource sectors. 
5.2.3 The reforms of the pricing and distribution systems 
During this stage, the pricing and distribution systems of petroleum were partially 
liberalised, driven by the overall economic reform, as well as the need to address the 
financial shortage faced by the NOCs. The reforms during this stage took an extremely 
cautious and experimental path, mainly influenced by the concerns of the government 
over the possible economic, social and political impacts of the policy change, and the 
lack of suitable national capacity. After the reform, a small amount of crude oil and oil 
products were allowed to be sold at a market or quasi-market prices, outside the 
government controlled distribution system. The major share of crude oil and oil 
products was still distributed by the government controlled distribution system, at the 
government regulated prices. 
332 
5.2.3.1 The pricing and distribution systems (crude oil) 
For crude oil, dual and multi-pricing systems were implemented by liberalising a small 
share of oil prices and allowing the existence of two or more bands of prices. 
332 Shi, D. (2006). The Research Report of Marketisation Reform of the Energy Industry (In Chinese). 
Beijing: Economy and Management Publishing House. p. 230 
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The government regulated prices: During this stage, a major share of crude oil was 
still sold at government regulated low prices. The price level had remained unchanged 
since 1971 (table 5.5), and was far below the level of international crude oil prices. 333 
Table 5-5 The government regulated prices for crude oil (1971 to 1987) 334 
Location 
Prices R%IB 
Yuan/ton 
US equivalent 
$/bbl 
Brent price'" 
$/bbl 
Daging. Shengli, Dagang, Liaohe. Jilin. I00 3.7 18.4 
Xinjiang Qinghai, 115 4.2 18.4 
Yu nen, Sichuan, Jianghan 130 4.8 18.4 
The dual price system (1981-1985): In 1981, the government started to allow the 
petroleum sector to sell their excess production, over their production targets to 
overseas at the international prices, or to the domestic market at government regulated 
export prices set by the government equivalent to that of the international level. 336 
Under the new system, most of the crude oil exceeding production target was exported, 
at the international price level, which was nearly 4 to 6 times of the domestic level 
(table 5.5 and 5.6). 337 During this stage, crude oil remained to take different prices 
based on factors such as quality and location. 
333Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 83. Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation 
Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 6 
334 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House-p. 6. The US equivalent is calculated by the author based on the foreign currency rate 
prevailing in 1987 and the conversion factor of 1ton = 7.3 bbl. Using the foreign exchange rate of 1987 
335 The price level for Brent in 1987. 
336 During this stage, although in theory this price should be similar to the international prices, the 
government had kept it lower than the international prices. 
337 Shi, D. (2006). The Research Report of Marketisation Reform of the Energy Industry (In Chinese). 
Beijing: Economy and Management Publishing House. p. 230 
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Table 5-6 The government regulated export prices 338 
Year 
Daging oil 
(RMB y uan/ton) 
USD Equivalent 
($/bbl) 
Shengli oil 
(RMB Yuan/ton) 
USD equivalent 
($/bbl) 
Brent oil 
($/bbl) 
I IM 2 (period I) 644 47 532 39 33 
1982 (period 2) 620 45 520 38 33 
1983 590 41 490 34 30 
1984 545 32 475 28 29 
19xx 555 20 485 18 15 
The multi-price system (1986-1993): In 1986, the international oil prices declined 
sharply, the amount of oil being export was reduced. Hence the NOCs faced financial 
problem again. To address this, the government introduced the third band of 
government regulated high oil prices, higher than the regulated export oil prices, 
applied to a small share of crude oil sold to Sinopec by CNPC. 33' For example, the new 
regulated high price for Daqing oil was RMB 660 yuan/ton in 1989, compared to RMB 
127 yuan/ton of regulated low price, and RMB 555 yuan/ton of regulated export price. 
By then, a triple-track pricing system came into being. 
The government also gradually increased the level of the regulated prices from 1988 to 
1993 to relieve the financial burden of the NOCs, in response to their strong lobbying. 
The regulated low and high prices were increased by RMB 10 yuan/ton in 1988 and by 
338 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 10. The conversion factor: Iton =7.3 bbl, the foreign currency of the year was used to 
convert USD equivalent of oil prices of each specific year. 
339 Shi, D. (2006). The Research Report of Marketisation Reform of the Energy Industry (In Chinese). 
Beijing: Economy and Management Publishing House. p. 230 
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an average of RMB 34 yuan/ton in 1991.340 The regulated low prices were increased by 
an extra RMB 27 yuan /ton in 1989. Meanwhile, each year the government increased 
the share of crude oil allowed to be sold at the regulated high prices. From 1991-1992, 
25.4 mit tons of oil was lifted. Despite the above piece-meal attempts at increasing the 
price level for crude oil, the average prices for domestic crude oil were still much lower 
than the international prices (table 5.7). 
Table 5-7 Comparison of the domestic and international prices (1981-1996) 341 
Year 
Average oil prices (RMB 
yuan/ton) 
FX rate (USD /RMB 
Yuan) 
Chinese oil prices in 
USD/bbl 
Brent prices 
USD/bbl 
1981 102.2 1.7051 7.99 35.93 
1982 115.58 1.8926 8.72 32.97 
1983 127.21 1.9767 9.19 29.55 
1984 162.64 2.3270 9.98 28.78 
1985 201.49 2.9367 9.80 27.56 
1986 174.56 3.4528 7.22 14.43 
1987 196.23 3.7221 7.53 18.44 
1988 205.11 3.7221 7.87 14.92 
1989 247.18 3.7659 9.38 18.23 
1990 291.17 4.7838 8.70 23.73 
1991 333.95 5.3227 8.96 20.00 
1992 376.01 5.5149 9.74 19.32 
1993 546.26 5.7619 13.54 16.97 
1994 756.23 8.6187 12.53 15.82 
1995 871.63 8.3507 14.91 17.02 
1996 946.48 8.3142 16.26 20.67 
340 Zhou, M., Lu, L., & Chai, S. (2005). Accounting and Information System (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. p. 23 
Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 11 
341 BP. (2006). "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. " Retrieved 21 Jan 2007, from 
http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryld=6842&contentld=7021390. Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. 
(2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 19 
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5.2.3.2 The pricing and distribution systems (oil products) 
Reforms of oil products maintained a similar trend to that of crude oil through the 
introduction of dual and multi price systems. However, the government increased the 
prices for oil products at a much faster pace than crude oil. 
From 1978 to 1983, the government set prices for most oil products. The price level was 
low and maintained almost unchanged since 1970s (government regulated low price). 
Since 1983, the government allowed the oil products produced from higher priced crude 
oil to be sold at a higher price regulated by the government (government regulated 
high price) and sold to the government controlled distribution system. 342 By 1993, 
most of the oil products were allowed to be sold at a high government regulated price 
except those meant for military and agricultural use. 343 See table 5.8 for a detailed 
evolution of the pricing system for oil products. 
Additionally, a small share of oil products was allowed to be sold outside the central 
planning system to customers chosen by refineries at a price negotiated by buyers and 
sellers jointly (quasi market prices). For this amount of oil products, the government 
maintained the right to intervene when necessary. It did so in 1984 by setting a ceiling 
price for this share of products. It also intervened to reduce the price level for diesel to 
address a surplus of diesel in that year. In another move in 1984, the government set 
342 Sinopec was authorised to set the prices 
343 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 28-29 
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ceiling prices for all major oil products to curb inflation. 344 
In 1993,9% of oil products produced by Sinopec and 5% of oil products produced by 
CNPC were allowed to be sold outside the government regulated distribution system. 345 
In response to these measures, a few commodity exchange markets for oil products were 
established in 1993 in Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing as attempts to search for a better 
for price discovery mechanism. 346 
Table 5-8 The oil products pricing and distribution system (1978-1993) 
Year The pricing and distribution system The nature of the system 
Before 1983 central planning system Factory gate price was decided by the government 
through the Ministry of Petroleum Industry 
1983-1993 a mixture of central planning and quasi market Factory gate price was regulated by the government 
system/ dual, multi-price system through Sinopec; 
The wholesale and retail prices for oil products was 
regulated by the Ministry of Commerce based on cost 
+ profit method 
Although the government regulated most of the 
prices and the allocation of oil products, a small 
amount of oil products was allowed to be sold by the 
oil companies outside the government-planning 
system at a market price, at a higher price. 
Examples of regulated price, higher price and ceiling price for a few major locations in 
1988 are illustrated in table 5.9. 
344 Ibid. p. 26 
345 Ibid. p. 1 3 
346 Dong, X., Sun, R., Zhang, H., Gao, J., Zhang, P., & Li, X. (2006). The Research of the Reforming of the 
Oil Products Market Distribution System in China (In Chinese). Beijing: University of Petroleum, China. p. 74, 
116 
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Table 5-9 Examples of price level of 70# petrol in China in 1988 
70# petrol (yuan/ton) 
Regulated price High price Ceiling price 
Shenyang, Dalian, Fushun 667 930 1120 
Jinzhou, Jinxi 705 968 1130 
Changchun 667 958 1120 
Jilin, qianguoqi 697 1005 1150 
Wuhan 728 975 1140 
5.2.3.3 Conclusion 
The petroleum pricing and distribution systems at this stage underwent major reforms 
driven by the general intention of the government to enhance the efficiency of the 
system through liberalisation. As a result, the government gradually liberalised the 
pricing system for crude oil and oil products by allowing a small share of these products 
to be sold outside the government controlled distribution system. The government also 
increased gradually the level of regulated prices for both crude oil and oil products, in 
order to reduce the gap between international and domestic oil price levels and provide 
a better price signals for suppliers and consumers. These measures started to increase 
the autonomy of NOCs in deciding the prices for their products. 
However, as has been analysed in the section 5.1, the reform was largely restricted by 
the national capacity of the country and by the concerns of social impact of the reform. 
As a result, the measures taken by the government were extremely cautions and gradual. 
The government still maintained major control over pricing and distribution systems for 
crude oil and oil products, and the domestic pricing setting mechanism was still largely 
isolated from the international price system with major considerations for reforms being 
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focused on domestic factors. 
This cautions approach was helpful in maintaining stability and in minimising the social 
impacts of reforms, but had several negative consequences. For example, the system 
was still largely a government regulated system and market played only a minor role in 
forming prices. Meanwhile, the existence of multi tiers of prices for crude oil and oil 
products increased the difficulty for the government to regulate the pricing and 
distribution system and could potentially foster rent-seeking behaviours. Finally, the 
prices for oil products had been increased faster than the prices for crude oil. This policy 
started to squeeze the profitability of the crude oil producer CNPC and resulted in an 
inflated profit for Sinopec. This mismatch of price level for crude oil and oil products 
also encouraged over-investment in refineries which would otherwise have been 
economically unviable. 
347 In 1995, the processing capacity for crude had reached 0.2 bn 
ton, which was much higher than the production capacity of 0.135 bn ton, so that most 
of the refineries were not operating at full capacity. 348 
5.2.4 The reform of the financial regime 
During this stage, similar to the general reform of financial system, the government 
reduced largely the amount of direct budget injection in the petroleum sector. However, 
restricted by the national capacity, the NOCs still relied mainly on the government for 
347 Wen, C., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 14 
348 Ibid. p. 21 
168 
capital, through several special transitional policies tools, including the Exploration and 
Development Funds ("EDF"), the Reserve Usage Fee ("RUF"), and the Oil 
Maintenance Fee ("OMF") policy. 
5.2.4.1 The EDF policy 
In 1981, the government introduced a "Big Production Contract" to address the 
financial shortage facing CNPC and also to increase the autonomy of the company. EDF 
was introduced in the contract as a tool to raise funds for CNPC. The contract was a 
special performance contract signed between the government and NOCs. 349 See table 
4.10 for details of this contract. 350 Through the contract, the petroleum sector 
committed to achieve an annual target of producing 100 mit tons of crude oil, together 
with several other performance indicators. The 100 mit tonnes of crude oil, according to 
the contract, should be sold to the government controlled distribution system at the 
government regulated low prices. Production exceeding the target could be sold by the 
petroleum sector either overseas or in the domestic market at a much higher price level 
(See section 5.2.3.1). The extra revenue received by the petroleum sector was required 
to be put in a special fund called EDF, and to be earmarked for use in exploration and 
development as well as the welfare of employees. The policy remained in force until 
1990 and helped the petroleum sector to raise a large amount of capital investment. 35' 
349 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 23. Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large 
Firms in the Oil Industry London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 77 
35° Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 23 
351 Ibid. p. 26 
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Table 5-10 The major content of the Big Production Contract 352 
In 198 1. a proposal jointly drafted by the Energy Commission, NPC, NETC was submitted to the state council named "The report 
on the increased dulling and oilfield construction work needed to stabilisation of 100 mit tonnes crude oil production next year". 
According to the proposal, the MPI was committed to produce 100 mit tonnes crude oil per year; a "hand-over" to the state of 
94 5% of actual oil output, and 90.5 general production rate Rx refinery (Tong shou /r). The 100 inn tonnes oil should be sold at 
low regulated prices. The MPI was allowed to export the production exceeding the contract production and retain the profit (in 
foreign exchange) or sell it in domestic market at a much higher government regulated export price. 
The foreign exchange income of' the MPI could be used to import advanced technology and instruments. The extra revenue 
gained by the industry was earmarked into special fund, 86% of which were allowed to be used for exploration and development, 
the rest of 15% were allowed to be used for the welfare and bonus of employee The proposal was approved by the State Council 
soon and this was the first sector reform taken by the government and marked the beginning of the reform of big SOEs in China. 
5.2.4.2 The RUF policy 
The RUF was another financial policy introduced by the government to help the 
petroleum sector in fund-raising, in response to a sharp reduction in international oil 
prices in 1986.353 According to the policy, the petroleum sector could save certain 
amount of capital in a special fund for each unit of oil and gas it produced. The capital 
was book-kept as production cost and could be used later towards exploration and 
development. In 1988, the rate of the RUF was RMB 5 yuan/ton for crude oil and RMB 
5 yuan/cubic meter for gas. The rate for RUF increased by RMB 27,17 and 10 yuan in 
1989,1990 and 1991 respectively. 
5.2.4.3 The On1F policy 
The OMF was another financial policy established in early 1960s and remained in force 
352 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 77 
353 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 25 
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throughout this stage. The mechanism of OMF was similar to that of RUF, according to 
which the petroleum sector was allowed to put aside certain amount of capital in a 
special account to ear-marked for use in small scale production maintenance activities 
during the production stage. 354 Similar to that of RUF, it was accounted as production 
cost 
5.2.4.4 Direct subsidy 
In addition to the above policies, from 1988 the oil sector received subsidies from the 
government, to cover its continuous deficit partially caused by the government 
regulated price mechanism (See table 5.11). 
Table 5-11 The deficit and subsidy of CNPC (1988-1993) 355 
Unit RMB bn 
Year CNPC deficit subsidy from MOF 
I9sh 0.74 0.16 
1989 3.87 3.92 
1990 5.59 4.97 
1991 5.28 4.88 
1992 9.26 5 
1993 2.63 2.7 
Total 27.37 21.63 
5.2.4.5 Conclusion 
During this stage, the financial relationship, in theory, progressed towards being more 
market driven, with funds provided by the government to NOCs being reduced and 
354 Zhou, M., Lu, L., & Chai, S. (2005). Accounting and Information System (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. p. 10,13 
355 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 172 
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NOCs moving towards being self-reliant in raising funds. However, due to the lack of 
the regulatory capacity of the government, the market capacity and immaturity of other 
reforms, such as the liberalisation of price and market, as well as the enforcement of 
market driven accounting standards, which enabled enterprises to recover investment 
through cost accounting, the NOCs still lacked commercial ability, and therefore had to 
rely mainly on the government for most of their capital requirements through several 
transitional financial policies (table 5.12). The capital raised by the petroleum sector 
from retained profit and bank loans still counted for only a small share of the total 
capital needs, despite the government's encouragement for the petroleum sector to 
utilise domestic and foreign loans. 356 
Table 5-12 The total investment and its sources357 
Unit: RMH bn_ % 
Year Total investment State Budget OMF EDF RUF Sub total % of state investment 
IIMN 21.44 2.38 3.82 6.55 0.66 13.41 62.5% 
1989 25.13 1.42 4.18 6 3.52 15.12 60.2% 
1990 26.83 1.91 4.58 6.39 6.29 19.17 71.4% 
1991 30.59 1.91 4.93 7.65 8.08 22.57 73.8% 
1992 36.59 1.63 5.26 12.29 8.41 27.59 75.4% 
5.2.5 The reform of the fiscal regime 
The reforms of the fiscal regime in the petroleum sector bore the hallmarks of the 
principles of the general fiscal regime reform. Similar to other sectors, the reforms of 
the fiscal regime in the petroleum sector were conducted gradually to take national 
356 Interview of a former finance officer of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry conducted in Beijing in 2006 
"From 1981, the oil industry had borrowed the Japan Energy loan, Japan Commercial loan, and World Bank 
loan for its investment under the support of the government" 
357 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 171, CNPC year book (1997) 
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capacity into consideration and to maintain stability and. The system experienced two 
rounds of "tax for profit" initiatives, following which the share of taxation increased 
and the share of profit remittance by the NOCs reduced in the overall revenue income of 
the government. 
5.2.5.1 The reform of the corporate income tax 
During the first round of "tax for profit" initiatives in 1983, a 55% income tax was 
levied on the petroleum sector in the first instance. Thereafter, the net profit from the 
first step was subject to a certain level of profit collection. The income tax plus profit 
collection equalled to the total remittance the petroleum sector submitted to the 
government before the reforms. In 1984, a second round of "tax for profit" reforms was 
launched and the direct profit remittance in the second level of the first round was 
completely substituted by taxation. Thus, in addition to the 55% income tax, the 
government thereafter collected another round of "profit adjustment tax" so that the tax 
revenue of the government remained almost the same as the previous years. The rate of 
the profit adjustment tax was therefore calculated based on the government share of 
after profit in 1983. For example, if the total profit of the petroleum sector in 1983 is 
RMB 100 bn, the government collected 55% income tax amounting to RMB 55 bn, and 
another RMB35 bn on the remaining RMB 45 bn, so that the rate of the profit 
adjustment tax was 35/45=78%. This rate of profit adjustment tax was then fixed from 
1985 to 1990.358 
358 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
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5.2.5.2 Other new taxes 
In addition to the Income Tax, the government also introduced a wide range of new 
taxes to be applied to the petroleum sector. For example, the energy and transportation 
keypoint fund was introduced in 1983. The products tax, the business tax, and the 
resource tax were introduced in 1984. The land usage tax was introduced in 1988. The 
budget adjustment fund was introduced in 1989. The fixed assets investment adjustment 
tax was introduced in 1991. Many other taxes were also introduced at this stage. 359 
5.2.5.3 Conclusion 
The fiscal regime reform that took place in the petroleum sector was an application of 
the general fiscal regime reform of the country to the sector. By the end of the period, 
taxation had substituted direct profit remittances as the main mean to extract revenue 
from the petroleum sector. In 1981, only a few minor taxes applied to the petroleum 
sector, and the taxes paid by the petroleum sector in 1981 was only 0.69 bn yuan. By 
1990, seventeen taxes and fees were applied to the sector, which thus paid 5.38 bn yuan 
in taxes (see table 5.13 ). 360 Due to the weak national capacity of the country, especially 
the lack of regulatory and market capacity, the tax rates in the newly established system 
were mainly based on the previous tax burden borne by enterprises. 
Publishing House. p. 172 
359 Ibid. p. 178 
360 Ibid. p. 179 
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Table 5-13 Tax paid by the petroleum industry (1981-1990) 361 
Year Crude oil production Sales revenue Tax paid Tax burden/income Tax burden 
nm tones RMB bn RMB bn 00 RMB yuaii ton 
1981 101 12.8 0.69 5.39 6.83 
1982 102 13 1.04 7.97 10.2 
1983 106 14.2 1.4 9.85 13.21 
1984 115 15.2 2.04 13.41 17.74 
1985 125 16.9 3.53 20.85 28.24 
1986 130 17.9 3.73 20.78 28.69 
1987 134 18.8 4.04 21.46 30.15 
1988 136 20.9 4.71 22.57 34.63 
1989 137 25.6 5.36 20.94 39.12 
1990 137 29.4 5.38 18.27 39.27 
5.2.6 The P-A relationship formed by the reforms 
During this stage, the government still remained a major player in the reforms of the 
NOCs and the petroleum sector. The main targets for the government to reform the 
petroleum sector were to enhance its commercial performance. Meanwhile, restricted by 
the national capacity, especially the weak regulatory and market capacity of the country, 
also concerned with the social impact of reforms, the government took a cautions and 
administrative style of reforms measures. 
Another notable phenomenon during this stage was the increasing influence of the 
petroleum sector in the decision making process of reforms, due to their increasingly 
separate identity from the government and degree of autonomy. This was clearly shown 
in the industrial structure reforms, when NOCs opposed significant foreign involvement, 
381 Ibid. (Tax paid figure in the table do not include income tax) 
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and in the fiscal regime reform, when they lobbied to increase oil prices as well as 
funding from the government. 
5.2.6.1 The tasks of the petroleum sector 
The petroleum sector during this stage was assigned with more autonomy although only 
marginally, in marketing their products, retaining their revenue, disposing their after-tax 
profit, as well as raising capital. Accordingly, there had been an increasing emphasis on 
profitability indicators in measuring the performance of the petroleum sector. However, 
production was still assigned to the petroleum sector as the major performance task due 
to weak national capacity and the practice of assigning NOCs with regulatory and social 
functions. Furthermore, the lack of a market system in forming prices and allocating 
products, together with the lack of a market style accounting system, were the major 
factors attributing to this situation. 
In addition to the productive responsibilities, the petroleum sector still took regulatory, 
administrative and social functions, due to the weak regulatory capacity of the 
government to take over these functions, and due to the social considerations of the 
government. These considerations also prevented the government from conducting more 
radical market-driven reforms in the pricing and distribution systems, as well as in the 
fiscal and financial regimes. 
176 
5.2.6.2 The supporting system 
The system of direct control and monitoring still served as a major mechanism for the 
government to govern the petroleum sector. The government still tightly controlled the 
majority of investment and production plans, contributed to a majority of capital and 
collected a majority of profit. It also set the price for a majority of oil, and controlled the 
distribution system. 
However, the control of the government over the petroleum sector had been weakened 
due to the increasing size, autonomy, and the separate identity developed by the sector, 
as discussed in section 5.1, the increasing difficulty to regulate the sector due to the 
transitional style reforms, 362 and the removal of the party control over daily operations 
of SOEs by the government. 
The role of material and commercial incentives started to increase as the government 
started to emphasise more on commercial performance of NOCs. The moral incentive 
had to a large extent been abandoned as the mentality of people had changed 
significantly. 
5.3 The evaluation of the reforms 
As has been analysed in section 5.1, the major objective of the government to reform 
the petroleum sector was to apply general principles of the economic reform to it, in 
362 This is partially caused by the complicated dual and multi-price systems. 
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order to enhance its commercial performance. This objective by itself represented 
progress compared to the previous stage when the government emphasised production 
rather than profitability due to challenges it was facing. To achieve the target, the 
government set commercial performance mainly reflected by profitability as the major 
target of the NOCs. Also, the government had undertaken reforms that should have had 
a positive impact on the commercial performance of NOCs, including corporatisation, 
increased autonomy and material incentives for NOCs, and partially liberalised pricing 
and distribution system. 
In addition to the above target of reform, the government also wanted to maintain 
stability during reforms, and minimise the negative economic and social impacts of the 
reforms, and employ practical measures in reforming NOCs which is compatible to the 
national capacity of the country during this stage. As a result, the reforms during this 
stage was effective in accommodating the second reform target, but was less effective in 
addressing the first objective, which could be reflected by the rising deficit of CNPC 
(table 5.14). 
Table 5-14 The Profit of CNPC (1988-1993) 
Year After-tax profit 
(RMB hn) 
1988 -0.74 
1989 -3.87 
1990 -5.59 
1991 -5.28 
1992 -9.26 
1993 -2.63 
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From the task perspective, the government had to use production as a primary 
performance indicator to measure the performance of the NOCs, restricted by national 
capacity, especially the lack of a effective price signals, a market style accounting 
system, and the regulatory capacity was the major factors attributing to the situation, as 
mentioned in section 5.1 and 5.2. As a result, the petroleum production continued to rise, 
although modestly (table 5.15). 363 Similar to the situation in the previous stage, the use 
of a production indicator could impede the commercial performance, as economically 
unviable petroleum could be produced. Furthermore, driven by the need to enhance 
productive performance, the NOCs were more likely to pursue their own exclusive 
interests by arguing for more budgetary allocations and other favourable terms from the 
government, resulting in poor investment and cost management. Additionally, the 
practices of assignment of NOCs with regulatory, administrative, and social 
responsibilities gave rise to "conflict of identity" and "multi-task" effects and could 
have a negative impact to the commercial performance of NOCs. 
Table 5-15 The Production and Reserve Indicators (1980-1993) 
Oil production 
(nil) tones) 
New production capacity 
(mn tones/year) 
Geological reserve 
(bn tones) 
1980 105.77 
1985 124.79 
1988 136.19 15.8 13.5 
1989 136.64 17.1 13.9 
1990 136.92 13.3 14.3 
1991 137.22 14.9 14.9 
1992 138.02 15.1 15.3 
1993 139.13 15.4 15.7 
363 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 20,26 
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From the incentive perspective, the government increased performance-linked material 
incentive, which was in accordance with the changing mentality and ideology of people 
during this stage. This was a positive aspect which took full account of the fact that the 
Cultural Revolution had damaged the trust of people in the communist ideology to some 
extent; therefore the moral incentive used in the previous stage was no longer effective. 
The continuous economic reform and the uncertainty caused by the chaos in the 
previous stage not only increased the sense of insecurity but also triggered the desire for 
material wealth, which made material incentive a more useful tool. However, the 
effectiveness of the incentive system was restricted by the nature of the tasks of the 
NOCs, and the ability of measuring these tasks by the government as discussed in the 
previous paragraph. As a result, it was hard to measure the mixture of the productive, 
regulatory and social tasks of the NOCs, without an effective accounting system. 
The monitoring and controlling system also had its weaknesses. On the one hand, too 
much control restricted the autonomy of the petroleum sector, and could therefore fail to 
mobilise the sector to enhance its commercial performance. On the other hand, as 
discussed in section 5.2, new system was in fact weaker than before, due to the relative 
weak capacity of the government and growing power and separate identity of the NOCs. 
The ineffective accounting system failed to generate timely and accurate information 
and thus worsened the situation. The petroleum sector, different from other sectors, still 
used a soviet-style accounting system, which emphasised quantity rather than 
180 
eficiency. 364 Further, under the current accounting system, the cost management was 
left mainly in the hands of the BUs. Meanwhile, the scope of the expenditure eligible 
for this category was not well-defined. As a result, the petroleum sector could benefit 
from the escalation of costs. 365 
To conclude, the government had the intention of placing commercial performance at 
the top of the agenda of the petroleum sector, and had conducted positive reform 
measures such as partial liberalisation of pricing and distribution systems, improvement 
of fiscal and financial systems, and the creation of NOCs as well as the enhancement of 
the their autonomy in their commercial operations. These represented positive progress 
compared to the previous stage. These reforms also resulted in the increase of the 
divergence betwen the government and the NOCs' interest. Additionally, the tasks, 
incentives, and monitoring systems were insufficient to support the objective of the 
government to enhance the commercial performance of the NOCs. This weakness, 
however, could mainly be attributed to the insufficient national capacity of the 
government, especially the weak market system which restricted the formation of 
effective price signals and the lack of a market style accounting system which restricted 
the ability of the government in accessing information and measure the real 
performance of the NOCs. 
364 Zhou, M., Lu, L., & Chai, S. (2005). Accounting and Information System (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. p. 10-16. The accounting standards applied to the petroleum sector during 
this stage were a mixture of the Russia foundation and Chinese development in response to specific 
challenges the country facing. It was designed to support the soviet style central-planning system, therefore 
it emphasised on quantity rather then efficiency. 
365 Ibid. p. 114 
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6 NOC REFORMS IN CHINA- STAGE THREE (1993-1998) 
The period from 1993 to 1998 marked a new era in the history of Chinese economic 
reforms, due to the adoption of free market ideology, and the election of Vice Premier 
Zhu Rongji, whose policy-making style was significantly different from his predecessor, 
being "stronger and more decisive". 366 The government was able to conduct more 
radical market reforms that were not possible during the previous stage, due to 
ideological restrictions. There were not only radical changes in the fiscal regime, pricing, 
accounting, and investment system in the country, but also more fundamental reforms of 
SOEs, which were left behind compared to non-public enterprises due to ideological 
reasons. Along with these reforms, the national capacity of the country was enhanced 
greatly, which enabled a more radical reform of the regulatory framework, the industrial 
structure, the pricing and distribution system, as well as the fiscal and financial systems 
of the petroleum sector. However, the government's failure to build up sufficient 
regulatory capacity to regulate a much liberalised market, increasing security of supply 
risks, and the social impacts of reforms restricted the government's choice of reform 
measures. 
This chapter begins by analysing the general background of the petroleum sector during 
this period, including the general economic background of the country, the productivity, 
366 Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
London, England The MIT Press. p. 100 
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consumption, and other factors of the petroleum sector, as well as national capacity of 
the country during this stage. This is followed by the introduction of the new P-A 
relationship established between government and NOCs during this stage. The chapter 
concludes with an evaluation of the reforms conducted by evaluating the effectiveness 
of the relationship. 
6.1 The general background 
This section will analyse the new economic ideology adopted during this stage, as well 
as several major elements of the economic reforms, including the establishment of new 
economic rules and the reforms of SOEs, together with changes in productivity and 
other factors of the petroleum sector, as well as the national capacity. By analysing this 
change of factors, this section examines the challenges and opportunities facing the 
Chinese government in regulating the petroleum sector and their reform objectives. 
6.1.1 A breakthrough in economic ideology 
There was a breakthrough in economic ideology in China during this stage, which 
enabled the country to conduct further market-driven economic reforms. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the economic reforms in the previous stage remained extremely 
cautious and terms such as "market reforms" were carefully avoided, and terms such as 
"commodity economic reforms" were used to prevent ideological clashes with the 
socialist nature of the country. This situation started to change when the concept of 
"socialist market economy" was ratified by the communist party and was adopted in the 
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country's Constitution. 367 Accordingly, the government was able to promote economic 
development at all cost. 
This ideological breakthrough was partially caused by the pressure facing the 
government due to years of sluggish economic performance from 1989 to 1991. It was 
also pushed by the forward-looking leader Deng Xiaoping, whose high profile trips to 
several coastal cities in Southern China and his milestone speeches sending out a clear 
message to promote market-driven reforms. 368 The rise of Vice Premier Zhu also 
resulted in the adoption of more decisive measures towards a market economy. He 
emphasised the importance of establishing market rules to provide a level field for all 
players therein, reforming of SOEs to enhance their performance, as well as enhancing 
the role of government as an effective regulator. Thus, unprecedented economic reforms 
which could not have been implemented during the previous stage took place in China 
under these circumstances and they greatly enhanced the market capacity of the country 
and increased the regulatory capacity of the government. 369 
36' The fourth session of the fourteenth communist party conference approved the "Decision of the China 
Communist Party central committee on some issues concerning the Establishment of a socialist market 
economy structure". To avoid ideological controversy, the government carefully coined the term "Socialist 
market economy" which is defined as a transitional reform plan with the market as the final target and with 
socialist as the approach and transitional guideline. See Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's 
State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 41 
368 Wang, H. H. (1999). China's Oil Industry and Market: Elsevier. p. 2. People'sNet. (2001). The Term of 
"Three Benefits" (In Chinese). Retrieved 19 Mar, 2007, from 
http: //www. people. com. cn/GB/shizheng/252/5303/5304/20010626/497655. html. The government issued 
three criteria in justifying reform measures, according the criteria, economic reforms should benefit the 
productivity of the country's economy, the overall national power, and the living standard of Chinese people. 
369 Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, 
USA: World Bank. p. 69. Yuan, B. -H. (1999). The Review of a Few Issues of Socialism Economic of China in 
the Last 50 Years (In Chinese). The Research of Modern China History, 5-6. 
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6.1.2 The establishment of market-driven economic rules 
The government further liberalised the economy by increasing the role of the market in 
setting prices for commodities and allocating them. Accordingly, the government 
established new market rules to support such a market-driven economy, through reforms 
of the fiscal regime, of accounting standards and of the financial system. Different from 
the piecemeal style reforms in the previous stage, many reforms during this stage took 
the form of a radical step, driven by the strong political will of the government to 
further liberalise the economy. 
6.1.2.1 The pricing and distribution reforms 
The pricing and distribution systems for commodities were further liberalised, with the 
share of materials allocated by the government being reduced rapidly. The distribution 
of most of the commodities was now left to the market, except for a few strategically 
important commodities, such as energy and water. The dual and multi track pricing 
systems prevailing in the previous stage were gradually abolished. 370 Furthermore, the 
government started to allow the domestic pricing system to become more closely linked 
to the international price system, as the country's economy was further integrated with 
the global economy. 371 
370 Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
London, England The MIT Press. p. 101 
37 Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Herndon, VA, 
USA: World Bank. p. 70. A special policy of the Chinese government to further integrate with the global 
economy was the principles of full utilisation of both domestic and foreign market and resources, the so 
called "two markets and two resources" policy issued by the central government in 1993. 
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6.1.2.2 The reforms of the fiscal regime 
In 1993 a completely new market styled fiscal regime was implemented in China, which 
was more transparent, fairer and easier to implement than the previous ones (the 
detailed rules of the new taxation system are shown in the table 5.1). 372 Taxation was 
established as the major means of revenue collection by the government, as the practice 
of profit remittance of SOEs had been largely abolished. Measures were taken to 
simplify the taxation rules by removing the practice of applying different taxes and tax 
rates to players operating in different sectors, and with different scales and ownership 
structures. The VAT, which was "uniform for enterprises of all ownership types", 
became the major source of revenue for the government. 373 The universal taxation 
regime could provide a better basis for all players to compete with each other, regardless 
of their ownership structure. 374 The new system also enhanced the controlling power 
and revenue income of the central government, 375 and improved the tax collection and 
tax administration procedure. 
376 
372 Zhang, Y., & Fuke, T. (1997). Changing Tax Law in East and Southeast Asia Towards the 21st Century': 
Kluwer Law International. p. 42. The new system established the role of turnover tax including Value added 
tax, Consumption tax and business tax, and income tax being the major taxes in the country. The aims of 
the reform, according to the government was to unify the taxation law, realise a fair burden of taxation for 
market player, simplify taxation administration system, optimise the allocation of taxes income of central 
and local government, ensure the fiscal income, and establish the taxation system that is suitable for the 
socialist market economy. Jia, K. (2000). The Analysis and Review of China's Fiscal Regime Reform (In 
Chinese). The academic newspaper of He Nan Fiscal and Taxation Institute, 14(1). 
373 Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Herndon, VA, 
USA: World Bank. p. 70 
374 Zhang, Y., & Fuke, T. (1997). Changing Tax Law in East and Southeast Asia Towards the 21st Century': 
Kluwer Law International. p. 42 
375 Bahl, R. (1998). Central-Provincial-local Fiscal Relationships' In D. J. S. Brean (Ed. ), Taxation in Modern 
China (pp. 125-150). New York: Routledge. p. 130. Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing 
China's State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, USA: World Bank. p. 70. As has been analysed in the 
previous chapter, one of the outcomes of the economic reform during 1980s was the continuous reduction 
on the government revenue income due to the decentralisation of resource control of the government. The 
state revenue as a percentage of GDP reduced over the years from 31 % in 1978 to 14 % in 1992 
376 Jia, K. (2000). The Analysis and Review of China's Fiscal Regime Reform (In Chinese). The academic 
186 
Table 6-1 The taxation reform in 1994377 
Tax Before reform After reform 
VAT The VAT was not imposed on The VAT applied to all tangible manufacturing and distribution 
the total economy but only on activities of the economy and only two rates of 13% and 17% were 
some products. There were 12 used. The tax is not included into the price. The power of deduction 
categories of VAT with tax and abate of the VAT remained with the central government, 
rate ranging from 8% to 45% although VAT is a shared tax, with 75% gives to the central 
government and 25 gives to the local government. 
Consumption Previous goods tax The main purpose of the consumption tax was to recoup the revenue 
Turnover 
tax loss of the government due to the reform of the taxation system. "The 
tax 
tax is highly significant in implementing the state's industrial policy, 
adjusting the economic structure and guiding consumption in the 
correct direction". The tax was a central tax. 
Business tax Business tax was imposed on certain types of businesses that were 
not subjected to VAT, such as the transfer of non-tangible asset and 
the sale of fixed assets. There were three brackets of tax rate of 3%, 
5% and 5-20%. 
Income Enterprises Before reform, different rate After the reform, "the division of profits between the government and 
tax income tax and tax base was applied to the enterprises were to be determined by an objective tax system that 
different enterprises with is uniformly applied to all enterprises. Other ways of transferring 
different ownership structure. profits between enterprises and government were to be eliminated". 
The tax rate ranged from 10% A unified tax rate of 33% was applied for all types of ownership 
to 55%. The tax base was enterprises to eliminate the uneven treatment of different enterprises. 
taxable profit: the difference After reform, the deduction of loan payment before taxation was 
of gross sales and allowable abolished. Wage and bonus payments became "deductible but only 
costs. up to a limit. 
6.1.2.3 The reforms of accounting standards 
The government also reformed the accounting standards in order to increase the 
availability and quality of commercial information from enterprises. A completely new 
package of market styled accounting standards was implemented in China in 1993 and 
newspaper of He Nan Fiscal and Taxation Institute, 14(1). Zhang, Y., & Fuke, T. (1997). Changing Tax Law 
in East and Southeast Asia Towards the 21st Century': Kluwer Law International. p. 42. 
37 Bahl, R. (1998). Central-Provincial-local Fiscal Relationships' In D. J. S. Brean (Ed. ), Taxation in Modern 
China (pp. 125-150). New York: Routledge. p. 130,138. Jia, K. (2000). The Analysis and Review of China's 
Fiscal Regime Reform (In Chinese). The academic newspaper of He Nan Fiscal and Taxation Institute, 
14(1). Zhang, Y., & Fuke, T. (1997). Changing Tax Law in East and Southeast Asia Towards the 21st 
Century. Kluwer Law International. p. 42 
187 
the previous "Soviet styled" accounting standard was abandoned. 378 A series of new 
rules covering the accounting of cost, profits and investment were issued by the MOF to 
formalise and unify the formerly segmented accounting practices. 379 Although still 
different from the prevailing international accounting systems, the new accounting 
standards adopted the same principles of the international standards. Under the new 
standards, cost accounting was clearer and easier to be monitored and audited, capital 
injection from different types of investors was better measured and their rights better 
protected, and the real performance of enterprises was easier to be measured and 
benchmarked with each other. 
6.1.2.4 The reform of the financial regime 
The financial system was also reformed by the government and the principle of 
macroeconomic austerity was applied, in order to curb inflation and to address the debt 
problems of SOEs incurred in the previous stage on account of cheap credit. 380 The 
major reform measures included stricter lending standards of state banks and the 
enforcement of bankruptcy law, according to which insolvent SOEs could in theory 
declare bankrupt. 38' As a result of these reforms, it became increasingly difficult for 
378 Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, 
USA: World Bank. p. 70 
379 The newly issued accounting standards in 1990s included: (1) The unification of different accounting 
standards for different form of enterprises with different ownership structure, (2) Ten new accounting 
standards, (3) Western style financial statements and book-keeping methods, (4) A new capital register 
system, (5) A western style cost management method was adopted. (6) A standardised profit allocation 
system, (7) A new western style financial evaluation system. 
380 Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
London, England The MIT Press p. 304-308. By the middle 1990s, the Chinese SOEs were virtually 
insolvent as a result of "cash flow evaporating and debt accumulating" 
381 Ibid. p. 307 
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SOEs to seek finance from banks without showing a good sign of profitability. The 
"hard budget constraint" was helpful in urging SOEs to be more responsible for their 
own commercial performance. 382 Despite the positive elements of the reforms, the 
banking sector was still passive. Furthermore, in view of the high financial savings by 
Chinese people, and the lack of an effective investment environment in favour of 
individuals, banks continued to have an ample, indeed an over supply of funds that 
needed to be lent out. 383 
6.1.3 The reforms of SOEs 
Bolder SOEs reforms to further commercialise these enterprises were conducted during 
this stage. Such reforms had been carefully avoided in the previous stage, due to the 
ideological restrictions, the weak national capacity, and the concerns of the social 
impacts of the reforms. They were now made possible due to the ideological 
breakthrough, and the significant enhancement of market and regulatory capacity. 
In 1994, the National People's Congress issued the Corporation Law of the People's 
Republic of China. According to the law, SOEs were allowed to be set up as 
independent entities, owned by the state and governed by public laws, but could act in a 
commercial manner similar to the private enterprises. 384 
382 Ibid. p. 102 
383 Kynge, J. (2007). China Shakes the World: the Rise of a Hungry Nation. London: Phoenix. Economist. 
(2008). The Invasion of the Sovereign-wealth funds 2008. The Economist, 386(8563), 11. 
384 Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, 
UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 6 
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The government also started to enforce a new system named the Modern Enterprise 
System ("MES") 385 in 1994 to substitute the ineffective Contract Management 
Responsibility System ("CMRS"), which was used in the previous stage. 386 It was 
realised that due to the complex nature of the industrial activities and to the lack of 
regulatory capacity of the government, especially due to the lack of a market style 
accounting system, under the CMRS system, SOEs with private information could 
easily bargain for favourable performance targets, or try to achieve their targets in a way 
that could harm the interests of the government. 387 The new system provided for a 
clearer definition of property rights and a clear separation of the ownership and 
management of SOEs. It also encouraged SOEs to adopt western style corporate 
governance structures, to set up internal check and balance systems, and to adopt new 
management practices through a so called "scientific management system". 388 These 
reforms played an important role in driving SOEs to "abandon the expansionary 
385 The MES is the "latest effort of the Chinese government attempting to clarify the position on property 
rights of SOEs, providing a clearer definition of rights and responsibilities between the state and the 
management. It has been characterized with reconstruction and restructuring of SOEs into corporations 
similar t their Western counterparts and introduced new management mechanism" Bai, X., & Bennington, L. 
(2002). Steering and Rowing in Chinese SOEs: the Modern Enterprise System in China Paper presented at 
the 15th Annual Conference of the Association for Chinese Economics Studies Australia. p. 3 
386 Yuan, B. -H. (1999). The Review of a Few Issues of Socialism Economic of China in the Last 50 Years 
(In Chinese). The Research of Modern China History, 5-6. Christiansen, F. (1996). Chinese Politics and 
Society: an Introduction London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf. p. 228-234. Yusuf, S. (2005). Under 
New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, USA: World Bank. p. 72 
387 Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, 
USA: World Bank. p. 68. Bai, X., & Bennington, L. (2002). Steering and Rowing in Chinese SOEs: the 
Modern Enterprise System in China Paper presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the Association for 
Chinese Economics Studies Australia. p. 3. Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned 
Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 65-87 
388 Bai, X., & Bennington, L. (2002). Steering and Rowing in Chinese SOEs: the Modern Enterprise System 
in China Paper presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the Association for Chinese Economics Studies 
Australia. p. 3 
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business model and to adopt a new business model that gave top priority to cost savings 
and effective investment. , 389 
However, radical reforms of SOEs were still restricted due to concerns over their social 
impacts, especially when the regulatory capacity of the government in providing social 
support was not mature. For example, despite the enforcement of the bankruptcy law, 
bankruptcy of insolvent SOEs and large scale lay-off of workers were still rare 
practices. 390 First of all, the government still controlled, and often kept low, the prices 
for strategically important goods and public goods, such as oil, gas, water, power and 
food on account of social concerns. The SOEs producing these goods were not allowed 
to go bankrupt even when they were operated at a deficit. Secondly, the large scale 
laying-off of workers could cause civil unrest, especially when the country lacked an 
effective social welfare system to substitute those provided by SOEs. 391 
6.1.4 The petroleum background: changes in productivity and other factors 
The trend of strong oil consumption and stagnant production prevailing during the 
previous stage continued during this stage. As a result, the country became a net 
importer in 1993. Increasing concern over security of supply started to play an 
important role in shaping the thinking of the government in reforming the NOCs. 
389 Gamaut, R., Song, L., & Tao, Y. (2006). Impact and Significance of State-Owned Enterprise 
Restructuring in China The China Journal 55,35-63. p36 
390 Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, 
USA: World Bank. p. 75 
391 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 16 report on government work issued by the second meeting of the eighth peoples 
congress 
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The continuous economic growth relied mainly on energy intensive industries, and the 
subsidised oil prices further pushed up the country's oil demand. During the period of 
the eighth five-year plan (1991-1995), the energy intensive sectors such as mining, 
manufacturing, electricity, water, and construction grew at a high annual rate of 17.3%. 
Meanwhile, the oilfields in eastern China were depleting rapidly while the production 
capacity in west China was still immature. 392 The offshore activities also failed to bear 
significant additional production. Hence, the domestic growth rate of petroleum 
production further slowed down, and the domestic production was increasingly unable 
to meet the demand (Figure 6.1). 
393 
China became a net importer of oil in the early 1990s and its dependency on imported 
oil increased rapidly. 394 This together with the lack of experience in handling 
international petroleum market, and the instable Middle East following the Gulf War 
from 1990-1991 made the security of oil supply a vital concern for the Chinese 
government during this stage. 395 In 1994, the government clearly specified in an official 
document that petroleum was "a special and strategic commodity" and the NOCs were 
encouraged to utilise international market and resources. 396 The policy had a significant 
392 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 30 
393 Calculated according to the BP. (2006). "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. " Retrieved 21 
Jan 2007, from http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryld=6842&contentld=7021390. 
394 Wang, H. H. (1999). China's Oil Industry and Market: Elsevier. Yan, C. -L. (1997). China's Energy 
Development Report (In Chinese). Beijing China Economic and Management Publishing House. p. 4. In 
1995, the country spent 1.39 bn USD on buying crude oil 
395 Qiu, B. (2000). Chinese Petroleum Sector challenging WTO (In Chinese). Beijing: The Petroleum 
Industry Publishing House. p. 9 
396 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 31. China. Org. (1996). Outline of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) Retrieved 21 
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impact on the petroleum sector. It made it possible for the NOCs to operate overseas 
therefore helping them to build up their investment, financing, and marketing capacities. 
Figure 6-1 The production and consumption of crude oil 
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Another major element was the further deterioration of financial position of CNPC 
partially due to poor commercial performance of the company resulting from imprudent 
cost management and investment. The company ran into continuous deficit and 
accumulated heavy debt since 1988 as shown in the table 6.2. In 1994, the annual 
capital and interest payment even exceeded the total profit of the company. In 1995, the 
total long term debt of the company accumulated to RMB 85.1 bn, with annual capital 
and interest payment liability reaching RMB 16 bn, equal to 13% of sales revenue. The 
company's net assets and long-term debt ratio had increased to 74.8% by the end of 
1995, much higher than that of the international average (25-40%)397. The critical 
Mar, 2007, from http: //www. china. org. cn/95e/95-englishl/2. htm. 
397 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 18 
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financial shortage of CNPC was a major challenge that the government and NOCs faced 
during this stage. The financial problems facing the sector and the government made it 
more urgent to enhance commercial performance of the sector. 
Table 6-2 The Profit of CNPC (1988-1993) 
Year Profit before tax Tax After-tax profit 
(RMB bn) (RMB bn) (RMB bn) 
1988 3.9 4.64 -0.74 
1989 1.52 5.39 -3.87 
1990 0.20 5.79 -5.59 
1991 1.08 6.36 -5.28 
1992 -2.89 6.37 -9.26 
1993 3.91 6.54 -2.63 
6.1.5 Changes in national capacity 
The government's regulatory capacity in terms of regulating its national economy was 
enhanced immensely as a result of the implementation of new laws and regulations, the 
promotion of better educated government officers, the accumulated experience of 
regulating market economy during the previous stage, as well as the newly established 
market style economic rules such as accounting standards, fiscal, investment, and 
pricing systems which together enabled the government to collect more information and 
to regulate the economy more effectively. 
However, the regulatory capacity of the country had a few weaknesses, and the progress 
mentioned in the previous paragraph was offset by a few other factors. The first one is 
that the local governments gained significant power during the decentralisation of the 
fiscal regime in the previous stage. These reforms allowed local governments to build 
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up their institutional capacity. Although the quality of information enterprises provided 
was greatly enhanced due to the employment of the new accounting system, the central 
government still had difficulty gaining access to these information generated at the local 
level. It was said that "numbers make cadres, and cadres make up numbers". 398 This 
control of information enabled the local government to bargain with the central 
government in order to pursue their interests at the cost of the central government. 399 
Although not a dominant factor, this played a role in the reforms of NOCs during this 
stage. 400 
Another weakness in the regulatory capacity was in terms of regulating the petroleum 
sector. The government had relied heavily on the NOCs to govern the sector and 
reforms of it lagged far behind other sectors due to its strategic role in the national 
economy. This together with the increasing independence of the sector increased the 
risks of the sector pursuing its own interest at the cost of the central government. aoi 
Furthermore, the government was still unable to provide an adequate and 
well-functioning social welfare system to provide employment support, pension, and 
398 Kynge, J. (2007). China Shakes the World : the Rise of a Hungry Nation. London: Phoenix. 
399 Larsson, T. (2006). Reform, Corruption, and Growth: Why Corruption is more Devastating in Russia than 
in China. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39,265-281. Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, 
from Revolution through Reform. New York, London: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 124 
400 Lieberthal, K. (1995). Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China, from Revolution through Reform. New 
York, London: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. p. 178. "Reformers during the 1980s worked hard to bring 
younger, better educated individual into office. " p. 204. During the reforms the SPC are losing power, and 
power was transferred to localities and ministries 
401 This is especially the case of the petroleum sector as will be seen in section 5.2.1: the government still 
chose to rely on NOCs for critical support and failed to build up an effective regulatory capacity. 
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health care. As a result, the NOCs continued to retain these responsibilities. For 
example, the petroleum sector had invested in a wide range of non-petroleum related 
business under a strategy of "diversifying investment", aimed at providing employment 
for children of their workers, which was considered to be a social responsibility of the 
NOCs. 
The industrial capacity of the petroleum sector remained similar to the previous stage, 
with the sector containing strong productive capacity, but poor investment, financing, 
and marketing capacities due to its lack of autonomy in these areas. However, this 
situation started to change gradually as the government encouraged the sector to invest 
overseas as analysed in section 6.1.4. 
The general market capacity was developed during this stage as more commodities were 
liberalised. It is however not the case for crude oil and oil products, which was still 
tightly controlled by the government, together with other sectors such as water, power, 
and food 402 due to concerns over social impacts. 
6.1.6 The implications on the government and the petroleum sector 
The changing nature of the economic ideology, new market style economic reforms, and 
the specific petroleum sector related factors analysed above presented new challenges 
402 Minder, R., & Leahy, J. (2008,10th January, 2008). Asia Battles with Surging Food Costs. Financial 
Times, p. 9. 
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and opportunities for the government to reform the NOCs. The government remained 
keen to enhance the commercial performance of the petroleum sector during this stage, 
and faced restrictions, old and new, in pursuing this goal. 
On the one hand, the government wanted to conduct reform to enhance the commercial 
performance of the NOCs, in order to address their severe financial problems and to 
avoid the possible social chaos caused by laying off workforce. Meanwhile, further 
economic reforms and the significant enhancement in the government's regulatory 
capacity made it possible for the government to further separate itself from the 
commercial activities of the NOCs, and to provide the latter with greater autonomy. 
On the other hand, the government was concerned about the possible negative effect of 
radical reforms for a few reasons. The government needed to have the NOCs to address 
the increasing security of supply risk, by assigning them with the tasks of delivering a 
stable and smooth supply of oil domestically at the government designated prices. The 
government also wanted the NOCs to retain social responsibilities such as providing 
employment, social welfare and other services which the government was not able to 
take over due to its weak regulatory capacity as analysed in section 6.1.5. 
6.2 The reforms of the institutional arrangement of the petroleum 
sector 
The institutional arrangement of the petroleum sector underwent major changes 
197 
reflecting the factors analysed in the previous section. The major elements of the 
reforms included, firstly, the changes in the industry structure of the sector by allowing 
CNPC and Sinopec to participate in the import/export business, secondly, the tightening 
of pricing and distribution system, and thirdly, the further formalisation of fiscal and 
financial systems. 
6.2.1 The reforms of the regulatory framework 
There were a few minor changes in the regulatory framework of the sector, mainly as 
part of the general restructuring of the government organisation under Vice Premier Zhu, 
who intended to reduce the size of government in order to increase its regulatory 
efficiency. For example, as part of Zhu's government reform, the State Economy and 
Trade Commission ("SETC") was re-established as a general economic institution. As a 
result, the SPC and SETC became two powerful economic administration bodies of the 
central government that were brought on par with each other. 403 Furthermore, specific 
line ministries were abolished, including the Ministry of Energy in 1993. After that, 
most petroleum related regulatory functions of the ministry were either moved to the 
SPC or SETC or to the three NOCs of CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec. 404 Despite the 
403 Fesharaki, F., & Wu, K. (1998). Revitalizing China's Petroleum Industry through Reorganisation: Will it 
Work? OGL Special(Special Issue), 33-45. p. 34. The commission was originated from the State Economic 
Commission (SEC) which was abolished by Li Peng in the 1988 government reform. 
404 Gao, S., Liang, S., Geng, Z., Yang, Q., & Guo, Y. (2003). The Review and Evaluation of the Energy 
Strategy and Policy (In Chinese). Beijing Energy Research Institute of National Development and Reform 
Commission. p. 48. PetroChina. (2005). The Government Institutional Reform of China since 1949 (In 
Chinese). Beijing: PetroChina Company Ltd internal report. p. 8. Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand Restructure of 
the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The Petroleum Industrial Publishing House. p. 15. 
Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. p. 254. In 1980, State Energy Commission was established to 
provide "coherence and coordination to energy policy". It was abolished later in 1983. 
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above changes, the regulatory framework remained more or less the similar to the 
previous stage, as the Ministry of Energy remained an ineffective entity since its 
establishment. The new regulatory framework and industrial structure is shown in 
Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6-2 The new regulatory framework and industrial structure 
I 
-------------- 
SPC: State Planning Commission (1993-2003) 
SETC: State Economic and Trade Commission 
MOF: Ministry of Finance 
MOFTEC: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
MGMR: Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources 
MOC: Ministry of Commerce (2003-present) 
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation (upstream) 
Sinopec: China Petrochemical Corporation (Downstream) 
CNOOC: China National Offshore Oil Corporation (offshore upstream) 
CNSPC: China National Star Petroleum Corporation 
Sinochem: China National Chemical Import and Export Corporation 
COC: China Oil Corporation 
Unipec: China International United Petroleum and Chemical Company 
State Council 
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6.2.2 The reforms of the industrial structure 
The overall industrial structure remained similar to the previous stage, with some 
marginal changes, as a result of lobbying from different interest groups, especially 
NOCs. 
6.2.2.1 The establishment of the CNSPC 
In 1996, a new NOC called China New Star Petroleum Corporation ("CNSPC") was 
established by transforming the offshore Petroleum Geological Bureau under the 
MGMR, which was established in 1955.405 This was a response of the central 
government to the strong lobbying from the Ministry, which felt it was in a much 
weaker position and threatened by the other NOCs. 406 Despite the strong objection of 
CNPC and CNOOC, the new company was approved by the State Council as a fully 
state owned enterprise to report to both State Council and MGMR. 407 The company 
was assigned a much wider range of rights than its peers and was able to conduct both 
upstream and downstream, operations in the domestic sector, and also participate in 
import/export businesses. 40' The establishment of the company could in theory 
intensify competition among NOCs. However, the impact was marginal as the scale of 
405 Sinopec. (2005). Information on Sinopec (In Chinese), Retrieved 6th April, 2008, from 
News. sinopecnews. com. cn/shnews/2005-03/29/content_231595. htm 
406 Gao, S., Liang, S., Geng, Z., Yang, Q., & Guo, Y. (2003). The Review and Evaluation of the Energy 
Strategy and Policy (In Chinese). Beijing Energy Research Institute of National Development and Reform 
Commission. p. 13 
407 Ibid. 
408 The business activities of the company includes exploration, development, production of petroleum and 
natural gas domestically and overseas, domestic marketing of petroleum and natural gas; cooperation with 
foreign companies in given regions established by government, exploration and technology services 
domestically and overseas and the import and export of trade and technology services. 
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the new company was small. In 1997, the CNSPC had a production of only 0.6 mit 
tonnes of crude and 0.8 bn cubic meters of natural gas, which is much smaller than the 
other NOCs. 409 
6.2.2.2 The establishment of two new foreign trade companies 
Pursuant to strong lobbying by CNPC and Sinopec, the government allowed them to 
become involved in the lucrative import and export business during this stage, which 
increased the competition within the sector to certain extent. The move also helped to 
enhance the exposure of these two NOCs to the international market and build up their 
marketing capacity. 
The two NOCs had long been complaining that they should have similar rights as 
CNOOC and CNSPC in conducting import and export business and have access to the 
international market. They pointed out that the lack of access to the market and isolation 
from market forces prevented them from increasing their competitiveness. Meanwhile, 
they argued that the monopoly of Sinochem over import and export provided the 
company with monopoly profits, and had a negative impact on the country's 
commercial interest. 410 
To reconcile the opposing positions of CNPC and Sinopec on one hand, and Sinochem 
409 Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand Restructure of the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The 
Petroleum Industrial Publishing House. p. 23 
410 Ibid. 
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on the other, the government implemented a proposal which required CNPC and 
Sinopec to set up their trading arms jointly with Sinochem. The joint venture of CNPC 
and Sinochem is called China Oil Corporation ("COC"). The joint venture of Sinopec 
and SinoChem was called China International United Petroleum and Chemical 
Company ("Unipec"). By the end of the stage, there were five entities involved in 
import and export business of petroleum: CNOOC, Sinochem, COC, Unipec and 
CNSPC. A quota system was implemented by the government to keep the balance of the 
domestic economy. All players had to acquire certain quota from the government for 
importing and exporting of crude oil and oil products. 
6.2.2.3 Onshore foreign cooperation 
During this stage, foreign oil companies were permitted to participate in onshore 
petroleum activities in China. 41 1 The attempt never went too far due to the strong 
objections from CNPC who had guarded the domestic resources for decades. Therefore 
the blocks made available for bidding to foreign companies were remote and less 
promising. Additionally, all foreign participation had to jointly conducted with CNPC, 
the so-called "government participation". A regulation titled "Regulation of People's 
Republic of China on Exploitation of Onshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation 
with Foreign Enterprises" was issued in order to establish the dominant role of CNPC in 
cooperating with foreign players. 412 
411 CNPC. (1997). CNPC Yearbook 1996 (In Chinese) Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing House 
412 MOLAR. (2005). The Selected Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Mineral 
Exploration and Development (In Chinese)). Beijing: Ministry of Land and Resources p. 41 
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6.2.2.4 The responsibilities of the government and NOCs 
During this stage, the responsibilities of the government and NOCs remained similar to 
that of the previous stages. Government still relied heavily on NOCs for regulatory 
support, as illustrated in table 6.3. 
Table 6-3 The responsibilities and rights of the government and NOCs 
(1993-1998)4'3 
The responsibilities of the government I The responsibilities of the NOCs 
I. To draft and implement the overall petroleum policy and 
reform plan in consultation with the NOCs. 
2. To formulate the investment plan and to approve certain 
projects (such as oil development projects with production 
capacity exceeding 0.5 mit ton/year for, and natural gas 
development projects with production capacity exceeding 0.2 
bcm, long term pipeline projects with investment exceeding 
RMB 50 mn. 
1. To propose the development strategy for the petroleum sector, 
and support the formulation and implementation of petroleum 
policy and reform plan. 
2. To pre-screen the petroleum exploration and development 
projects before submitting for SPC approval. 
3. To forecast the domestic crude oil and oil products supply and 
demand and to devise the draft plan for crude oil and oil products 
production, transportation and marketing. 
3. To formulate the annual, middle and long term 
production, distribution, import and export plans for crude oil 
and oil products in consultation with the NOCs. To establish 
and assign the production tasks to the NOCs. To issue licence 
and quota for the NOCs conducting petroleum related 
activities. To set up prices for crude oil and oil products"' 
4. To organise production, transportation, distribution, import 
and export of crude oil and oil product according to state plan. 
413 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 80. SPC. (1995). 1995 Energy Report of China (in Chinese). 
Beijing Department of Communcations and Energy, State Planning Commission of P. R. China. p. 37-44. 
SPC, & SETC. (1994). 'The Notice on Reforming of the Distribution System of Crude Oil and Oil Products (In 
Chinese). Retrieved 26th Mar, 2007, from 
http: //www. yfzs. gov. cn/gb/info/LawData/gjf2001 q/gwyfg/2003-06/30/1549040781. html 
CNPC. (1997). CNPC Yearbook 1996 (In Chinese) Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing House. p. 16 
The notice of SPC on registry regimes of oil and gas exploration'. p. 18, 'The method of regulating market of 
oil products 
414 Gao, S., Liang, S., Geng, Z., Yang, Q., & Guo, Y. (2003). The Review and Evaluation of the Energy 
Strategy and Policy (In Chinese). Beijing Energy Research Institute of National Development and Reform 
Commission. p. 10-14. In 1996, the government revised the "Law of Mineral Resources" clarified the 
ownership of mineral resources and terminated free use of resources. 
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6.2.3 The reforms of the industrial structure: the internal structure of the NOCs 
(the example of CNPC) 
During this stage, NOCs were facing severe commercial pressure due to the government 
reforms, as well as their financial crisis. 415 In response, they also formulated new 
strategies and conducted internal reforms to address these challenges. Take CNPC for 
example, the company came up with a new strategy of enhancing efficiency and 
profitability by emphasising its core business of oil and gas in 1995.416 Guided by the 
new strategy, the company conducted internal reforms to enhance the control of the 
headquarters over its BUs, and tried to eliminate the negative impacts of the 
decentralised business structure employed by CNPC in the previous stages, as 
introduced in chapter 5. 
6.2.3.1 The weaknesses in the previous internal structure 
In the beginning of the stage, the internal structure of the company remained largely 
similar to the previous stage. Most BUs still employed the "self contained" model, and 
undertook wide range of social functions in addition to their commercial 
responsibility. 417 This together with the decentralised and complicated organisational 
structure of CNPC (figure 6.3), made it very difficult for the headquarters to exert an 
415 CNPC. (1997). CNPC Yearbook 1996 (In Chinese) Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing House. 
p. 78. The company formulated the develop strategy of "fasten development and centred on economic 
efficiency. ". Jia, Y., Xiao, Y., & Guo, T. (2005). Budget and Cash Management (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. p. 229 
416 CNPC. (1997). CNPC Yearbook 1996 (In Chinese) Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing House. 
p. 80 
417 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 173 
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effective control over their BUs, which resulted in imprudent investment and cost 
control at the Bus' level. 
Oil and gas Refinery Engineering, Pipeline, Marketing Social 
Exploration/prod /petrochemical facilities and transportation services 
uction Service 
Holding Holding Holding Holding Holding Holding 
Company I Company I Company I Company I Company I Company I 
Company 2 Company 2 Company 2 Company 2 Company 2 Company 2 
In 1998, the average cost of oil was as high as 11.6 US$/bbl, with production costs 
reaching 9.6 US US$/bbl. For refineries, II of them incurred a loss, among them 5 were 
especially severe, with a total loss of RBM 5.5 bn per year. 418 To address these 
problems, CNPC tried three types of internal reforms: a revised "production and 
operation responsibility system", "asset operation responsibility system" and "Modern 
418 Ibid. p. 172 
Figure 6-3 The organisational structure of CNPC in 1998 
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Enterprise System" trial. 419 Further, other internal reform measures were undertaken to 
enhance the ability of the headquarters to control their BUs. 
6.2.3.2 The internal reforms on the organisational structure and internal 
governance 
In 1994 and 1995, the headquarters of CNPC revised the internal responsibilities 
contracts system by applying new systems which better accommodated the need of the 
headquarters to control its BUs. The "production and operation responsibility system" 
and "asset operation responsibility system" were adopted, which not only emphasised 
the profitability as major tasks of BUs, but also enhanced material incentive and 
autonomy of BUs. 420 Two new performance indicators were introduced by the two new 
systems, including the State Asset Maintenance Ratio and Reserve to Production Ratio 
to measure the long term commercial performance of BUs. 421 The package of 
performance-linked reward and sanction mechanisms was also enhanced by the two 
419 Bai, X., & Bennington, L. (2002). Steering and Rowing in Chinese SOEs: the Modern Enterprise System 
in China Paper presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the Association for Chinese Economics Studies 
Australia. p. 5 
420 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 30 
421 Ibid. p. 34-35 
The State Assets Maintenance Ratio = (State owned equity in the beginning of accounting year + after tax 
profit of accounting year)/state equity in the beginning of accounting year *100% 
A=(E+I)/E*100% 
A-The State Assets Maintenance Ratio 
E- State owned equity in the beginning the year (the government share if shareholder equity in the 
balance statement) 
I- After tax profit of accounting year 
The reserve to production ratio = newly increased reserve of the year/ oil and gas production of the 
year*100% 
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new systems. 
422 
In addition to this, CNPC also initiated trial of the Modern Enterprise System and the 
"oil company model". BUs under this trial were required to separate their core 
commercial activities and non-core activities. They were required to establish a 
corporate governance system by establishing Boards of Directors and supervisory 
Committees in order to enhance the internal check and balance mechanism. (Figure 6.4 
and 6.5 demonstrate the example of the Dagang oilfield after adopting the new 
SyStem). 
423 
Figure 6-4 The new organisational structure of the Dagang oilfield 
Dagang Oilfield Group Company Limited 
Core business: 
I. The exploration company; 
2. The development and production company; 
3. The refinery; 
4. The oil marketing company; 
5. The gas marketing company; 
6 The geological research institute. 
Services Social Diversified Other 
Companies Supporting businesses Companies 
422 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 34 
423 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 79. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen 
Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 45,48 
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Figure 6-5 The corporate governance structure of Dagang oilfield 
Investor- 
The headquarter of CNPC 
The Decision making institution: The supervision institution: 
The Board of Directors (9 people) The Supervisory Committee (7 people) 
The executive institution: 
The senior managers (7 people) 
6.2.3.3 The reform of other internal supporting mechanisms 
CNPC also established a new financial management system comprising the modern 
budgeting system, the centralised cash management system, and a new accounting 
system, to equip its headquarter in controlling its BUs. 
A western style budgeting system was adopted by the CNPC as a tool for the 
headquarters to exert better control over cost management, investment management and 
cash management of its BUs before, during and after each budgeting year. 424 The 
headquarters started to build up institutional capacity to enforce the budgeting system 
by establishing Budgeting Committee at the headquarters and the BUs level. Members 
424 Jia, Y., Xiao, Y., & Guo, T. (2005). Budget and Cash Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 38-39. It was common practice before the reform that the planning department which 
was in charge of investment, and the finance department which was in charge of financing and financial 
management operated in a separate way, with very few cooperation between them. The modem budgeting 
system was adopted to consolidate these two functions in order to improve the efficiency of the company. 
The system was firstly trialed in Zhongyuan oilfield in 1994. Chen, M. (2005). Budgeting Practice in China: a 
Case Study. University of Dundee, Dundee. 
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of these committees were normally senior and middle managers at each level . 
425 
CNPC also applied a new centralised cash management system to better control 
operations of BUs through the control of cash flow. 426 All BUs were required to 
establish an internal cash settlement centre and rationalise their bank accounts. Under 
the policy, more than 4800 bank accounts were closed in 1995. Through the new system, 
the headquarters was able to curb misuse of capital by BUs, to reduce daily cash 
positions, and to enhance control over investment and operational activities of BUs. 427 
CNPC also launched a new accounting system under the guidance of the new 
accounting standards issued by MOF in 1993 . 
42' Accounting practice on sales revenue, 
expenditure, cost and depreciation was further clarified and formalised. Stricter 
discipline was applied to cost and expenditure management by the new accounting 
system. A new financial reporting system was created to unify and formalise format of 
accounting statements and the procedure of submitting. Additionally, computer and 
network based financial management information systems were used in order to 
425 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 30. Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large 
Firms in the Oil Industry London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 86. "industrial added value = total 
industrial output-intermediate input (direct material input, production cost, management cost, sales cost and 
financial cost) +income taxi" 
426 Interview of a former finance officer of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry in Beijing in 2006 
427 Jia, Y., Xiao, Y., & Guo, T. (2005). Budget and Cash Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 234 
428 Zhou, M., Lu, L., & Chai, S. (2005). Accounting and Information System (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. "Regulations about the implementation of new financial and accounting 
standards of the Ministry of Finance" 
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enhance the quality of financial data and better support decision-making since 1994.429 
These new systems emphasised profitability and efficiency as being the major tasks of 
BUs, and increased the controlling capacity of the headquarters over BUs. However the 
system still had certain weaknesses. The profitability indicator was still obscured by the 
regulated pricing system, as well as by the social functions taken by BUs. As a result, 
production was still an important indicator to measure the performance of BUs. 43° 
6.2.4 The reforms of the pricing and distribution systems 
The pricing and distribution systems underwent major reforms during this stage, 
through which the government sought to reaffirm the government's control over the 
petroleum pricing and distribution systems, whilst at the same time try to increase the 
price levels and to steadily reduce the gap between domestic and international prices . 
431 
A new package of reforms was implemented by the government in 1994, and thereafter 
adjusted in later years. 
6.2.4.1 Drivers for the reforms of the pricing and distribution systems 
The major drivers for the reforms of the pricing and distribution systems were the 
429 Ibid. p. 32-44 
430 Jia, Y., Xiao, Y., & Guo, T. (2005). Budget and Cash Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 40 
431 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 16. The reform plan was issued through The Notice on the opinions of reforming the 
crude oil and oil products circulation mechanism". SPC, & SETC. (1994). The Notice on Reforming of the 
Distribution System of Crude Oil and Oil Products' (In Chinese). Retrieved 26th Mar, 2007, from 
http: //www. yfzs. gov. cn/gb/info/LawData/gjf2001 q/gwyfg/2003-06/30/1549040781. html 
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market disorder, represented by frequent imbalance between supply and demand, 
rampant rent-seeking and speculative behaviours, as well as the existence of a black 
market. 
For example, at a certain period in the previous stage, the domestic gasoline prices 
doubled and exceeded the international prices shortly after a reform measure to remove 
the price caps on a small share of oil products. 432 Speculative behaviour was rampant 
and it was said that more than 1.3 million people were involved in the petroleum trading. 
Rent-seeking behaviour soon followed. 433 The country's increasing exposure to the 
international market and the lack of national capacity to deal with the market risks were 
the main reasons for these problems. However the government tended to blame the 
liberalisation reforms conducted in the previous stage for the problems and started to 
reverse these reforms. 
6.2.4.2 The reforms of pricing system (crude oil) 
The reforms of the pricing system for crude oil contained two components. On the one 
hand, the government regained control by re-established the role of SPC as the sole 
body in charge of pricing policies, and abolished the liberalisation measures introduced 
on a trial basis during the previous stage. Thus the dual and multi track pricing systems 
that prevailed in the previous stage were removed. 
432 Qiu, B. (2000). Chinese Petroleum Sector challenging WTO (In Chinese). Beijing: The Petroleum 
Industry Publishing House. p. 18 
433 Ibid 
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On the other hand, the government increased the level of the regulated prices for crude 
oil to gradually address and alleviate the financial burden of the government and the 
NOCs. In 1994, the government raised the price on the regulated low prices to reach an 
average of RMB 700 yuan/ton, to bring it on par with the regulated export prices, 
thereby effectively merged them. It also raised the price on the regulated high prices to 
reach an average of RMB 1250 yuan/ton. 434 In 1996, the government increased the 
level of the regulated low prices of crude oil by an average RMB 110 and 120 yuan/ton, 
and reduced the price level of the regulated high prices by an average of RMB 50 
yuan/ton, bringing the two on par, and almost merged them. 435 
Table 6-4 Crude oil prices after 1994 reform (before the 1996 reform)436 
Average prices % of production Scope of application 
the regulated 700 Yuan tun (including 72°. Crude oil included in the state comnwdity plan and 
low prices VAT) produced by certain large scale oilfields 
The regulated 1250 Yuan/ton (including 28% Crude oil not included in the state commodity plan 
high prices VAT) by SPC, produced by middle and small scale oil 
fields with high cost, and heavy financial burdens 
6.2.4.3 The reforms of the pricing system (oil products) 
The government also regained control to establish prices of oil products, and abolished 
the liberalisation measures enforced in the pricing system during the previous stage. 
After this reform, the SPC was responsible for setting wholesale and retail prices in 35 
434 SPC, & SETC. (1994). The Notice on Reforming of the Distribution System of Crude Oil and Oil Products 
(In Chinese). Retrieved 26th Mar, 2007, from 
http: //www. yfzs. gov. cn/gb/info/LawData/gjf2001q/gwyfg/2003-06/30/1549040781. html. Crude oil from 
different oilfields was priced differently to reflect different quality of the crude oil they produce and the 
different financial situation they are having 
435 The government still kept the practice of pricing crude oil produced in different oilfields differently. 
436 Interview of a senior finance officer of PetroChina in Beijing in 2006. Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. 
(2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. P. 15-16 
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large cities in China. The retail prices for the rest of country were set by price bureaus at 
provincial level under the guidance of the SPC. 437 The price level for oil products 
remained stable during this stage except for a slight increase in 1996 by RMB 50-100 
yuan/ton. 
6.2.4.4 The reform of the distribution system 
The government also significantly tightened control over the petroleum distribution 
system in the 1994. SPC was the major government body in charge of the centrally 
controlled distribution system. However, owing to its weak capacity, SPC in turn largely 
relied on the planning capacity of CNPC and Sinopec. 438 NOCs were banned from 
selling crude oil and oil products outside the government controlled distribution system. 
All domestic onshore crude oil produced by CNPC, foreign companies and domestic 
producers, as well as all oil products produced by Sinopec and CNPC, domestic and 
foreign invested (applicable to the share that was required to be sold domestically) 
refineries, were required to be sold through the government controlled distribution 
system. 
437 SPC, & SETC. (1994). The Notice on Reforming of the Distribution System of Crude Oil and Oil 
Products (In Chinese). Retrieved 26th Mar, 2007, from 
http: //www. yfzs. gov. cnlgb/infolLawDatalgjf2001glgwyfgl2003-0613011549040781. htmI. Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & 
Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commerc+ial Publishing House. p. 20 
438 Ibid. SPC was required to formulate annual, middle and long term plan of the supply and demand of 
crude oil and oil products, based on macro-economy development plan, industrial policies, import and 
export policy, energy policy (including energy conservation policy), and the production capacity of existing 
oil fields. CNPC was responsible for the detailed forecast of domestic demand and supply for crude oil 
(including domestic production and import). Sinopec was responsible for the detailed forecast of demand 
and supply of oil products (including domestic production and import). 
213 
The government also tightened the licensing system for enterprises participating in the 
marketing of crude oil and oil products. Based on a qualification review, the 
government removed the licences of those who failed to meet its standards. The 
government also banned companies with the Party, political and military background 
from participating in distribution activities. Meanwhile, the government required the 
NOCs, mainly CNPC and Sinopec, to optimise the value chain of the distribution 
system by cutting redundant steps from the chain. 439 Many sales companies of Sinopec 
were transferred into administrative and coordinating entities, and lost their right to 
conduct oil and gas related transactions. Direct sale of oil products to major consumers 
such as railway, transportation, air transportation, army, CNPC and foreign trade sectors 
was also introduced. 
These reform measures contained the positive elements of removing the multi-band 
price systems and made the pricing system more straightforward and easier to regulate. 
However, the reforms during this stage reduced the extent of liberalisation and 
prevented the formation of market capacity within the sector and marketing capacity 
within the NOCs. 
439 SPC, & SETC. (1994). The Notice on Reforming of the Distribution System of Crude Oil and Oil 
Products (In Chinese). Retrieved 26th Mar, 2007, from 
http: //www. yfzs. gov. cn/gb/info/LawData/gjf2001 q/gwyfg/2003-06/30/1549040781. html. Only one retail 
transaction and one wholesale transaction were allowed within each value chain to bring crude oil or oil 
products from the producers to the consumers in order to cut unnecessary resale of oil products among 
players, which caused delay, increased cost and complicated the system. 
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6.2.5 The reform of the financial regime 
The financial regime underwent reforms similar to the general financial reforms 
discussed in section 6.1. The system was further formalised, with the share of capital 
provided by the government being further reduced, and the share of commercial loans 
increased (as shown in figure 6.5). 
Table 6-5 The structure of capital investment (CNPC) 440 
The Exploration Among it the government Bank loan and 
investment (RMB bn) investment (RMB bn) % others (%) 
1981-1985 46.4 11.4 24.6% 75.4°a 
1986-1990 107.8 10.8 10.0% 90.0% 
1991-1995 229.9 6.0 2.60% 97.4% 
Furthermore, a new dividend policy was introduced by the government in order to 
clarify the role of the government as revenue-collector and shareholder. 44' According to 
the policy, the government, similar to other shareholders, was eligible for a certain share 
of net profit based on its share in enterprises. 442 The policy was only possible after the 
new accounting standards enacted during this stage. Under the new standards, a 
"registered capital system" was established, which required a clear accounting of capital 
provided by different types of investors, such as government investor, legal person 
440 CNPC. (2000). CNPC Yearbook 1999 (In Chinese). Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing House. 
p. 509. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. p. 71 
441 CNPC. (2006). CNPC Internal Research Report on the State Dividend policy Beijing: CNPC. p. 2. 
According to the government document "The Method on the Collection of profit on State Assets", a profit 
sharing system for SOEs was established. SOEs were required in theory to pay dividend, profits or after tax 
profit to the government according to the percentage of state share. The method was suspended during the 
1993 and 1998 due to "immature environment ". The method was activated in 2007, when a pilot scheme 
was by the government. 
442 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 181 
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investor, individual investor and foreign investor. By doing so, investors were able to 
benefit from dividends based on their share of registered capital in enterprises. 443 
During this stage, the government suspended the policy temporarily to support SOEs, as 
most of them still took heavy social burdens. 
Despite the positive elements discussed above, the role of the new financial system 
established during this stage was largely restricted by the regulated pricing system, 
which muddled the financial relationship between the government and NOCs. The 
government still provided the NOCs with significant amount of subsidy to compensate 
their losses due to the regulated pricing system. For example, an RMB 5 bn was 
transferred to CNPC in early 1990s. 444 
6.2.6 The reform of the fiscal regime 
6.2.6.1 The new fiscal regime 
The taxation system applied to the onshore petroleum operation was also changed as 
part of the general fiscal reform in the country analysed in section 6.1. The core changes 
of the new system compared to the previous system are shown in the table 6.6. The 
taxation system applying to the onshore domestic operations after reform is shown in 
table 6.7. These changes had two major implications. First of all, the VAT had largely 
aas Zhou, M., Lu, L., & Chai, S. (2005). Accounting and Information System (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. p. 26-32 
444 Lin, K. -C. (2003). Divergent Responses to Oil Price Shocks: Explaining Continuity and Radical Change 
in Industrial Governance of the Chinese Oil and Petrochemical sector. Unpublished draft acquired from the 
author. p. 41 
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substituted the Products Tax as the major turnover tax applicable to the petroleum 
sector. 445 The rules of the VAT were the same all over the country and in all sectors. 
This to a certain extent improved the transparency of petroleum taxation and made it 
easier to be compared to other sectors. Secondly, the share of specific resource taxation 
was increased by the introduction of new taxes such as the Mineral Resource 
Compensation Fee since 1994.446 
The fiscal regimes applying to the rest of the petroleum operations, such as on-shore 
cooperation (between CNPC and foreign partners), offshore cooperation (between 
CNOOC and foreign partners) and offshore domestic operation (CNOOC) remained 
unchanged. 447 
Table 6-6 The major changes in the taxation system for onshore petroleum 
operations 448 
The abolished tax The Adjustment Tax, The Products Tax, the Special Tax for Fuel Combustion, the Keypoint 
Energy and Transport Construction Fund (KETC), and the Budget Adjustment Fund (BAF); 
The revised tax The VAT had substituted the Products Tax; 
The rate for the Resource Tax had been increased and the scope been expanded. 
The newly added tax The Mineral Resource Compensation Fee and the Consumption Tax; 
445 MOF. (2005). Briefing of VAT under China's Tax System Paper presented at the VAT conference Italy. 
The Chinese VAT is a turnover tax levying on value added during sales of goods or services. The tax is not 
included in prices of services or goods. 
446 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 184 
aas For these operations, the major fiscal system applied was Production Sharing Contract 
446 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. p. 183. The Taxation Principles Division of the Ministry of Finance, China. 
(1998). Tax System of China (In Chinese). Beijing: Enterprise Management Publishing House. Wong, C. P. 
W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From Centrally Planned to 
Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and Mongolia) Oxford 
University Press. p. 131 
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Table 6-7 The Fiscal regime for onshore petroleum operation 449 
Taxes/ Fees Tax rate Tax base Note 
Taxations 
1. VAT 17% (crude oil), 13% (natural Sales revenue or Shared tax (75%: the central government, 25%: 
gas) expenditure . 
4541 the local governments) 
2. The Consumption 277.6 RMB yuan/ton (gasoline) Amount of 30 RMB yuan/ton rebate since 1994 
Tax 117.6 RMB yuan/ton (Diesel) production sold 
3. The Business Tax 3% Sales revenue For natural gas purify & Pipeline, 
transportation fee 
4. The Urban Urban area 7%, town areas%, 1+2+3 Used for maintenance of urban, town and other 
Maintenance and others 1% public infrastructures and facilities 
Construction Tax 
5. The Resource Tax Depends on different oil and gas Quantity sold or used It is a local tax. It was increased from RMB 
field (for self use) 4-6yuan/ton to 8-30 yuan/ton after the 1994 
reform 
6. The Housing tax 1.2% for remain value, or 12% Remain value or rent 
for rent income income of houses 
7. The Urban Land 0.3-1OYuan/ square meter Acreage of land 
Using Tax occupied 
8. The Enterprise Income 33% Taxable income 
Tax 
9. The Vehicle using tax RMB 16-320yuan/year (motor Carrying capacity 
vehicle), RMB 12-32 yuan/ year 
(Non-moter vehicle) 
IO. The Stamp tax Varies Varies 
11. The Fixed Assets 0-30% Fixed assets invest 
Investment Direction 
Adjusting Tax 
449 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 131. Brean, D. J. S. (1998). Fiscal Reform in Modern China. In D. J. S. 
Brean (Ed. ), Taxation in Modern China (pp. 1-30). New York: Routledge. p. 16. Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. 
(2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 184 
450 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. p. 43. The calculation of VAT is different from that of normal taxation. 
There are two parts of VAT, at the sales side and at the expenditure side. VAT at sales said = sales revenue 
(no VAT included) x VAT rate (13% or 17%) VAT at expenditure said = expenditure (no VAT included) x VAT 
rate (13% or 17%). The final VAT an enterprise need to pay = VAT at sales said - VAT at expenditure said. 
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Taxes/ Fees Tax rate Tax base Note 
12. The Cultivated Land Different rate applied on Square meter of 
Occupation Tax dillerent region occupied land 
13. The Customs Duty 
I 
Varies Varies 
Main administrative charge and fees 
14. Additional 3% =1+2+3 
Education lee 
15. Mineral Resource 1% Revenue lt is shared by the central and local 
Compensation fee governments (60-50% versus 40-50%) 
16. Mining Exploration RMB 100-500 Yuan per square Acreage 
Right Fee kin 
17. Mining Production RMB 1000 Yuan per square km Acreage 
Right Fee 
18. River Maintenance Depends on different region Revenue 
Fee 
6.2.6.2 The privileged taxation policies 
After the reforms, the taxation structure of the petroleum sector was similar to other 
sectors. The privileged treatments provided to the petroleum sector earlier were reduced 
or had lapsed, and new such treatments were now more difficult to acquire. The 
remaining privileges included the income tax abatement policy, which was launched 
since 1994 to release losses of NOCs resulting from low crude oil price Policy. 451 The 
government returned a certain share of income tax to the NOCs to compensate them for 
their losses. The income taxation abatement was treated as state capital injection. 452 
CNPC was also granted a waiver from the Keypoint Energy and Transport Construction 
Fund, and Budget Adjustment Fund from 1994-1996. This practice was similar to other 
451 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 182 
452 Interview of a senior finance officer of PetroChina in Beijing in 2006 
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SOEs in deficit during this stage and was also treated as state capital injection. 
6.2.6.3 Conclusion 
The 1994 reforms further formalised the fiscal relationship between the government and 
the NOCs increased its transparency of them. The more unified fiscal regime across the 
country, and the reduction of special treatments made it easier for stakeholders to 
compare the tax burden of the petroleum sector to other sectors. Despite these positive 
aspects of the reforms, the impact of the new taxation system was still largely restricted 
by the government regulated pricing system, due to the role of price as a major factor in 
calculating taxes. The government regulated pricing system also played a role as an 
indirect tax, when the government kept the domestic prices lower than the international 
prices, which further obscured the calculation of the tax burden of the petroleum sector. 
According to a rough calculation, from 1980 to 1990, this implicit levy amounted to 
over RMB 400 bn, and between 1991 and 2001, the average annual implicit levy 
remained about RMB 30 bn. 
453 
6.2.7 The P-A relationship formed between the government and NOCs 
During this stage, the objectives of the reforms for the government were to a large 
extent similar to the previous stage. The government intended enhance the commercial 
performance of the sector. Whilst at the same time, it needed to take consideration of the 
453 Lin, K. -C. (2003). Divergent Responses to Oil Price Shocks: Explaining Continuity and Radical Change 
in Industrial Governance of the Chinese Oil and Petrochemical sector. Unpublished draft acquired from the 
author. p. 41 
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social impacts of the reform measures, and to the condition of the national capacity of 
the country. 
These factors were reflected in the reform measures during this stage. For example, the 
main purpose of the reforms of the regulatory framework and of the fiscal and financial 
regimes were to further embrace the market economy, to reduce the direct role of the 
government in enterprises, and to formalise the relationship between the government 
and the NOCs, driven mainly by the need to enhance the commercial performance of 
NOCs. On the other hand, the tightened pricing and distribution systems reflected the 
social concerns of the government. 
NOCs also played an obvious role during the reforms at this stage. Challenged by 
increasing commercial pressure, these companies started to exert their influence by 
lobbying for favourable policies and other terms from the government. This tendency 
could be demonstrated by the industrial structure reform when CNPC and Sinopec 
received access to lucrative import and export business from the government after 
strong lobbying by them. 
6.2.7.1 The tasks of the petroleum sector 
Similar to the previous stage, the commercial tasks assigned to the NOCs by the 
government were still multiple, including production and profitability. The enhancement 
of accounting standards, and the further reform of the fiscal and financial regimes 
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enhanced the role of profitability in measuring the performance of NOCs compared to 
the previous stage. However, the lack of an effective market mechanism to form the 
price signals remained the largest obstacle in the role of profitability. As a result, 
production was still important in measuring the performance of NOCs. The autonomy 
of the petroleum sector was further enhanced in terms of the investment and financing 
activities, but was weakened in marketing activities, due to the reforms to the pricing 
and distribution system. 
The petroleum sector continued to play a regulatory and administrative role in 
supporting the government. Its role in supporting resource management, and pricing and 
distribution regulation was still strong due to the lack of the relevant government 
capacity in these fields. However, their extent had been reduced especially in the field 
of revenue and information collection, due to the employment of the new accounting 
standards and the fiscal regime. 
Furthermore, the petroleum sector, similar to many other SOEs, still took social 
responsibilities including pensions, housing and healthcare as well as employment, due 
to the government' relevant capacity. 
6.2.7.2 The supporting system 
At this stage, the government resorted to a complex of direct administrative orders, 
market and economic means, and political means by appointing senior managers. 
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However, the direct control of the government over NOCs still remained important 
measure, especially in terms of control over the production levels, investment plans for 
large projects, as well as control over the pricing and distribution of products. This was 
mainly due to the lack of effective market signals in the petroleum sector. Meanwhile, 
there was an increase in the share of the material incentive for the NOCs as a result of 
the enhanced fiscal and financial system. 
6.3 The evaluation of the reforms 
The reforms during this stage reflected the government's targets of enhancing the 
commercial performance of the NOCs, while at the same time maintaining the control 
over these companies for stabilisation considerations. The above targets, including the 
commercial targets, were relatively well-addressed by the government through the 
reforms during this stage. The establishment of new accounting standards greatly 
enhanced the effectiveness of the government in collecting information. The 
employment of new fiscal regime also enhanced the ability of the government in 
collecting revenue and therefore the government could afford to rely less on the NOCs 
for these regulatory functions. The establishment of a more transparent formalised and 
fairer fiscal and financial regime was also helpful in providing signals for the NOCs to 
make decisions. These moves were on the right track to help the government in 
removing regulatory functions from the NOCs, to avoid the negative "conflict of 
identity effect", to establish a more market-driven environment for the NOCs and to 
provide them with a higher degree of autonomy. 
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The effectiveness of the reforms could be reflected by active internal reforms conducted 
by the NOCs to increase their commercial performance. The tasks assigned to BUs were 
enhanced by placing more emphasis on profitability indicators, and by adding long-term 
performance indicators, such as the State Assets Maintenance Ratio, and the Reserve 
and Production Ratio (section 6.2.3.2). The supporting system was also enhanced along 
with newly established accounting and budgeting systems, as well as stricter control 
over cost and investment. These approaches improved the quality of information 
available to the headquarters to measure the performance of BUs, and also helped to 
enhance the governance of business units. The separation of core commercial activities 
and non-core activities of BUs, which was conducted on a trial basis during this stage, 
was also positive in enhancing their performance. This helped the headquarters to 
collect better information on BUs' commercial performance, therefore put a higher 
pressure on commercial and non-commercial units. 
However, the largest obstacle for the government to further commercialise the NOCs 
was the lack of a liberalised market in setting prices and allocating resources. This 
restricted the role of profitability, and prevented the government from assigning the 
NOCs with further autonomy in terms of investment, financing, and marketing. This 
also prevented the NOCs from developing their commercial competence. Similar to the 
previous stage, a regulated pricing and distribution system not only obscured the 
profitability indicators in reflecting the real commercial performance of NOCs, but also 
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restricted the major components of the supporting system, namely the fiscal and 
financial systems, to function well. 
Another main weakness of the system was caused by the limited progress made in 
building up the government's capacity to regulate the petroleum sector, and in providing 
social welfare support. The abolition of the Ministry of Energy during this stage showed 
that the government still preferred to rely on NOCs for necessary support rather than 
foster its own capacity in regulating the petroleum sector. 454 
Their continued hold over regulatory responsibility enabled the NOCs to argue for 
policies which were favourable to them. The limited foreign involvement in the Chinese 
petroleum sector is one example. Also, the existence of social functions, such as 
employment, schools and hospitals, made it difficult for the government to refuse 
requirements from NOCs for financial support. It also made it difficult for the 
government to measure the profitability of NOCs. The social burden of the NOCs also 
resulted in inefficient investment. In the case of employment, for example, driven by the 
needs to provide employment for children of their existing staff, the NOCs had invested 
a large amount of their precious capital in non-relevant activities, such as food 
processing, tourism, construction, light industrial and transportation and catering. 455 
454 Gao, S., Liang, S., Geng, Z., Yang, Q., & Guo, Y. (2003). The Review and Evaluation of the Energy 
Strategy and Policy (In Chinese). Beijing Energy Research Institute of National Development and Reform 
Commission. p. 15,50 
455 CNPC. (1999). CNPC Yearbook 1998 (In Chinese). Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing House. 
p. 146 
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This had a negative impact on commercial performance of NOCs. 
The weakness of the system in enhancing commercial performance during this stage 
could be reflected by the reserve, production, and profit figure. During this stage, the 
performance of the petroleum sector was not promising in terms of reserve and 
production with only modest increase, as shown in the table 6.8 and figure 6.6. The 
revenue indicators had increased significantly, which may be attributed to the 
continuous increase of price level by the government during this stage, rather than an 
improvement of commercial performance. (Table 6.9 and figure 6.7). 
Table 6-8 The reserve, production and revenue indicators of CNPC 
Year Production New capacity 
Proven oil 
Reserve 
Asset (original 
value) 
Asset (net 
value) 
Revenue 
(Inn Ton) (inn ton year) bn ton (RMB bn) (RMB bn) (RMB bn) 
1988 136.19 15.8 13.47 80.37 53.00 26.94 
1989 136.65 17.0 13.9 97.62 67.25 34.84 
1990 136.92 13.3 14.33 123.44 89.51 40.48 
1991 137.22 14.2 14.86 147.25 109.57 53.61 
1992 138.03 15.1 15.33 173.65 130.87 63.43 
1993 139.13 15.4 15.77 201.26 131.74 95.38 
1994 139 15.4 16.27 220.26 135.70 112.47 
1995 139.81 16.4 16.66 274.68 147.81 131.18 
1996 141.41 17.0 17.4 307.41 161.82 142.93 
1997 143.22 16.0 18.0 375.12 180.26 167.83 L1998 
107.38 9.6 13.67 387.38 215.45 269.51 
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Figure 6-6 The reserve, production and revenue indicators of CNPC 
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Table 6-9 The profit indicators of CNPC456 
Year Before tax profit Tax Profit 
(RMB bn) (RMB bn) (RMB bn) 
1988 3.9 4.64 -0.74 
1989 1.52 5.39 -3.87 
1990 0.20 5.79 -5.59 
1991 1.08 6.36 -5.28 
1992 -2.89 6.37 -9.26 
1993 3.91 6.54 -2.63 
1994 25.36 15.49 9.87 
1995 26.75 18.09 8.66 
1996 29.57 20.59 8.98 
1997 33.18 22.92 10.26 
1998 36.59 30.11 6.48 
456 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House, p73 
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Figure 6-7 The profit indicators of CNPC 
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The cost of CNPC kept rising during this stage. However the growth rate of cost slowed 
down during this stage since 1994, as could be seen in Table 6.9. This may be attributed 
to the stricter cost control of CNPC (table 6.10 and figure 6.8). 
Table 6-10 The cost indicators of CNPC457 
Cost (RMB yuan ton) 
year total cost* Operation cost 
1991 208 100 
1992 238 118 
1993 313 154 
1994 453 190 
1995 525 236 
1996 569 253 
1997 605 264 
* Including operation cost and other fees, such as oilfield maintenance fee, reserve usage fee, and depreciation etc 
457 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 75. These costs were defined in the Chinese terms, which were different from the 
concept of western style costs. Chinese petroleum industry did not use the western style costs until they 
were quoted in the western stock market since 2000. 
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Figure 6-8 The cost indicators of CNPC 
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7 NOC REFORMS IN CHINA - STAGE FOUR (1998-2006) 
The SOE reform, together with a few other changes in China's economy and the 
petroleum sector, drove the most extensive reforms of the NOCs ever since 1949. Under 
the new leadership of Premier Zhu Rongji, more radical measures were taken to reform 
SOEs and to enhance their performance. The government started to encourage SOEs to 
list in domestic and international stock exchange in order to raise funds and to enhance 
the corporate governance of these companies. This further pushed reforms of NOCs, as 
the petroleum sector was often selected by the government as a pioneer and flagship of 
core reform measures before they were applied to SOEs in other sectors. 458 
The NOCs' overseas listing overcame many weaknesses of the P-A relationship during 
the previous stages. The employment of external monitoring and control system served 
as an effective supplement of the weak capacity of the government. The employment of 
international accounting standards largely enhanced the quality and quantity of 
information related to the NOCs' activities. The adoption of a new pricing formula 
started to connect the domestic and international market and provide the NOCs with 
market price signals. The background of the reforms, the measures of the reforms and 
the effectiveness of these reforms will be analysed in more detail in this chapter. 
458 Interview of a senior finance officer of PetroChina in Beijing in 2006. It was said that Zhu Rongji wanted 
to list a few large SOEs overseas, in order to raise capital and to enhance the corporate governance of 
these companies by exert stricter regulations from western stock markets regulators. To ensure successful 
IPO, companies should have high quality assets and attractive rate of return. Petroleum companies with 
reserves were believed to be in this category. 
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7.1 The general background 
7.1.1 The economic background: the reforms of SOEs 
Since 1998, the reform of SOEs gained momentum under the leadership of Zhu Rongji, 
when he was formally elected as Premier in early 1998. An SOE reform strategy of 
"grasping the large and releasing the small" was passed by the 15 `h Communist Party 
Congress in 1997.45`' According to the strategy, large and centrally owned SOEs, 
mainly energy and resource related, or those participating in sectors with economies of 
scale, should be reformed in order to improve their commercial performance, while 
retaining the government control over them. 460 
The further reform of SOEs was essential for the country as its economy was threatened 
by severe loss of SOEs. These deficits was partially due to the transition of the country's 
economy from a seller's to a buyer's market, and partially caused by the insufficient 
reforms of SOEs during the previous stage as discussed in chapter 5.461 Under a buyer's 
market, there existed a surplus of goods and services, which largely reduced profit 
margins of producers, especially these of SOEs, who were far less competitive than 
459 Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
London, England The MIT Press. p. 100,301. Regional governments, as owners of many middle and small 
sized SOEs, were allowed an unprecedented freedom to "privatise, bankrupt, sell and auction, and merger 
and acquisition" of their SOEs. 
460 Ibid. p. 302 
461 Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, 
USA: World Bank. p. 77. Investorwords. (2007). "Definition of Sellers' Market and Buyers' Market. " 
Retrieved 09 Feb, 2007, from http: //www. investorwords. com/4470/sellersmarket. html. Sellers' market is 
defined as a market which has more buyers than sellers. High prices result from this excess of demand over 
supply. Buyers' market is defined as a market which has more sellers than buyers. Low prices result from 
this excess of supply over demand. From 1995 to 1998 the ratio of goods shortage in China was reduced to 
zero and the ratio of surplus for goods climbed to 25.8% (from 18.3%). 
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their private peers. 462 In 1995, half of the industrial sector, including textile, chemicals 
and mechanicals, with SOEs as the major players, utilised no more than 60% of its 
production capacity. 463 As a result, in late 1990s, a majority of SOEs were plagued with 
severe deficits and bad debts, which greatly threatened the country's overall economic 
performance, 464 The urgency to reform SOEs was also caused by the need to protect the 
domestic economy, as the country decided to join the WTO and acquired the entrance in 
2001,465 Facing competition from foreign players, the government was under pressure 
to improve the competitiveness of its SOEs. 466 
To address these challenges, a proposal for radical SOE reform was drafted and 
launched by the government under the leadership of Premier Zhu. According to the 
proposal, middle and small SOEs were allowed to adopt flexible reform measures such 
462 By 1999, the prices of goods being set by the government was further reduced and about 86% of prices 
of goods were set by market. The more liberalised market system was a severe challenge to SOEs and the 
expansionary economic model the country pursued. Under that model, production was the core of Chinese 
economy. The government assigned production target to SOEs by signing responsibility contract with them. 
But the weakness of the model in its negligence of the investment and operative efficiency was problematic 
in a more market driven environment. Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's 
State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, USA: World Bank. p. 75 
463 Lin, K. -C. (2003). Divergent Responses to Oil Price Shocks: Explaining Continuity and Radical Change 
in Industrial Governance of the Chinese Oil and Petrochemical sector. Unpublished draft acquired from the 
author. p. 16. 
464 Yusuf, S. (2005). Under New Ownership: Privatizing China's State-Owned Enterprises. Hemdon, VA, 
USA: World Bank. p. 77. Profit of SOEs dropped to an 'all-time low of less than 2% of the gross value of 
state enterprises industrial output' in 1998. NBS. (2006). GDP Growth 1952-2006 (in Chinese). In China 
Statistical Yearbook 2004: National Bureau of Statistics, China. 
465 Wong, C. P. W. (1996). Part One People's Republic of China. In P. B. Rana & N. Hamid (Eds. ), From 
Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach (Volume 2 People's Republic of China and 
Mongolia) Oxford University Press. 
466 Lin, K. -C. (2006). Disembedding Socialist Firms as a Statist Project: Restructuring the Chinese Oil 
Industry, 1997-2002. Enterprise & Society: The International Journal of Business History, 7(1), 59-97. p. 16. 
Qiu, B. (2000). Chinese Petroleum Sector challenging WTO (In Chinese). Beijing: The Petroleum Industry 
Publishing House. 
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as privatisation, bankruptcy, sale and auction, and merger and acquisition. 467 For large 
SOEs, 468 most of them energy and resource related or participating in sectors with 
economies of scales, reform measures were applied while the government still retained 
control over them. 469 The major elements of SOE reforms during this stage included the 
enhancement of the regulatory capacity to regulate SOEs in order to take over more 
regulatory and social responsibilities of SOEs, the increased competition from the 
private sector, the reforms of ownership policies including privatisation, and the 
enhancement of the governance in SOEs by establishing new governance systems. 
7.1.1.1 The separation of non-commercial responsibility from the SOEs 
The government started to enhance its regulatory capacity in order to gradually relieve 
SOEs from social responsibilities. A specific government agency, the State Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission ("SASAC"), was established in 2003 to 
represent the government as a shareholder and to monitor the performance of SOEs. 
More details on SASAC will be analysed in section 7.2.1.3.470 Measures were also 
467 Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, 
UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 55,66. The idea was confirmed in the fifteenth party congress in 
Oct 1997 and Ninth National People's Party Congress in March 1998. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). 
Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 140,154. 
XinHua-Net. The Rough Lined Model of Economy Growth Should be Terminated (In Chinese). Retrieved 
16th, Dec., 2006, from http: l/news. xinhuanet. com/politics/2005-10/18/content_3641685. htm 
468 Large SOEs are defined by the government as big SOEs of fiscal or strategic importance to the 
government. The government issued an important official document specified the dominance of SOEs in 
strategically important fields in 1999. 
469 Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, 
UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 67. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen 
Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 177. In 1997, central government controlled 
SOEs were encouraged to form large enterprise groups. In early 1998 government required large scale 
SOEs to establish modem enterprises system and eliminate loss. 
470 PerkinsCoie. (2003). New Framework for the Administration of State-owned Assets in China. 
Retrieved 29 Nov, 2006, from http: //www. perkinscoie. com/content/ren/updates/china/070903. htm. 
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taken to transfer social responsibility from SOEs to the government. For example, most 
educational institutions formerly run by SOEs were transferred to the Ministry of 
Education during this stage. 471 Reforms of medical and social support system were also 
launched in order to enhance the role of the government in these areas. Additionally, 
prices for most commodities were further liberalised to alleviate the burden of subsidies 
hitherto borne by SOEs. Furthermore, there was a more relaxed attitude in hiring and 
firing workers as the development of private sector became increasingly an important 
employer. 472 All these efforts were aimed at relieving the social burdens of SOEs, and 
enabling them to focus more on commercial performance. 
7.1.1.2 The enhancement of the role of private sector in formerly public-owned 
sector 
The government also further removed protections and privileges from SOEs and started 
to permit the private sector to participate in and compete with SOEs in certain sectors 
formerly reserved for the SOEs. A series of new laws and regulations were passed in an 
attempt to establish a level playing field for both SOEs and private enterprises. In 
March 1999, a clause in the Chinese constitution, which read "the private economy is a 
supplement to public ownership", was substituted with "the non-public sector, including 
individual and private businesses, as an important component to the socialist market 
471 PetroChina. (1999). IPO Prospectus of PetroChina. Retrieved 18 Nov, 2006, from 
www. petrochina. com. cn 
472 Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, 
UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 67,77. Four assets management companies were founded by 
the government using capital from the central treasury. These companies provided capital to SOEs for them 
to return loan to banks. Through this mechanism, the bank loans of SOEs to bank became the shares hold 
by these asset management companies on behalf of the government. 
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economy". 473 In 2000, a National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, 
former SPC, see section 7.2) document was released, which clarified that the 
government would "eliminate all restrictive and discriminatory regulations that are not 
friendly towards private investment and the development of private economy". 474 In 
2005, another important document was issued by the State Council to remove 
restrictions on the involvement of private capital in certain sectors that had long been 
monopolised by SOEs, such as electricity, telecommunications, railways, civil aviation 
and petroleum. 475 
7.1.1.3 The ownership reforms of the SOEs 
The government also started to reform the ownership structure of SOEs through 
measures such as privatisation, public-listing, and Sino-foreign joint ventures in order to 
expand the channel of financing and enhance incentive and governance from private 
shareholders. 476 The booming domestic stock market during this stage provided a good 
avenue for SOEs facing a paucity of capital. 477 From 1998-2000, Chinese SOEs raised 
RMB 493.4 bn from the domestic stock market. 478 Large scale SOEs were also 
473 Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, 
UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 75 
474 Ibid. p. 74 
475 Ma, S. (2005). Guiding Private Capital into the Petroleum Sector (In Chinese). Retrieved 20 Nov 2006, 
from http: //www. ce. cn/. The document is titled "Opinion on Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding the 
Development of the Non-Public Sectors of the Economy". 
476 In 1997, the Parry's fifteenth congress encouraged SOEs to attract more capital from the private sector, 
by exploring new ownership structures, such as share-holding companies and public-listing, as well as 
Sino-foreign joint ventures. In 1998, the 'Security Law of PRC" was passed to enhance the safety standards 
in the operation of domestic stock markets. 
"" Lin, K. -C. (2003). Divergent Responses to Oil Price Shocks: Explaining Continuity and Radical Change 
in Industrial Governance of the Chinese Oil and Petrochemical sector. Unpublished draft acquired from the 
author. p. 23 
478 Ibid. p. 24,25 
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encouraged to conduct public listing on international stock markets. 479 
7.1.1.4 The enhancement of corporate governance structure in SOEs 
The government also expended effort to enhance the corporate governance structure of 
SOEs by further promoting the employment of the Modern Enterprise System ("MES"), 
which had been introduced in the previous stage. In 1999, the new Corporation Law of 
PRC was revised to provide a stronger support the expansion of the MES and its 
adoption in SOEs. By 2001,76% key SOEs had adopted the MES. 48° 
7.1.2 The petroleum background: changes in productivity and other factors 
7.1.2.1 The domestic supply and demand 
As the inability of the domestic supply to meet the demand was further increased during 
this stage, the security of supply became an increasingly important theme for the 
country. Since 1998, the domestic petroleum demand remained strong along with strong 
economic growth (see figure 7.1, the Chinese GDP at current price). The average annual 
growth of petroleum demand remained an average of 7.5% from 1998 to 2005 (see 
figure 7.2). 481 This trend is set to continue in the coming decades given the strong 
projection of economic growth of the country (see table 7.1). 
479 Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. K. (2006). Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises and Banks. Cheltenham, 
UK. Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. p. 66 
480 Yuan, B. -H. (1999). The Review of a Few Issues of Socialism Economic of China in the Last 50 Years 
(In Chinese). The Research of Modern China History, 5-6. 
481 Calculated according to the BP statistics review, BP. (2006). "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2006. " Retrieved 21 Jan 2007, from 
http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryld=6842&contentld=7021390. PetroChina. (2006). The 
Research of Chinese Petroleum Taxation (In Chinese). Beijing: PetroChina Internal Research Report. p. 28 
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Figure 7-1 The Chinese GDP at current prices of 2005 (1990-2005) 482 
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Figure 7-2 Oil Production and Consumption (1980-2005)483 
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*Oil production includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (natural gas liquids - the liquid ontent of natural gas 
where this is recovered separately). 
*Oil consumption includes inland demand plus international aviation and marine bunkers and refinery fuel and loss 
482 NBS. (2006). GDP Growth 1952-2006 (in Chinese). In China Statistical Yearbook 2004: National Bureau 
of Statistics, China. 
483 BP. (2006). "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. " Retrieved 21 Jan 2007, from 
http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryl d=6842&contentld=7021390. 
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Table 7-1 China Oil Demand and Supply Projections (mn tonnes per year) 44 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Demand Projections 
IEA(2004) 375 503 636 
EIA(2006a) 450 540 660 780 920 
China Energy Development Report (2003) 310 350 400 
Supply Projections 
IEA (2004) 168 137 112 
EIA(2006a) 172 167 162 162 167 
China Energy Development Report (2003) 170-190 180-200 170-190 
Meanwhile, the domestic production remained stagnant with the average annual growth 
of production being only 1.8% from 1998-2005 (see figure 7.2). 485 Mature reserves in 
Eastern and Northern China depleted significantly, whilst the new reserves in Western 
China were small and posed technological challenges (see figure 7.3). 486 
Figure 7-3 Proven Reserves of oil in China487 
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484 Oliver, H. H. (2006). Reducing China's Thirst for Foreign Oil: Moving Towards a Less Oil-Dependent 
Road Transport System China Environment Series 2006 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars), 41-58. p. 42 
485 Calculated according to the BP statistics review, BP. (2006). "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2006. " Retrieved 21 Jan 2007, from 
http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryld=6842&contentld=7021390. 
486 PetroChina. (2006). The Research of Chinese Petroleum Taxation (In Chinese). Beijing: PetroChina 
Internal Research Report. p. 27 
487 BP. (2006). "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. " Retrieved 21 Jan 2007, from 
http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryld=6842&contentld=7021390. Proved reserves of oil - 
Generally taken to be those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with 
reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and 
operating conditions. 
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7.1.2.2 An increasing dependency on imported oil and the security of supply 
concerns 
China's dependency on imported oil continued to increase rapidly during this stage. The 
import of oil has increased at an annual rate of 20% from 1998-2005 (see figure 7.4). 488 
The higher exposure to the imported oil made security of supply a major concern for the 
government. Most of China's oil was imported from the Middle East and Africa, areas 
plagued with wars and political instability, especially after 9/11. Meanwhile, more than 
four fifths of Chinese oil imports were transported through the Malacca straits, where 
pirate attacks are rampant. Additionally, concerns expressed by many Chinese officials 
and scholars over the lack of a strong navy to ward off a possible naval blockade of the 
sea lanes by the US during a war have increased the concerns over a stable and secure 
supply of petroleum. 
Table 7-2 China's Crude Oil Import489 
(Unit: thousand ton) 
Region 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ME 16782 16668 16904 37650 33860 34392 46365 55789 59852 65605 
A 5907 2191 7249 16949 13546 15797 22182 35301 38343 45787 
AP 9412 5468 6832 10613 8683 11850 13854 14162 9664 5162 
EWH 3370 2995 5629 5054 4168 7369 8726 17595 19803 28626 
TOTAL 35470 27323 36614 70265 60256 69408 91126 122846 127662 145180 
*ME: Middle East; A: Africa; AP: Asia Pacific; EWH: European and West Hemisphere 
488 Calculated according to the BP statistics review, BP. (2006). "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2006. "Retrieved 21 Jan 2007, from 
http: //www. bp. com/productlanding. do? categoryl d=6842&contentld=7021390. 
489 Tian, C. -R. (2000). Review of China's Oil Imports and Exports in 1999 (In Chinese). International 
Petroleum Economics, 8(2). Tian, C. -R. (2005). Review of China's Oil Imports and Exports in 2004 (In 
Chinese). International Petroleum Economics, 13(3). 
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Figure 7-4 China's Crude Oil Import 
(Unit: thousand ton) 
Increasing exposure to imported oil has further exposed the country to fluctuations and 
market risks in the international petroleum market. The lack of experience in dealing 
with the market, as well as the administrative nature of the domestic pricing system 
increased the vulnerability of the country to handle the risks. This vulnerability 
concerned the government and might have further prevented the government from 
liberalising the domestic market. However, the increasing difficulty and cost to maintain 
the regulatory pricing system in order to insulate the domestic market from the 
international market put the government under significant pressure. For example, during 
the 1998 price collapse, when the international oil price reduced to 11.93 $/bbl, rampant 
smuggling of cheap oil inside the country forced CNPC to cut its production for more 
than 4 months. 
7.1.2.3 The World Trade Organisation ("WTO") entrance 
China's WTO entrance in 2001 also had a significant impact on the petroleum sector, 
240 
which was traditionally protected by tariff and non-tariff barriers. According to the 
WTO commitments, the government would not only remove or reduce import tariff of 
crude oil and oil products, but also end the monopoly of NOCs on import and export, 
retail, wholesale and storage businesses, by allowing foreign and domestic private 
players to enter by the end of 2006 (See table 7.3 for more details on these 
commitments). 490 In the long term, the NOCs would be under unprecedented pressure 
to improve their competitiveness and commercial performance, as their dominance in 
lucrative petroleum businesses was under strong challenge. However, in the short term, 
especially during the transition period, the government would be unwilling to see its 
SOEs, operating in strategic sectors, defeated by foreign players. Hence it intended to 
provide extra support in order to build up these so called "national champions". 
490 People'sDaily. (2004). WTO Commitments of China Retrieved 7 Feb, 2007, from 
http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/200410/06/eng20041006_159179. html. JonesDays. (2006). WTO 
Commitments of China Retrieved 7 Feb, 2007, from 
http: //www. jonesday com/pubs/pubs_detail. aspx? publD=S3940. "The PRC's Regulation on the 
Administration of the Crude Oil Market" was issued by the Ministry of Commerce on December 4,2006, 
came into force on January 1,2007. 
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Table 7-3 The petroleum related commitments of WTO entrance491 
1. The tariff cut 
As required by the WTO, China's tariff on crude oil will be eliminated from the previous 6%. Tariffs on gasoline will 
be lowered to 5% from 9%. Tariffs on diesel, kerosene and fuel oil will remain unchanged at 6%, 9% and 6% 
respectively. 
2. The opening up of imports/export business 
In the past, the government has used a license and quota system favoring imports of crude oil over oil products, in 
order to maximise domestic refining capacity. Only several state owned entities are recognised as "State trading 
companies" when it comes to importing the vast majority of crude oil and refined products- the Sinochem, the Unipec, 
COC and Zhuhai Zhenrong Co 
On the import side, oil import restrictions are being dismantled in the wake of China's entry to the WTO by allowing 
more private and foreign importers into the market, In 2002,4 mit tons of refined products, and 7.2 mit tons of crude 
oil, were allowed to be imported by "non-State trading companies" that had successfully obtained import licenses, but 
which were not necessarily State-owned or controlled. The new importers will be allowed to increase their crude oil 
imports by 15 per cent a year for the next 10 years. Their refined oil imports will also be allowed to rise by 15% until 
2004. The import quota on refined oil was eliminated since then. 
3. The opening up of wholesale and retail business 
On the distribution field, foreign companies are allowed to tun the retail business by the end of 2004 and wholesale 
business in 2006. 
In II Dec 2004 China opened its retail market. In the past, this profitable market is principally controlled by Sinopec, 
CNPC, CNOOC, and Sinochem. In Dec 2006, China opened its wholesale market, which has been monopolised by two 
State-owned conglomerates Sinopec and CNPC. Two regulations were issued to encourage market-oriented 
competition, enhance branding awareness and improve service quality. Private companies and foreign companies such 
as BP, Exxon Mobil or Total are permitted to enter the crude oil sale and storage market as long as they meet the 
requirements set forth in the official Regulation. According to the Regulation, a licensing system will be implemented 
to regulate the operation of the domestic crude oil market. Two licenses are available: a crude oil sale license ("Sale 
License") and a crude oil storage license ("Storage License"). The Sale License and the Storage License together are 
herein referred to as "Crude Oil Licenses. " The term "crude oil" covers both domestically produced and imported 
crude oil. 
7.1.3 Changes in national capacity 
The regulatory capacity of the government in regulating national economy was greatly 
enhanced during this stage along with the issuance of new laws and regulations to 
regulate economic activities, the establishment of new government entities such as 
SASAC, and the accumulated experiences of the government in regulating a more 
market-driven economy. 492 The market based economic rules established during the 
491 Ibid 
492 PetroChina. (2006) 
Research Report. p. 6. 
The Petroleum Regulatory Framework (In Chinese). Beijing: PetroChina Internal 
People'sNet. (2006). SASAC Published the Performance for Central SOEs, Two 
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previous stage (chapter 6) had been well tested and adjusted and were also well 
understood by enterprises following years of operations. 493 The capacity of the 
government to take responsibility of social functions was also enhanced due to reforms 
in medical and social support systems and the transferring of educational function from 
SOEs to the government. 
However, the government still lacked petroleum specific regulatory capacity, although it 
started to address this issue during this stage. Therefore, the government still needed the 
NOCs' support in regulating certain aspects of the petroleum sector, such as resource 
management, the pricing and distribution systems, and quality control for certain 
products in the retail market. 
The commercial capacity of the NOCs was enhanced due to increased autonomy 
assigned to them during the previous stage, and their overseas activities involving 
SOEs Were not Qualified for Annual Bonus (in Chinese). Retrieved 07 April 2008, from 
http: //finance. people. com. cn/GB/1039/4731394. html. The SASAC was established in 2003 to take charge 
of the performance management of major SOEs and their heads. The head of SOEs are defined as general 
manager/ director, deputy general manager/ director, CFO, members of the board of directors of SOEs. 
Since 2004, the SASAC started to sign annual performance agreement with the head of 138 central SOEs 
including the three NOCs, and to evaluate the performance of them. The performance of the head of SOEs 
is evaluated on an annual basis and three-year basis to reflect the short and long-term performance of them. 
For annual performance, there were two main set of indicators involved in the performance contract: (1) 
annual total profit and the rate of return on net assets; (2) others indicators that were specific for each 
industry and each company. For a three year performance, there were two set of indicators involved: (1) the 
appreciation rate for state-owned assets and the average increasing rate of business income for core 
business; (2) others indicators are specific for each industry and each company. The head of SOEs will be 
promoted/ demoted or rewarded /sanctioned according to their performance. The process was more 
transparent than before. Although the detailed performance indicators are not for public reviewing, the final 
rating of each SOEs is published (in five categories ranged from A to E). 
493 The MOF further enhanced domestic standards by requiring all 1,200 companies listed on Shenzhen 
and Shanghai stock markets to adopt norms similar to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). Economist. (2007). Cultural Revolution The Economist, 63-64. 
243 
marketing, investment and commercial management. 
The market capacity of the country was also enhanced as the government further 
liberalised the economy. More prices of commodities were decided by the market, and a 
majority of enterprises was free to price and market their products. However, the market 
capacity for the petroleum sector had deteriorated, due to the tightened pricing and 
distribution systems in the previous stage, which resulted in the closure of the few 
commodity exchange markets for oil products. 
7.1.4 The objectives of reforms 
During this stage, to enhance the commercial performance of the NOCs remained to be 
the government's top agenda. This objective was more viable and more urgent than the 
previous stage, influenced by a group of factors analysed above, such as the general 
SOE reform, changes in regulatory capacity of the government, long-term concerns over 
WTO entrance, the country's increasing exposure to the international market, and the 
increasing difficulty and expense in maintaining the government regulated pricing and 
distribution systems. 
The SOE reforms and the enhanced regulatory capacity of the government, enabled it to 
further relieve SOEs' social burden and employed more radical reform measures to 
enhance their performance, such as privatisation. The WTO entrance exposed the SOEs 
to the competition from international players Furthermore, the administrative pricing 
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and distribution systems became more difficult and more expensive to maintain, as the 
country was increasingly exposed to the international petroleum market, and this 
pressured the government to gradually relinquish its control over the petroleum pricing 
and distribution systems. 
Although the security of supply and the social, political and economic impacts of 
reform measures kept concerning the government, it was able to design specific reform 
measures to overcome these issues. 
7.2 The reforms of the institutional arrangement of the petroleum 
sector 
Significant reforms of NOCs occurred during this stage with a scope and at a scale 
never witnessed before in China, driven by the complicated factors discussed in the 
section 7.1. 
7.2.1 The reform of the regulatory framework 
The regulatory framework of the petroleum sector underwent important changes in 
order to enhance the general and petroleum related regulatory capacity of the 
government. The SASAC and the Energy Bureau were created in 2003, while the State 
Energy Office and State Energy Leading Group were established in 2005 . 
494 This 
494 Fesharaki, F., & Wu, K. (1998). Revitalizing China's Petroleum Industry Through Reorganization: Will it 
Work? OGL Special(Special Issue), 33-45. p. 35. Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand Restructure of the Chinese 
Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The Petroleum Industrial Publishing House. p. 61 
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section will introduce the reforms of the regulatory framework in the period from 1998 
to 2001, when the regulatory capacity was weakened, and the period since 2003 when 
the government started to strengthen its capacity. 
7.2.1.1 The reforms from 1998 to 2001 
In 1998, under the leadership of Premier Zhu, the government underwent a major 
reform of regulatory framework (figure 7.5), 495 in order to enhance the role of the 
government in regulating a more market-driven economy. Through the reform, the 
government readjusted the functions of SPC and State Economic and Trade 
Commission ("SETC"). The SPC was renamed as the State Development and Planning 
commission ("SDPC"). Its planning role was weakened and its industrial supervisory 
role was transferred to SETC, making the latter a powerful agency. 496 Furthermore, the 
government formally removed the administrative statues of a few powerful SOEs, 
including the NOCs, and respective "state bureaus" named the State Bureau of 
Petroleum and Chemical Industry ("SBPCI") was established under the SETC to take 
charge of the "industrial planning and overall development strategies" of the NOCs. 497 
495 The reform proposal was issued through The Notice on the reforming of the government institution" 
during the first meeting of the ninth People's Congress in 1998 
496 Lin, K. -C. (2003). Divergent Responses to Oil Price Shocks: Explaining Continuity and Radical Change 
in Industrial Governance of the Chinese Oil and Petrochemical sector. Unpublished draft acquired from the 
author. Fesharaki, F., & Wu, K. (1998). Revitalizing China's Petroleum Industry through Reorganization: Will 
it Work? OGL Special(Special Issue), 33-45. p. 35 
497 Fesharaki, F., & Wu, K. (1998). Revitalizing China's Petroleum Industry through Reorganization: Will it 
Work? OGL Specia/(Special Issue), 33-45. p. 35. OGP. (1998). Restructuring China's Oil Industry - China 
Petroleum Conference 1998's Supplement. China's newsletter of oil, gas and petrochemical industries, 
published by Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, China. For more details on the reform, see "The proposal on 
the establishment of two large petroleum and petrochemical corporation" by SETC in April 1998. The 
SBPCI was responsible to promote the further restructuring of the 7,500 state owned enterprises under 
CNPC and Sinopec, and to formulate a redundant policy to cut down workforce. Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up 
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Additionally, the MGMR, the State Land Administration, the State Oceanography 
Bureau and the State Bureau of Survey and Mapping were merged into the Ministry of 
Land and Resources ("MOLR"), and their function on resource management was 
enhanced. 498 
These reforms separated the regulatory and commercial functions of NOCs legally, and 
further commercialised the NOCs. The government was empowered in regulating the 
strategic aspect of the petroleum sector and its resource management. However, the 
newly established SBPCI and MOLR were too small to regulate the massive and 
powerful NOCs, and the NOCs were still active in influencing the government. 499 The 
SBPCI bureau was disbanded three years later in 2001, and the three NOCs reported to 
SETC directly. The main regulatory framework of the petroleum sector by the end of 
2001 is illustrated in figure 7.6. 
and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry London and New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon. 
498 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Fesharaki, F., & Wu, K. (1998). Revitalizing China's Petroleum 
Industry Through Reorganization: Will it Work? OGL Specia/(Special Issue), 33-45. p. 33. OGP. (1998). 
Restructuring China's Oil Industry - China Petroleum Conference 1998's Supplement. China's newsletter of 
oil, gas and petrochemical industries, published by Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, China 499 It had only a bureau status which is lower than all the three NOCs. The size of the bureau was too small to cope with comprehensive coordinating work it is supposed to do. 
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Figure 7-5 The reform of the institutional structure in 1998 
Before the reform 
Ministry of Mechanical Industry 
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
Ministry of Domestic trade 
Ministry of light Industry 
Ministry of Textile Industry 
Ministry of Chemical Industry + Government 
functions of CNPC and Sinopec 
CNPC 
Sinopec 
After the reform 
r----------- ------------- 
State Bureau of Coal Industry 
State Bureau of Mechanical Industry 
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State Bureau of Domestic Trade 
State Bureau of Light Industry I 
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T-ý State Bureau of Textile Industry 
( State Bureau of Petroleum and Chemical Industry 
; 
zzzzzzzzzzüzzz::::: z: z 
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1-------------------------I 
Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources (MGMR) 
State Land Administration 
State Oceanography Bureau 
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248 
Figure 7-6 The regulatory framework (1998-2003) 
State Council 
SDPC II SETC II MOF II MOFTEC II MOLR 
CNPC I Sinopec II CNOOC II SinoChem II CNSPC 
PetroChina II Sinopec II CNOOC 
Limited Limited Limited 
SDPC: State Development and Planning Commission (1998-2003) 
SETC: State Economic and Trade Commission (1998-2003) 
MOF: Ministry of Finance 
MOFTEC: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (1998-2003) 
MOLR: Ministry of Land and Resources 
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation 
PetroChina Limited: PetroChina Company Limited 
Sinopec: China Petrochemical Corporation 
Sinopec limited: Sinopec Company Limited 
CNOOC: China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CNOOC limited: China National Offshore Oil Company limited 
CNSPC: China National Star Petroleum Corporation (before 2001), it was acquired by Sinopec after 2001 
Sinochem: China National Chemical Import and Export Corporation 
7.2.1.2 The reforms since 2003 
In 2003, the Chinese government launched another large scale institutional reform 
during the third meeting of the tenth People's Congress. 50° The SETC was disbanded 
and its functions were transferred to the newly established SASAC, National 
Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC", the previous SDPC), and the 
500 people'sNet. (2003,7th April, 2008). The Reform of Government Institution (In Chinese). from 
www. people. com. cn /GB/guandian/183/6103/6104/20030318/946373. html 
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Ministry of Commerce ("MOC"). 501 It re-acquired the industrial regulatory functions 
from SETC and became the major regulatory body of the petroleum sector again. 
Additionally, the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Ministry ("MOFTEC") that 
used to control the licence and quota management of the import and export of the 
petroleum industry was disbanded, and the petroleum related functions of the ministry 
were transferred to the MOC. 
The government also started to enhance its energy related regulatory capacity, having 
realised the weakness of the previous regulatory framework in relying on powerful 
SOEs. An Energy Bureau was established under NDRC in 2003, with only 30 staff. 502 
The frequent energy shortages and disruptions since 2003 further exposed the 
inaqequacy of the energy regulatory system. In response, in 2005, two more 
energy-related institutions were established by the government, namely the Energy 
Leading Group ("ELG"), which was a high level coordination entity led by Premier 
Wen Jiabao and two vice premiers, with senior officers from other major government 
ministries as members, as well as the State Energy Office ("SEO"), which was the 
standing office of the Energy Leading Group. 503 
501 The function of managing the performance of SOEs was transferred to SASAC. The function of 
industrial planning, short and mid term coordination was transferred to NDRC. The function of domestic and 
foreign trade was transferred to the Ministry of Commerce. PerkinsCoie. (2003). The Establishment of 
SASAC Retrieved 7 Feb, 2007, from 
http: //www. perkinscoie. com/content/ren/updates/china/070903. htm. SASAC. (2003). The Method to 
Regulate the Performance Management of the head of Central SOEs. Retrieved. From SASAC. 
502 JinghuaTimes. (2005,31st May). The Establishment of State Energy Leading Group (In Chinese). 
Jinghua Times, p. A02. OxfordAnalytica. (2005). China: New Structure for Energy Policy Oxford analytica 
Brief. 
503 Ibid. The major ministries involved included NDRC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SASAC, Ministry 
of Commerce, Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, and SERC 
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The new regulatory framework of the petroleum sector is demonstrated in Figure 7.7, 
and the major role of each institution is listed in table 7.4. Among all the regulatory 
institutions, the NDRC remained the major body in making industrial policies, and the 
two newly established energy entities were the main bodies dealing with the general 
energy policies. 
Figure 7-7 The regulatory framework (2007) 
ELG: Energy Leading Group 
SEO: State Energy Office (of Energy Leading Group) 
NDRC: National Development and Reform Commission 
EB: Energy Bureau (of NDRC) 
SASAC: State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 
MOF: Ministry of Finance 
MOC: Ministry of Commerce 
MOLR: Ministry of Land and Resources 
SEPA: State Environmental Protection Administration 
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation (holding company) 
PetroChina Limited: PetroChina Company Limited (listed company) 
Sinopec: China Petrochemical Corporation (holding company) 
Sinopec limited: Sinopec Company Limited (listed company) 
CNOOC: China National Offshore Oil Corporation (holding company) 
CNOOC Limited: China National Offshore Oil Corporation Limited (listed company) 
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Table 7-4 The functions of major regulatory entities 
Energy Leading Group (ELG)/State Energy Office (SEO): 
The ELG is a high level coordinating entity to be responsible for the State Council. Its main job is to examine the 
general energy issue and submit proposal for the state council to approval. The SEO was the standing organisation of 
the leading group. It has a vice ministry status and operates within NDRC. The main responsibilities of the SEO are (1) 
To formulate energy development strategy; (2)To conduct research on key policies such as energy development and 
conservation, energy security and accident dealing system, energy and foreign cooperation. 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)/ Energy Bureau (EB): 
The Commission was established in March 2003 to consolidate the authorities and functions of the former SDPC and 
the former SETC. The commission (1) has the industry administration and policy coordination authority over China's oil 
and gas industry; (2) determines mandatory minimum volumes and applicable prices of natural gas to be supplied to 
certain fertilizer producers; (3) publishes guidance prices for natural gas and retail median guidance prices for certain 
refined products, including gasoline and diesel; (4) approves significant petroleum, natural gas, oil refinery and 
chemical projects set forth under the Catalogues of Investment Projects Approved by the Central Government; and (5) 
approves Sino-foreign equity and cooperative projects exceeding certain value. EB is the main body in NDRC to deal 
with energy issues. 
State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC): 
The commission represents the government to administrate the assets of state-owned enterprises. The main 
responsibilities of the commission are: (1) To represent the state as investors of the NOCs; (2) To supervise the NOCs 
to maintain and increase the value of state assets; (3) To improve the corporate governance structure of NOCs; (4) To 
Investigate and approve the development plan and strategy of the NOCs; (5) To devise the guiding principles over the 
income distribution standards of NOCs; (6) To control the overall remuneration level of the NOCs; (7) To appoint and 
fire the head of the NOCs according to legal procedure, to devise the remuneration for the head of the NOCs, and 
to reward or sanction the performance of the head of NOCs. 
Ministry of Finance (MOF): 
The Ministry regulated the petroleum sector from industrial and company perspective. Its main function include: (1) To 
regulate the taxation system of the petroleum sector; (2) To regulate the profit share between government and NOCs; 
(3) To involve in the reform policy of the NOCs and devise the financial system for the NOCs; 
Ministry of Commerce (MOC): 
The Ministry was established in March 2003 to consolidate the authorities and functions of the former SETC and the 
former MFTEC: (1) sets the importtexport volume quotas for crude oil and refined products; (2) issues import and export 
licenses for crude oil and refined products to oil and gas companies that have obtained import and export quotas; and 
(3) examines and approves production sharing contracts and Sino-foreign equity and cooperative joint venture 
contracts. 
Ministry of Land and Resources (MOLR): 
The ministry has the authority for (1) granting, examining and approving oil and gas exploration and production 
licenses, the administration of registration and transfer of exploration and production licenses. (2) To organise the 
investigation, evaluation of petroleum resources, and the plan for the protection and utilisation of petroleum resources; 
(3) To approve and designate blocks for foreign cooperation; (4) To issue extraction permit. 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA): to approval Environmental impact reports submitted by the 
NOCs 
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7.2.2 The reforms of the industrial structure (1998) 
The industrial structure of the petroleum sector also underwent radical 
commercialisation reforms, in three major steps during this stage driven mainly by the 
government intention to increase the commercial performance of the NOCs. Firstly, in 
1998 CNPC and Sinopec were restructured into two vertically integrated companies 
based on geographical locations through a massive asset swap. Secondly, in 1999, each 
of the three NOCs, namely CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC established subsidiaries, which 
were wholly owned at this stage, and the core commercial assets of each of the NOCs 
were transferred to their respective subsidiaries. Thereafter, the three new subsidiary 
companies were partially privatised through overseas Initial Public Offering ("IPO"). 
This section will focus on the introduction of the first step, and the section 7.2.3 will 
analyse the other two steps. 
7.2.2.1 The rationales 
The main rationale of the 1998 reform was the need of the government and NOCs to 
enhance the commercial performance of the latter through optimising the industrial 
structure and by enhancing competition. Other considerations of the central government, 
such as the need to regain control of the petroleum value chain from regional 
governments, for revenue or other relevant purposes, also played a role in the choice of 
the reform measure. 
The previous industrial structure of the petroleum sector was segmented and 
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characterised by several NOCs and regional governments playing a dominant role in 
their respective part of the petroleum value chain (Table 7.5). 504 This thwarted effective 
competition and insulated the NOCs, especially CNPC, from market and market signals, 
and prevented the company from developing its marketing capacity. 505 
Table 7-5 the main players in the petroleum value chain before 1998 
The specific Value chain The main players in the value chain 
Upstream-onshore CNPC 
Upstream-offshore CNOOC 
Refinery Sinopec and local government 
Petrochemicals Sinopec, local government and Ministry of Chemical Industry 
Wholesale business Sinopec and local government 
Retail business Mainly local government 
Import and export Unipec, ChinaOil and Sinochem 
Additionally, most of the marketing part of the petroleum value chain, including the 
wholesale and retail enterprises and petrol stations, were controlled by local 
governments. In the end of 1990s, only 3.5% of the overall 80 thousand gasoline 
stations belonged to CNPC and Sinopec. 506 These players often pursued their own 
commercial interests, at the cost of the interest of the government and public. For 
example, they often ignored the government regulated prices and sell their products at 
higher prices, or with lower quality than official standards. 
504 Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand Restructure of the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese. ) Beijing The 
Petroleum Industrial Publishing House. p. 93-94 
505 Ibid. p. 93-94 
506 Ibid. p. 23. Lin, K. -C. (2003). Divergent Responses to Oil Price Shocks: Explaining Continuity and Radical 
Change in Industrial Governance of the Chinese Oil and Petrochemical sector. Unpublished draft acquired 
from the author. p. 33 
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7.2.2.2 The decision making process 
By the end of the 1990s, there were two main reform proposals supported by different 
vested interest groups. The first argued for the establishment of five to ten vertically 
integrated petroleum corporations, and the second preferred to keep the existing CNPC, 
Sinopec and CNOOC, and transform them into vertically integrated holding companies 
with oilfields and refineries. 507 According to the first one, the power would be left 
mainly with regional governments and BUs, it was therefore supported by large oilfields 
and refineries and regional governments. Whilst for the second one, the central 
government and headquarters of NOCs would retain the controlling power, and they 
therefore were the main supporters of this proposal. 
The first proposal was favoured in the beginning of this stage, and a series of trial 
measures was carried out accordingly. In 1997, three petrochemical corporations were 
merged in Shandong province. In 1998, four petrochemical corporations were merged in 
Nanjing province. Several other similar operations were also under planning. The 
central government soon realised the negative effects of the proposal from its 
perspective, especially when it lacked institutional capacity to regulate the behaviour of 
the regional government and middle sized NOCs. Given the difficulty of building up a 
strong regulatory capacity in short term, the government was soon in favour of the 
second proposal. 508 Another possible consideration of the central government in 
507 Yan, X. -C. (1998). The Grand Restructure of the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The 
Petroleum Industrial Publishing House. p. 4-74 
508 Ibid. p. 64-74 
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choosing the second proposal was China's entrance into the WTO. It was believed that 
larger companies had a higher chance of survival when facing competition from the 
western companies. 
7.2.2.3 The reform measures 
A more detailed proposal of reform was finalised by the State Council and was 
implemented in 1998.509 Accordingly, a massive swap of assets was conducted between 
CNPC and Sinopec. Sinopec transferred 19 refineries to CNPC in return for oilfields. 
After the reform, CNPC was responsible for the oilfields, refineries, sales companies 
and petrol stations in II provinces in north eastern and north western China, while 
Sinopec was responsible for 15 provinces in north China, central China, east and south 
China. 510 Additionally, the two NOCs took over the major wholesale and retail 
enterprises belonging to local governments. 15 of them were transferred to CNPC and 
19 of them transferred to Sinopec. 511 As a result, CNPC and Sinopec became two new 
vertically integrated companies distinguished by geographical location, and could 
509 Ibid. p. 81-89. The timing of the reform was also carefully selected. First of all, it was carried out as part 
of a general regulatory framework reform, which made it difficult for the opponents to object. Secondly, it 
was carried out when the international oil price was as low as $10/bbl. Therefore the scale of gain and loss 
was small for vested interest groups, which also prevented them from objecting too hard. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & 
Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. 
p. 143. The official aims of the reform, as has been published by the government, was to separate the 
regulatory function and commercial functions of the petroleum sector, to enhance competition, and to 
optimise the values chain of the industry and improve the performance of NOCs. 
ego Fesharaki, F., & Wu, K. (1998). Revitalizing China's Petroleum Industry Through Reorganization: Will it 
Work? OGL Special(Special Issue), 33-45. p. 5. OGP. (1998). Restructuring China's Oil Industry - China 
Petroleum Conference 1998's Supplement. China's newsletter of oil, gas and petrochemical industries, 
published by Xinhua News Agency, China. Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The 
Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 102. Yan, X. -C. (1998). 
The Grand Restructure of the Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing The Petroleum Industrial 
Publishing House. p. 88 
511 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 151 
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compete with each other. The production capacity of the two corporations after the 
restructuring is shown in tables 7.6 and 7.7.512 The operations and structure of CNOOC 
remained unchanged. 
Table 7-6 The production and capacity before reform (1997) 513 
Crude oil and gas 
(mn tones) 
% 
Refinery capacity 
(mu tonnes) 
% 
Refinery capacity utilised in 
1997 (mn tonnes) 
% 
('NP( 144.0 89.0 34.4 1( ,. 2 22.2 14.4 
Sinopec - - 160.8 75.5 124.9 81.3 
CNOOC 16.7 10.2 - - - - 
CNSPC and others 1.4 0.8 17.8 8.4 6.6 4.3 
Total 163.01 213 100 153.7 100 
Table 7-7 The production and capacity after reform (1998) 514 
Crude oil and gas 
(mn tones) 
% 
Refinery capacity 
(mn tonnes) 
a /ý 
Refinery capacity utilised in 
1997 (mn tonnes) 
e /Y 
('N P(' IUii. I 66.3 87.8 41.2 b7.7 44.8 
Sinopec 36.8 22.6 125.2 58.8 83.4 55.2 
CNOOC 16.7 10.2 - - - - 
CNSPC and others 1.4 0.9 - - - 
Total 163.0 213 100 151.1 100 
7.2.3 The reforms of the industrial structure (1999-2000) 
7.2.3.1 The Rationales and decision making process 
In 1999, the government started to plan another round of industrial structure reforms. 
The initial driver for the reforms was the need to address the financial shortage of the 
NOCs by allowing them to raise funds through public listing in the domestic stock 
markets. The proposal was soon upgraded in favour of an overseas IPO, of the entire 
512 Ibid 
513 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House, p. 153. OGP. (1998). Restructuring China's Oil Industry - China Petroleum Conference 
1998's Supplement. China's newsletter of oil, gas and petrochemical industries, published by Xinhua News 
Agency, China 
514 Ibid. The refinery figure in 1998 was adjusted slightly to include the productions of independent 
refineries 
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NOC, rather than its individual BUs. 515 This was partially due to the pressure felt by 
the government and the NOCs after WTO entrance. 516 It was believed that the strict 
standards in terms of operation and quality of information, and the monitoring and 
control systems imposed by international stock exchange regulators and investors could 
help the NOCs to improve their commercial performance. Meanwhile, the SOE reforms 
led by Premier Zhu encouraged large scale SOEs to list overseas, 517 and the NOCs 
were picked by the government as flagships, and hoped that a successful overseas 
listing of NOCs could lay a solid foundation for others SOEs to follow. 518 
To ensure a successful listing, the government and the NOCs developed a scheme to 
separate the good quality and productive assets from the remaining assets, including the 
service and social functions, and list only the former part. 519 This unusual move was 
intended to transform the previous uncompetitive NOCs with the "enterprise operating 
society" model into an "oil company" model which was common in the West. 
515 OGJ. (2000). China Accelerates Shift in Energy Policy, Restructuring of State Petroleum Firms. Oil and 
Gas Journal. p. 5 
516 OGP. (1998). Restructuring China's Oil Industry - China Petroleum Conference 1998's Supplement. 
China's newsletter of oil, gas and petrochemical industries, published by Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 
China. p. 22. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: 
Commercial Publishing House. p. 175. 
517 Cui, M. -X. (2006). The 2006 Energy Development Report of China (In Chinese). Beijing Social Sciences 
Academic Press (China). p. 243 
518 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 171 
519 The reform proposal was jointly designed by NOCs, the government and independent consultancy 
companies. 
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7.2.3.2 The reform measures 
A reform proposal containing two steps of reforms was finalised in 1998.520 
Step one, the separation of core commercial assets: In 1999, the three NOCs 
separated their high quality and core assets into three newly established respective 
subsidiary companies with limited liabilities. These new companies were organised 
according to the "oil company model". The rest of the assets were left with three 
holding companies. The subsidiaries were wholly owned by the respective holding 
companies at this stage and the holding companies continued to be entirely owned by 
the state. In the case of CNPC, two thirds (by value) of the company's core assets were 
transferred to the new company, PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina), along with 
only one third of the employees, around 0.5 million . 
521 This new company had 52 
subsidiaries, 13 oilfields, 15 refinery and petrochemical enterprises, 21 marketing 
enterprises, I pipeline enterprise and 2 R&D institutes. 522 The core indicators of 
PetroChina in 1999 are shown in table 7.8.523 
Table 7-8 The indicators of PetroChina in 1999 
Before re-valuation After re-valuation 
Total assets 280.8 RMB bn 402.0 RMB bn 
Net assets 95.5 RMB bn 213.1 RMB bn 
Total debts 185.3 RMB bn 188.9 RMB bn 
The debts to assets ration 66% 46.99% 
Employee level 0.48 mit 0.48 tnn 
520 The aims of the reform clarified by the official documents of the central government was (1) to establish 
modem enterprises system; (2) to separate the ownership and management and to establish a new system 
that is suitable for the market economy and the trend of globalisation; (3) to improve the international 
competitiveness of NOCs; and (4) to improve the overall profit of CNPC. 
521 IPE. (2000). Restructure, Change System and Listing, Stepping into the International Capital Market 
International Petroleum Economics, Mar, 5-7. 
522 I bid 
523 CNPC. (2001). CNPC Yearbook 2000 (In Chinese). Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing House. 
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Core assets were defined as exploration and production, pipeline and transportation, 
refinery and petrochemical, and natural gas. Non-core assets comprised engineering and 
construction, oil field services, facilities and equipment production, logistics, as well as 
schools, hospitals and pensions which remained with the holding company (See table 
7.9 for a detailed definition of core business and non-core business for CNPC). 
Through the reform, the organisational structure and corporate governance structure of 
PetroChina was also enhanced (See figure 7.8). The company also established a 
centralised management system, through which power largely centred at the hands of 
the headquarters (Figure 7.9). 524 
524 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 271 
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Table 7-9 Division of Core and Non-core business in CNPC 1999525 
Nature of Business Core business Non-core business 
Oil and gas *Oil and gas exploration and production: *Technical services for core businesses: Seismic 
enterprises *Oil and gas storage and transportation; exploration, drilling, well-testing, well-logging, 
*Refining and chemicals; down-hole operation, oil-field construction 
*Oil and gas marketing; *Manufacturing support and diversified businesses: 
*Exploration, engineering and planning; machinery manufacturing and maintenance, 
*Manufacturing maintenance; transportation, water supply, electricity generation and 
*Electricity and water supply in oil extraction supply, communication, material supply, construction 
plants. materials, light industry and electronics, non-petroleum 
chemicals (diversified enterprises), intermediary agents, 
financial institutions, agriculture, food and tourism and 
hospitality and housekeeping services, etc 
*Social functions: education, medical care, social 
security, retired employee administration, police and 
prosecution and courts, fire-fighting bridge, 
governmental departments, community offices, property 
management, etc 
Refining enterprises *Key refining and chemical production; *Chemical complex construction and installation; 
*Key supporting manufacturing equipment; *Transportation; 
*Oil and gas storage and transportation *Chemical *Overhaul; 
products marketing *Manufacturing support, diversified social functions 
Marketing Storage, transportation and sales of crude oil, Diversified business and social functions 
enterprises natural gas and petroleum products 
Pipelines and Transportation and storage of oil and gas Pipeline construction, non-petroleum industrial 
transportation production, diversified business and social functions 
enterprises 
R&D institutions Exploration and development research and Diversified businesses and social functions 
refining research 
525 Zhang, j. (2004). Catch-up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 112 
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Figure 7-8 The corporate structure and corporate governance structure of 
PetroChina Company Limited in 1999526 
Shareholder meeting 
Board of directors F Supervision committee 
Health, safety and 
President 
environment committee 
Senior Vice President 
Investment and development 
committee 
Vice president Evaluation and remuneration 
committee 
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Audit committee 
IR Plannin11 g Finance HR LA 111 Audit B QSE T&I EC 
office Dent Dent Dent Dent Dent Dent Dent Dent 
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Step two, overseas IPO of core commercial assets: After several months, all three 
new limited companies were partially privatised through overseas IPOs. Each company 
Sze IR: Investor relationship, HR: Human resources, LA: Legal affair, T&I: Technology and Information, QSE: 
quality, safety and environment. EC: Enterprise culture 
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floated only a small amount of their shares with the rest of shares held by the three 
respective holding companies representing the state. In the case of PetroChina the 
company was listed on the Hong Kong and the New York stock exchanges in April 2000 
and raised US$2.89 bn by floating 10% of its shares. The remaining 90% was held by 
CNPC representing the Chinese government. 527 The current share structure of 
PetroChina is shown in figure 7.9. 
Figure 7-9 Petrochina's Corporate Organisation and Shareholding Structure528 
Public Shareholders CNPC 
11.79%(') 
11 
PetroChina Company Limited 
11 88.21%(') 
Exploration and Refining Chemicals and Natural Gas and Others 
Production and Marketing Marketing Pipeline 5 enterprises 
14 enterprises (2) 36 enterprises )2+ 10 enterprises (21) 5 enterprises )2) 
(1) Indicates approximate shareholding by the end of 2005. 
(2) Includes subsidiary companies and branches without legal person status. 
(3) Represents enterprises directly administered and operated by such segment. 
(4) Includes PetroChina Planning & Engineering Institute, PetroChina Exploration & Development Research Institute, 
Newco, Foreign Cooperation Managing Division, PetroChina International Co. Ltd. and PetroChina Refining & 
Chemicals Technology Research Centre. 
52' The 10% was worked out jointly by the Chinese government, NOCs and consultancy companies based 
on considerations of maintaining the control power of the government, and the situations of stock market in 
1999. 
528 PetroChina. (2006). PetroChina Company Limited FORM 20-F. Retrieved 30th Mar 2008, from 
http: //www. petrochina. com. cn/resource/pdf/dqbb/2005n2O-F. pdf. 
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7.2.4 The reforms of the industrial structure: the internal reforms (the example 
of CNPC/PetroChina) 
The reform measures since 1998 also brought in significant internal reforms to the 
NOCs, which will be analysed in this section by using the example of CNPC and 
PetroChina. 
For Petrochina, the strict information disclosure requirements and the application of 
international accounting standards after the IPO increased the transparency of the 
company, and therefore the pressure on the managers to increase commercial 
performance. The separation of core and non core assets also helped the company in 
measuring the performance of its BUs clearly. CNPC's remaining businesses was also 
under unprecedented pressure to survive, as it was burdened with less-profitabile assets, 
and more than one million employees. Its main income came from service charges, 
lease payments and dividend income, mainly from Petrochina, which was under the 
scrutiny of PetroChina's shareholders. 529 Moreover, according to the agreement 
between CNPC and Petrochina, they both retained the right to purchase services or 
products from the third parties if their services and products were superior in the terms 
of quality or price. 530 
529 Ibid. p. 121 
530 Ibid. p. 4 
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7.2.4.1 PetroChina: Corporate strategy and operational goals 
PetroChina had set itself clearer and more commercially driven strategy and targets after 
the IPO. It established a corporate strategy of developing into an international integrated 
oil company with the aim of increasing shareholder value, reducing cost and improving 
competitiveness. Based on its promise to its shareholders during the IPO, the company 
also established clearly defined commercial performance targets. For example, the 
target for the increase rate of the net profit was 10% per year, a cost cut of RMB 9 bn 
from 2000 to 2003, and cut personnel level by 40-50 thousand. 53 1 It also set its ROEC 
target as 12-14 % in 3-5 years from 2000 and Return on Equity ("ROE")532 as 10-12% 
based on the oil prices of 16.5US$/bbl. The overall target for financing cost was 11% 
(with debt cost as 7.5%) through the centralised cash management system. The Debt to 
asset ratio533 was promised to be reduced from 47% to 25-30% through large scale 
repayment of debt. 534 Better defined investment criteria were also published, with a 
threshold rate for return on investment set strictly as 12%. 535 The detailed business 
planning for each segment is listed in the table 7.10. 
531 PetroChina. (1999). IPO Prospectus of PetroChina. Retrieved 18 Nov, 2006, from 
www. petrochina. com. cn, p. 192. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In 
Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 247 
532 Return on Equity: a measure of profitability, net income divided by shareholder equity. Bush, J., & 
Johnston, D. (1998). International Oil Company Financial Management in Nontechnical Language. Tulsa, 
OK: PennWell. p. 304 
533 Debt to asset ration is total liability divided by total debt. It reflect the financial situation of a company. 
534 Yu, Y., Li, O., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 248 
535 Ibid. p. 246 
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Table 7-10 The business planning of Petrochina promised in its IPO prospectus536 
The targets The measures 
Exploration Boost of' financial performance and return on Cost cutting: shut-down of inefficient blocks; 
& production capital; 14% increase in gas production; operation rigorous capital return requirement for investment 
cost cut from 5.05 US$/bbI in 1998 to 4.75 US$/bbl 
in 2002; ROEC reach 14%-16% in 3-5years 
refining & Improve the financial and operating performance of Implement a new integrated organisational 
marketing the segment; eliminate deficit by 2000; ROEC reach structure (shut-down of inefficient units, redefine 
8-10% in 3-5 years; close 3--5 refineries in 3-5 the product portfolio structure for a better fit of 
years; cut cost by RMB 1.2bn; the market share of market; enhance retail capacity); rigorous capital 
petrol station reach 18% in 3-5 years return requirements; cost-cutting measures. 
Chemicals Eliminate deficit of the segment; cut the total Focus on key products; improve investment 
operation cost by RMB 1.3 bn in 3-5 years, ROEC discipline; selectively increase production output 
reach 6-8% of certain value-added products to meet market 
demand; cost reduction measures 
Natural gas ROEC reach 3-5% in 3-5 years; the amount of sales To further increase its market penetration; focus on 
& pipeline increase at an annual rate of 17%; reduce the the exploration and development of large natural 
percentage of fertiliser user; Internal Rate of gas discoveries; and expand its transmission 
Return reaches 12% for West to East Pipeline infrastructure; reduce its production and operating 
project costs; and increase the sales price of natural gas. 
7.2.4.2 PetroChina: financial management 
To achieve these clearly defined goals, Petrochina also expended considerable effort in 
establishing a centralised financial management system, with three main components, 
namely, overall budgeting management system, centralised cash and debt management 
system, and centralised accounting management system, in order to enhance the 
monitoring and control system employed by the headquarters. 537 
The overall budget management system was an upgrade from the budgeting system in 
536 PetroChina. (1999). IPO Prospectus of PetroChina. Retrieved 18 Nov, 2006, from 
www. petrochina. com. cn, p. 192. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In 
Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 248 
537 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 252 
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the previous stage by emphasising more on profitability, and covering all investment, 
operational, as well as the financial activities of each BU. This therefore became an 
important monitoring and control tool for the headquarter to ensure the fulfilment of its 
profitability targets. The overall targets of the company were broken down into 
individual targets of each business unit and segment. Based on it, performance contracts 
were signed between the headquarters and the head of each segment and BU. 53' A 
typical performance contract included three key indicators, being, the profit indicators 
(ROEC, profit before tax, free cash flow), operational indicators (cost, expenditure, 
investment control indicators and other technological and economic indicators), and 
controlling indicators (quality, safety and environment indicators). 539 
PetroChina also established a centralised capital and debt management system, and 
established strict rules in controlling the investment and financial activities of BUs by 
using a better controlled cash management system. 54° 
PetroChina also established a centralised accounting management system, with unified 
code of practice, hardware, and software used by all members of the company. This not 
only effectively increased the speed of information collection but also improved the 
quality of information. Furthermore, through a computer based accounting system, the 
financial statement was generated at the central level rather than the BU level. The BUs 
538 Ibid. p. 254 
539 Chen, M. (2005). Budgeting Practice in China: a Case Study. University of Dundee, Dundee. 
540 A detailed principles of the system is introduced in the chapter 5 
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were responsible for inputting primitive information at their terminal and the financial 
statements could be generated at the headquarter level. This could largely reduce the 
manipulation of financial and operational data at the BU level. 
7.2.4.3 CNPC: internal restructuring 
CNPC also emphasised on its commercially driven targets to eliminate deficit and 
enhance profitability in 2000, and launched a package of reform proposals for internal 
restructuring. 541 The company established the service sector as its major business, and 
decided to gradually separate or divest other supporting and social functions. By doing 
so, the company made it easier for the headquarters to measure the performance of each 
of its BU, and easier for each unit to be accountable for its respective target, therefore to 
gradually remove the "negative multi-task effect". 542 A detailed survey was conducted 
on all the existing assets and operations of CNPC. A standardised rule was introduced to 
shut down or sell off non-profitable or non-relevant businesses. 
Measures were also taken by CNPC to enhance the performance of the company by 
reducing the workforce level, as the company still had around 1.06 million employees in 
1999. According to a survey, 40% of the workforce was not utilised. A pay-off scheme 
was introduced, enabling employees to seek early retirement in return for financial 
541 PetroChina. (1999). IPO Prospectus of PetroChina. Retrieved 18 Nov, 2006, from 
www. petrochina. com. cn. p. 121. CNPC. (2002). CNPC Yearbook 2001 (In Chinese). Beijing: The Petroleum 
Industry Publishing House. p. 9, "several policy measurements to promote the reform and development of 
CNPC" 
542 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 96 
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benefit commensurate with their years of service with the company. Asset optimisation 
scheme was another means of reducing workforce by separating non-relevant assets out 
of CNPC together with their employees. From 2000 to 2004,0.35 million were removed 
from CNPC since 2000.543 
7.2.5 The reforms of the pricing and distribution systems 
During this stage, the pricing and distribution system was under immense pressure to be 
further liberalised, due to the difficulty and high cost of maintaining a regulated system 
in a large net importer under a high price scenario, 544 the need of the government to 
commercialise NOCs, 545 and financial burden of NOCs and their strong lobbies. 
Meanwhile, the concerns over the social, political and economic impact of reforms still 
set the pace of the reform. Reflected these factors, the government chose a reform path 
of retaining control over the system, while starting a pricing formula system to link the 
543 Ibid, p294 
544 The regulated price has a distortion effect on the economy. One example of the distortion was the 
overcapacity of refineries in 1990s as a result of the artificial high refinery margin. According to international 
practice, refinery generally is a low profit margin industry while crude oil exploration and production industry 
is a high risk and, at times of high prices, high return. While in China, the situation was reverse to that of 
international practice. The average domestic crude oil prices were much lower than that of the international 
prices. The average prices for domestic onshore crude oil in 1997 were 1029 RMB yuan/ton, which was 
$14.72/bbl after the adjustment of VAT, 30% lower than the cost of import crude oil. In terms of oil products, 
However, by 1997 the average domestic prices for oil products exceeded the import prices. For example, 
the factory gate prices for 95# gasoline were 2478 RMB yuan/ton, and 0# diesel 2190 RMB yuan/ton, which 
were $29.35/bbl and $27.65/bbl each, higher than the prevailing international prices of $24.62/bbl and 
$24.35/bbl. Yan, X., & Yang, J. (1999). Fuelling the 21st Century China: the Report on Improving the 
International Competitiveness of Chinese Petroleum Industry (In Chinese). Beijing: The Enterprises 
Management Publishing House. p. 186. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform. 
Beijing: Commercial Publishing House, p. 30. 
545 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 99. A real liberalised price could transfer the market risk to NOCs. It also served as 
incentive for them to improve their performance, as their profit will be decided by the market rather than the 
government. 
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domestic oil price with the international oil prices. 546 
7.2.5.1 The reform of the pricing and distribution systems (crude oil) 
The major reform measure for the crude oil pricing mechanism was the introduction of a 
tentative formula pricing system. Meanwhile the government retained the dominant 
control and the right to intervene whenever necessary. 547 
In 1998, the government implemented the formula pricing system to peg the domestic 
oil prices with that of the Singapore market. A guiding price was set by the government 
on a monthly basis and remained valid for a month, according to the average prices of 
crude oil in the Singapore market during the previous calendar month. 548 See table 7.11 
for a sample of guiding price in 1998. 
546 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform. Beijing: Commercial Publishing 
House, p. 30. p. 104 
54' SDPC. (1998). The Notice on "the Reform Proposal of Crude Oil and Oil Products" (in Chinese). 
Retrieved 14 Feb, 2007, from http: //www. qzprice. gov. cn/ZHCE-1/gjfg/1998/1998-8. htm. Wen, Q., Xiang, 
Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. 
p. 101 
518 SDPC. (1998). The Notice on "the Reform Proposal of Crude Oil and Oil Products" (in Chinese). 
Retrieved 14 Feb, 2007, from http: //www. gzprice. gov. cn/ZHCE-1/gjfg/1998/1998-8. htm. Under the new 
system, CNPC and Sinopec submited daily prices of given crude in the Singapore market between 26th of 
previous month to 25th of current month to NDRC for it to calculate the benchmark prices according to them 
for next month. The benchmark prices were issued on the end of each month and remained valid for the 
next month 
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Table 7-11 Sample of the guiding price for crude oil in June 1998549 
The Domestic 
crude oil 
The crude oil for 
Benchmark 
The guiding prices 
(RMB wan) 
C. I. F 
($/bbl) 
Import tariff 
RMB yuan/tom 
Light Tapis 975 14.722 16 
Medium I Minas 810 12.943 16 
Medium 11 Sinta 788 12.726 16 
Heavy Duli 744 12.963 16 
The final settlement prices for domestic crude oil between CNPC and Sinopec were 
decided by the guiding prices, and a negative or positive premium negotiated between 
the two parties based on specific quality of crude oil at stake, domestic transportation 
cost, and the state of domestic supply and demand as shown in the formula below. 550 
The SDPC only got involved if disputes arose between CNPC and Sinopec. 
Equation 7-1 Settlement price = guiding price +/- premium 
7.2.5.2 The reform of the pricing and distribution systems (oil products) 
Similar to the reform of crude oil, the government implemented a formula pricing 
system to peg the domestic price of oil products to that of the international level. 
Considered the higher social impacts of the oil prducts price, the government took a 
more proactive approach to intervene when necessary. Since there were a wide range of 
products and different policies applied to them differently, this section focuses on major 
products such as gasoline and diesel, which both experienced several steps of reform 
549 Yu, Y., Li, O., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 105.1US$=8.24 RMB yuan, CIF: Cost, Insurance and Freight 
550 SDPC. (1998). The Notice on "the Reform Proposal of Crude Oil and Oil Products" (in Chinese). 
Retrieved 14 Feb, 2007, from http: //www. qzprice. gov. cn/ZHCE-1/gjfg/l998/1998-8. htm 
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during this stage. 55' 
The 1998 reform: In 1998, a new formula system was established for oil products. 
Similar to the pricing system of the crude oil, the government publicised guiding prices, 
and the NOCs decided settlement prices based on them. The guiding prices were 
established based on the price levels in the Singapore market plus import tariff. NOCs 
set wholesale and retail prices based on the guiding prices, domestic transportation cost, 
as well as retail and wholesale profit margins. 552 The NOCs were required to maintain a 
stable retail price in the domestic market. 553 Since 1998, the government intervened and 
stopped or slowed down the passs-through of the increase in international price level to 
the domestic market, in order to sooth the impact of surging international prices. This 
resulted in an enlarged gap between the international and domestic price levels. 
The 2000 reform: By early 2000, the mismatch of international and domestic pricing 
level mentioned above caused rampant smuggling of domestic oil products outside the 
country. Trucks from Hong Kong and foreign airplanes chose to refill in China. The 
NOCs were reluctant to import crude oil in order to reduce losses. Domestic supply 
551 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 109. The pricing system for oil products is more complex and sensitive than the system 
for crude oil. This is because first of all, it is more difficult to control price of oil products than control price of 
crude oil as the former has more players. Secondly the oil products by nature were more complicated than 
crude oil, which is more or less homogeneous. Thirdly, the social impact of oil products price was much 
higher than crude oil price as oil products are normally ultimate consumer commodity, whereas the crude 
prices are intermediate feedstock of refineries. 
552 People'sDaily. (2004). From a Little Trickle to a Mighty Gush. Retrieved 14th Feb, 2007, from 
http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/200410/06/eng20041006_159179. html. 
553 SDPC. (1998). The Notice on 'the Reform Proposal of Crude Oil and Oil Products Retrieved 14 Feb, 
2007, from http: //www. qzphce. gov. cn/ZHCE-1/gjfg/1998/1998-8. htm. 
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disruptions were frequent, and black markets started to develop. These market disorders 
greatly stretched the government's regulatory capacity. To tackle the problems, the 
government decided to adjust the domestic prices more frequently since May 2000. As a 
result, the domestic price levels soon caught up with the international prices. 554 
The 2001 reform: In 2001, the government adjusted the pricing system again to address 
several weaknesses of the previous formula mechanism. Firstly, pegging domestic 
prices to an offshore market, which may not necessarily reflect the domestic supply and 
demand trend, could accentuate surpluses or shortages in the domestic market. "5 
Secondly, the pricing of domestic oil lagged behind the prices in the Singapore market, 
and this easiness in forecasting future domestic prices allowed players to benefit by 
manipulating supply. 556 
To address the above problems, a new system was introduced in 2001, which contained 
five main elements. First, prices in two more markets were added to benchmark the 
domestic prices, the Rotterdam and the New York market. Second, the prices were not 
any more adjusted monthly, instead, the government adjusted the guiding prices 
whenever the change in the international market exceeded a certain limit, which was 
554 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 111 
555 For example, under an effective market with domestic prices influenced by domestic demand and 
supply, when the domestic demand exceeds supply, the domestic prices would increase, which would 
naturally reduce demand. However, this may not be the case for a market system with price system 
benchmarked with offshore pricing system. 
556 People'sDaily. (2004). From a Little Trickle to a Mighty Gush. Retrieved 14th Feb, 2007, from 
hftp: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/200410/06/eng2OO4lOO6_1 59179. html. 
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kept secret. 557 Third, stabilisation measures such as cap and floor prices were 
established by the government to curb exceptional fluctuation of domestic prices. 
Fourthly, more autonomy was assigned to NOCs, and they were allowed to add a 
premium of up to positive and negative 8%, compared to the previous level of 5%. 
Finally, the government liberalised certain less important oil products, such as fuel 
oil. 558 A domestic commodity exchange was soon established for the products. 
2007 reform: In Jan 2007, a new "crude price plus cost" mechanism was implemented 
in pricing oil products. According to the new system, the prices of oil products were set 
by benchmarking a basket of crude oil (Brent, Dubai, and Minas) in the international 
market, plus processing cost, profit margin, tariff and other factors. 559 The new measure 
could therefore increase the domestic price level of oil products, which was believed to 
be helpful in relieving heavy losses of domestic refineries and freeing the government 
from the financial burden during the previous years. 560 The subsidies the government 
provided to the NOCs exceeded 15 billion during 2005-2006.561 
557 Ibid 
558 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 112 
559 Sohu. (2007). The New Prices System for Oil Products is Implemented, Will relieve Loss of 
PetroChemical Industry (In Chinese). Retrieved 14th Feb, 2007, from 
http: //business. sohu. com/20070130/n247921043. shtml. CRI. (2007). China Adopts New Pricing System for 
Oil Products (In Chinese). Retrieved 14 Feb, 2007, from 
http: //english. cri. cn/2946/2007/01 /30/1221 @190918. htm. 
560 CRI. (2007). China Adopts New Pricing System for Oil Products (In Chinese). Retrieved 14 Feb, 
2007, from http: //english. cd. cn/2946/2007/01/30/1221@190918. htm. 
561 Wang, Y. (2006). Sinopec is Given a Subsidy of US$639m (In Chinese). Retrieved 15 Feb, 2007, from 
http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/china/2006-12/28/content 769253. htm 
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7.2.6 The reform of the financial and fiscal regimes 
The reforms of the fiscal and financial systems remained modest during this stage, with 
a few minor adjustments. 562 For the fiscal regime, a package of privileged policies was 
employed to support the reforms of the industrial structure discussed in section 7.2.2 
and 7.2.3. A new windfall tax was also introduced to reflect the record high international 
oil prices. For the financial regime, the dividends policy suspended during the previous 
stage was formally activated. 
7.2.6.1 A package of taxation policies to support the reform of industrial structure 
from 1998 to 2000 
The industrial structure discussed in section 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 could have significantly 
increased the tax burden of the NOCs, especially these in the VAT, the business tax, and 
the income tax. To ensure a success implementation of these reforms proposals, the 
government introduced a new package of taxation policies to relieve the tax burdens of 
the NOCs, 
563 
Take CNPC for example, the tax burden for the VAT and the business tax could have 
surged radically, as the deduction previously applicable within a company, could not be 
deducted once it spitted into two entities. For similar reasons, the income tax of CNPC 
and Petrochina could also have surged after the reforms, as the taxable profit generated 
562 CNPC. (2000). CNPC Yearbook 1999 (In Chinese). Beijing: The Petroleum Industry Publishing House. 
Annual speech of Vice Premier Wu Bangguo. 
563 Wen, Q., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 196-203 
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by PetroChina could not be reduced by the deficit of CNPC. To address these issues, the 
government allowed PetroChina to deduct its business tax bill from its VAT at the sales 
side in order to stabilise its tax burden. The government also introduced a special 
tax-rebate policy in 2000, according to which the income tax of PetroChina exceeding 
certain amount would be returned to CNPC to compensate for the losses, to be used on 
employee redundancy and for further development of CNPC. The government also 
decided to waive other one-off increase of taxes caused by the reforms, including the 
increase in income tax on the account of appreciation assets, the contract tax and stamp 
tax caused by new deals signed between CNPC and PetroChina. These new policies 
were more transitional policy from the government in smoothing the negative impacts 
of radical commercialisation reforms, rather than privileged support provided to the 
NOCs. 
7.2.6.2 A new windfall taxation 
In 2006, a new tax was introduced to ensure an increased share of government take 
under high oil price scenario. The new tax, named "Special Benefit Taxation" applied to 
revenue of the NOCs when crude oil prices exceeded 40$/bbl, with a sliding scale tax 
rate ranging from 20% to 40%, linked to the level of oil prices (table 7.12) 564 This 
windfall tax reflected the similar trend in other oil producing countries such as 
Venezuela and Kazakhstan. It further reflected the enhanced commercial role of the 
564 FT. (2006,28 March). Beijing Imposes windfall tax on oil groups. Financial Times. MOF. (2006). The 
Method on Collecting the Special Benefit Taxation (In Chinese). Retrieved. from 
http: //www. law-lib. com/Iaw/law_view. asp? id=153850. 
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NOCs, and the regulatory role of the government as resource owner intending to secure 
its benefit from resource extraction. 
Table 7-12 The Special Benefit Taxation (windfall tax) 
Crude price (US$/bbl) Tax rate 
40-50 (including 45) 20°c 
45 - 50(including 50) 25% 
50- 55(including 55) 30% 
55 - 60 (including 60) 35% 
60 40% 
7.2.6.3 The implementation of the dividends policy 
In 2007 the government also decided to activate the dividend policy which had been 
suspended in the previous stage on account of the poor profit generated by SOEs. 565 
Since 2000, following the SOE reforms discussed in section 7.1.1, the social burdens of 
SOEs were largely reduced, and their profit increased accordingly. Concerned about the 
risk of over-investment by cash-rich SOEs, and the lack of internal scrutiny mechanism 
for investment, the government has activated the policy and started to benefit from 
SOEs' dividends as a shareholder. 566 A pilot scheme is scheduled to start in 2008 which 
is to be followed by a formal implementation of the policy on a wider scale. This could, 
in theory, further formalise the financial relationship between the government and the 
NOCs, improve transparency and constrain inefficient investment by the NOCs. 
565 Wen, O., Xiang, Z., & Wu, D. (2005). Price and Taxation Management (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 181 
566 McGregor, R. (2007). Beijing Launches State Groups Dividend Plan. Financial Times, p. 7. 
People'sDaily(2006). "World Bank Recommends China's Large SOEs to Pay Dividends to Central 
Government. " Retrieved 14 March, 2007, from 
http: //english. people. com. cn/200602/12/eng200602l2_242002. html. Economist. (2006). Dividends in 
China: Can't Pay, Won't Pay The Economist 27th July. 
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7.2.7 The P-A relationship formed between the government and NOCs 
During this stage, the pressure on the government to enhance the commercial 
performance of the NOCs and to liberalise the petroleum market remained high. 
Furthermore, the enhancement of regulatory capacity to regulate the general economy 
and to provide social support enabled the government to conduct more radical reforms 
in the petroleum sector. This trend could be reflected by the massive scale of reform in 
the industrial structure. The concerns over social impact of pricing system and the 
insufficient petroleum specific regulatory capacity prevented the government from 
assigning the NOCs with complete autonomy in investment. These factors and concerns 
set the pace of the reform and could be reflected by the cautious reforms of the pricing 
and distribution system, and the reluctance to remove the role of NDRC in investment. 
7.2.7.1 The tasks of the petroleum sector 
Profitability became a dominant performance indicator of the listed bodies of the NOCs, 
attributing to the separation of core assets from the non-core assets, and the public 
listing of the NOCs. The formula pricing system also helped to provide the NOCs with a 
market driven price signals to calculate their profitability indicators. Even for the 
remaining businesses, the content of their social functions was largely reduced, due to 
the enhancement of the general regulatory capacity of the government. The NOCs 
during this stage, were still not as free as their international peers in making decisions 
over investment, financing and marketing. Their respective behaviors such as 
investment in large scale projects domestically or internationally, had to be submitted to 
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the NDRC and were subject to its approval. However, the scope of control from the 
government had been largely reduced compared to the previous stage. 
7.2.7.2 The supporting systems 
In terms of the monitoring and control system, the government still retained certain 
elements of direct control over the NOCs either though the approval system by NDRC, 
the appointment of management, or even personal influence. The government still gave 
out direct administrative orders to NOCs when needed, for example, to require the 
NOCs to ensure supply of certain regions at certain price level under a severe supply 
shortage. 567 The government still retained the right to appoint the President of CNPC 
and, indirectly, the President of PetroChina. Influence could also be exerted though the 
appointment of senior management who are loyal to the government and the party. 
Meanwhile, the indirect Party system remains influential and this plays an invisible but 
important role for the government to influence the NOCs. This reluctance to give up 
control of the NOCs was mainly due to the relative weak petroleum related regulatory 
capacity of the government, although the government had started to address the issue. 
Furthermore, the concerns over the negative social impacts of oil prices prevented the 
government from giving up control over the pricing and distribution systems. 
Despite the above direct control retained by the government, the government had 
567 China's state oil giants may suspend gasoline exports: report. (2007,31 August 2007). Platts 
Commodity News. 
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greatly enhanced commercial measures to monitor and control performance of the 
NOCs largely attributed to their public-listed status. In fact, the monitoring and control 
system from the regulator of the international stock exchange complemented the relative 
weak capacity of the government in regulating the NOCs. 
In terms of incentives, the profitability-linked material incentive system was also 
developed following the reforms of the industrial structure. The listed arms of NOCs 
were left with less social burdens and more autonomy. Better defined profitability tasks 
made it easier to assign better defined tasks to senior managers, middle managers and 
individuals. After the reform, managers and employees in NOCs' were increasingly 
rewarded or sanctioned by their profitability-linked performance. 568 
7.3 The evaluation of the reforms 
The reforms during this stage were effective in enhancing the commercial performance 
of the NOCs. From the tasks perspective, the separation of core and non-core assets into 
two separate entities, and the adoption of a formula pricing system made it easier to 
measure the profitability performance of the NOCs. This helped to remove the negative 
"multi-task effect" and the "conflicts of identity effect" from the NOCs and to enhance 
the commercial performance of them. Even for the remaining social responsibilities 
taken by the NOCs, the reforms during this stage largely reduced their negative effect 
568 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform (In Chinese). Beijing: Commercial 
Publishing House. p. 271 
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on the NOCs' commercial performance. For example, in the case of the responsibility 
for security of supply, NOCs could argue for compensation from the government or 
even refuse to conduct certain operations ordered by the government, strengthening 
their nature as publicly-listed companies. 
The monitoring and control system was also largely enhanced. This was partially due to 
the clarification of the tasks of the NOCs. The emphasis on profitability and the removal 
of non-commercial responsibilities made it much easier to measure the performance of 
the NOCs. This could also be attributed to the enhancement of the general regulatory 
capacity of the government, which was constantly built up during the previous stages. 
One core example is the employment of market style accounting standards in the 
country. Most importantly, the enhancement of the monitoring and control system was 
due to the public-listing status of the NOCs. The employment of international 
accounting standards and the functioning of strict monitoring and control from the 
international regulators and investors made the NOCs more transparent and 
well-governed. 
The reforms had a positive impact on the NOCs, which could be reflected in the case 
study of CNPC and PetroChina, wherein both of them had clarified their 
commercial-driven strategies and annual tasks and enhanced the internal systems to 
ensure the fulfilment of these tasks (section 7.2.7.2). The positive impact of the reforms 
during this stage could be demonstrated by the ability of the company in meeting its 
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own commercial targets, and the enhancement of other commercial indicators, such as 
these scales related indicators, operational indicators and profitability indicators. As 
could be seen from table 7.13, PetroChina met nearly all the commitments it made 
during the IPO, which is a positive sign of the company in controlling its operations 
effectively in order to meet its targets. 569 
Table 7-13 PetroChina general performance compared with IPO promise 
1PO promise 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ROE(' (°o) 9-11% 15.8 12.6 12.3 15.9 21.2 22.6 
Rctum per share 12-14% 20.2 15.9 14.8 19.5 
Dividend rate 40-50% profit for distribution 45 45 45 45 
Ratio of debt/ net assets 25-30% 25.5 23.5 20.2 16.4 
Increase rate for profit 
(RMB bn) 
10% based on 2000 level 
(29RMB bn) 
55.2 46.8 46.9 69.6 
Other performance indicators including profitability were also enhanced (seen from 
figure 7.10-7.21). However, NOCs were still different from IOCs in many aspects. For 
example, the NOCs were still receiving government support, in the form of writing 
down of the non-performing assets and the privileged taxation policies. Furthermore, 
90% of the NOCs' revenue was generated from domestic reserves, the acquirement of 
which was not through competitive bidding. The government still had controlling share 
in the NOCs. All these above factors differentiated them from a typical IOC. Therefore 
the comparison of the performance of the NOCs and IOCs should further be put in the 
context of this difference. 
569 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform. Beijing: Commercial Publishing 
House. p. 273 
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Performance indicators related with scale: 570 As could being show from figures 
7.10 to 7.14, PetroChina's growth performance was positive compared to IOCs. Its total 
assets, reserve, and production maintained a similar trend to that of IOCs or even 
outperformed IOCs in the case of production figure, despite the fact that the company 
maintained a much higher employee level then international majors and other NOCs. 
Figure 7-10 Total assets (mn USD) 
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570 All data of this section acquired from the internal analysis of PetroChina's finance department 
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Figure 7-12 Crude oil reserve (mn bbl) 
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Figure 7-13 Crude oil production (000 b/d) 
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Figure 7-14 Crude oil processing capacity (000bbl/d) 
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Operational performance: 571 As could been shown from figures 7.15 to 7.18, 
PetroChina maintained a high capital expenditure, which shows the devotion of the 
57 The operational performance in the thesis takes a broad meaning, which including the traditional 
performance of both capex and opex performance 
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company to maintain growth. However, the operational revenue was much lower than 
the average IOC level for mainly two reasons: firstly, the domestic price level was still 
maintained lower than the international one, and secondly, the company is a crude long 
company which produced less oil products than average IOCs. 
Figure 7-15 Capital expenditure (nm USD) 
18000 
16000 
14000 
12000 IOC Major a\erage 
10000 -. -- Statoil 
8000 -- Petrobras 
Ao PetroChina 6000 
4000 
2000 
0 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Figure 7-16 Exploration and development cost US$/bbl 
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Figure 7-17 Lifting cost (USD $/bbl) 
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Figure 7-18 Sales and operation revenue (mn USD) 
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The profitability performance: The net income of PetroChina maintained a similar 
growth rate between 2001 and 2005 to that of IOCs. Its return on assets ratio and return 
on equity ratio was either equal or exceeded those of the IOCs, which showed a good 
profitability of the company. 572 However, the Chinese foreign currency policy could be 
one of the contributing factors for this, since crude oil is priced according to the 
international prices, whereas the services and human costs are priced according to the 
572 The return on asset ratio measures the profitability of companies. It equals to net income divided by total 
assets. The return on equity ratio also measures the profitability of companies. It equals to net income 
divided by shareholder equity. 
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domestic level, lower than the international level. Also, it may be attributed to the fact 
that PetroChina owned most of the high quality and profitable assets of the previous 
CNPC, especially reserves. The real ability of the company to utilise these assets may 
need to be seen in a longer term. 
Figure 7-19 Net income (nm USD) 
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Figure 7-20 Return on assets employed (%) 
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Figure 7-21 Return on equity (%) 
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The performance of CNPC: Information on the performance of CNPC was still 
limited during this period. Not only because CNPC was practising the PRC accounting 
standards and did not publish its financial information to the public, but also because the 
financial data published by the company consolidated the data of Petrochina and did not 
provide detail for each of its subordinate companies. This makes it difficult to get real 
performance indicators for CNPC's remaining operations. 
Judging from the consolidated data, the overall performance of CNPC group improved 
during this stage and this could be attributed to the reforms. The total revenue of 
CNPC's remaining business increased from RMB 103.1 bn in 2000 to RMB 148.3 bn in 
2004.573 The profit of CNPC's remaining business increased from negative RMB 
12.1bn in 2000 to positive RMB 1.8 bn in 2004.574 CNPC also successfully expanded 
573 Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen Reform. Beijing: Commercial Publishing 
House. p. 305 
574 Ibid. 
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its revenue income outside PetroChina. The share of CNPC's revenue from PetroChina 
has declined from almost 100% to 50% from 2000 to 2003.575 
Sinopec's performance was also enhanced significant after the reforms with its profit 
increased from RMB 6.4 bn in 1999 to over RMB19 bn in 2000, and RMB 83 bn in 
2006.576 
575 Xiang, F. (2005). The Good News and Bad News of CNPC's Remaining Business. China Petroleum and 
Petrochemical Industry, 22,27-29. p. 27. Yu, Y., Li, Q., & Jiang, L. (2005). Restructuring and Deepen 
Reform. Beijing: Commercial Publishing House. p. 305 
576 Gearing up for Competition (2001). Petroleum Economist, August. Sinopec Annual report 2007. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 The research question and methodology 
The major subject of the thesis is National Oil Companies ("NOCs"), a group of 
companies participating in some part of the petroleum value chain, owned or controlled 
by a government. The relationship between an NOC and its government is much more 
complicated than those between an IOC and its shareholders due to the government's 
multi-dimensional role as a shareholder, resource owner and regulator. As a result, 
NOCs usually take non-commercial responsibilities and their governments often employ 
more proactive measures to intervene. Over the years, the relationship between 
governments and NOCs in many countries have undergone continuous reforms in order 
to establish an arrangement that best suits the interests of a country, the government or 
NOCs. The most notable trend since 1980s was the increasing degree of 
commercialisation of NOCs in order to enhance their commercial performance. The 
analysis of the effectiveness of NOC reforms is therefore important for all countries 
contemplating reforms of their NOCs. 
This thesis explored the effectiveness of NOC reform in achieving the objective of 
governments, and the major factors contributing to that effectiveness or lack of it. The 
thesis defined effectiveness of NOC reforms in terms of achieving the objectives of the 
government as it acknowledged that an NOCs is both a commercial entity and an agent 
of government. This therefore differentiates this thesis from many other studies which 
have emphasised the commercial effectiveness of NOCs. The thesis chose not to 
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evaluate the effectiveness of reforms by using quantitative data, due to the difficulty in 
accessing consistent and high quality information relating to NOCs over a long period 
of time. Instead, it evaluated indirectly the effectiveness of NOC reform by examining 
the effectiveness of the P-A relationship between governments and NOCs established by 
these reforms. Furthermore, the thesis identified the critical factors in the process of 
NOC reform. Different from many other studies which looked into NOC reform over a 
short period of time, it viewed NOC reforms as a long-term process, in order to analyse 
the interactions between different stages of reform. 
The Principal and Agent theory was the major analytical tool of the thesis. It employed 
mainly the fundamental elements of the theory, including the tasks assigned to the agent, 
the supporting system including monitoring and control systems and incentive system 
used by the principal to control the agent, as well as the possible principal and agent 
problems. All these elements were used in order to analyse the new P-A relationship 
formed by NOCs reforms in different stages. 
Case study and historical analysis were also the major methodologies of the thesis, 
through which a detailed study of NOC reforms in China was conducted covering a 
long period of time between 1949 and 2006. Four distinctive stages were analysed 
comprising one background stage and three reform stages. For each reform stage, the 
thesis analysed the reform of the regulatory framework, the industrial structure, the 
pricing and distribution system, and the fiscal and financial regimes. 
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8.2 The major findings 
8.2.1 The drivers of NOC reforms 
The thesis identified, through the case study, the existence of a wide range of factors 
that drove the governments to reform their NOCs. It also found that although the 
ideological drivers were more dominant in setting the direction of NOC reforms, the 
practical drivers, such as the level of national capacity and the concerns of social impact 
were more critical in setting the pace of the reforms. 
The case study on China's NOC reforms demonstrated the importance of the ideological 
changes, especially the changes in the economic ideology in reforming the NOCs. The 
whole transitional process of Chinese NOCs from being a government ministry to a 
publicly-listed and commercially driven company, from stage one to stage four, echoed 
a process of the Chinese economy transferring from a soviet styled central planning 
system to a market system. The socialist ideology prevailing in the country between 
1949 and 1978 played a dominant role in the central planning style of P-A relationship 
between the government and the NOCs. The market-driven reforms of NOCs since 
1978 were mainly supported by free market ideology adopted by the country, which 
argued for the role of government being focused on indirect ways such as setting 
effective rules, rather than operating the economy directly. 
However, the thesis identified that, during these three reform stages, it was mainly the 
practical factors such as the level of sufficient national capacity, as well as the concerns 
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of the government about the negative social impact of liberalisation that set the pace of 
the reform, as will be seen in the following two sections (8.2.2 and 8.2.3). 
8.2.2 The national capacity 
The case study of NOCs reforms in China (1949-2006) showed that changes in the 
national capacity, especially the general and petroleum specific regulatory capacity of 
the government, played a crucial role in the choice of reform measures and the 
effectiveness of NOC reforms. Not only did the government pay careful consideration 
to the level of national capacity in designing its reform proposals, but also the condition 
of this capacity determined whether or not a package of reform measures was able to 
function successfully. The lack of national capacity caused the existence of 
non-commercial responsibilities. This complicated the controlling and monitoring of the 
NOCs and resulted in "multi-task effects" and "conflicts of identity effects". 
During the first stage of the case study on China (1949-1978), the country took a Soviet 
Style, central planning system to organise and regulate its national economy. The 
government did not have the regulatory capacity to regulate a market economy. As a 
result, the petroleum sector was assigned with significant regulatory and social as well 
as operational responsibilities. 
Since 1978, the government started to build up its own regulatory capacity and to 
conduct market-driven reform of the petroleum sector. However, it was not until stage 
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four after 1998, that the country could take radical reform measures, constrained by the 
limited regulatory capacity of the government. The government started to establish 
market-style fiscal regime, and accounting systems since 1993. Before these systems 
were in place, the government was unable to collect sufficient information on the NOCs, 
to calculate their fiscal burden, and to prevent their imprudent cost control and 
investment behaviour. Therefore it was unable to measure the real profitability of the 
NOCs. 
Furthermore, since 1998, the government started to build up its own social support 
capacity for providing education, pension, health and unemployment support. Before 
these capacities were mature, the NOCs had to provide these functions on behalf of the 
government, which also obscured the profitability performance of the NOCs. 
Due to the above factors, the market-driven reform measures taken by the government 
during the second and third stages (1978-1998) failed to generate positive results. The 
inability of the government to measure the performance of the NOCs in monitoring and 
controlling their operations resulted in slow increase in reserve and production 
indicators, continuous deficit, escalating costs and undisciplined investment. These 
factors also resulted in a complicated organisational structure and the existence of a 
large share of enterprises within the NOCs operating in non-relevant businesses with a 
poor performance. 
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During the fourth stage of the case study on China, the regulatory capacity of the 
government had been greatly enhanced, as a result of the cumulative efforts in the 
previous stages. This greatly enhanced the ability of the government to take over certain, 
although not all social responsibilities from the NOCs, its ability to access and interpret 
information on the NOCs, and its ability to monitor and control the NOCs. This enabled 
the government to undertake more radical reform measures, such as partial privatisation 
and public listing. The reforms during the fourth stage, therefore, delivered a positive 
outcome, which was reflected by the active internal reforms undertaken by the NOCs to 
effectively increase their profitability-linked commercial performance. It was also 
reflected by the positive profitability, cost and other major commercial performance 
indicators of the NOCs. 
The case study of China also demonstrated in stage four that it is possible to design a 
special arrangement between the government and the NOCs in order to overcome the 
negative impact of a weak national capacity (see section 8.2.6). 
8.2.3 The concerns of social impacts 
The thesis also found another core factor that played an important role in NOC reform 
and its effectiveness, the government's concerns about the negative social and economic 
impact of reforms to the pricing and distribution systems. Driven by these concerns, the 
government kept control over the pricing and distribution systems of the petroleum 
sector throughout the four stages in the Case study, despite the partial liberalisation 
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effort trialled in different stages. The administrative pricing and distribution systems 
denied the availability of a fair market price which was essential in calculating an 
economically meaningful profitability indicator. This also resulted in a situation where 
the petroleum sector had its real commercial performance disguised, thus presenting it 
with neither an incentive nor the responsibility to enhance its commercial performance. 
As shown in stages two and three, concerned about the negative economic, political and 
social impacts of fluctuating and high oil prices, the government continued to retain 
control over the pricing and distributing systems, while keeping the oil prices low. This 
made it difficult to measure the real profitability of the NOCs. This also greatly 
restricted the functioning of the fiscal and financial systems, which had already been 
reformed based on market driven rules. This factor also attributed to the less effective 
reforms during these stages. 
8.2.4 The long term process of NOC reforms 
The case study of Chinese NOCs also demonstrated the long-term nature of the NOC 
reform process, mainly because of the critical role of national capacity in NOC reforms 
(section 8.2.2) and the long-term process of building up national capacity. The 
formulation of new laws, regulations and policies, the establishment of social support 
systems, the building up of government institutional capacity and the training of skilled 
staff, the establishment of new market driven rules, and the fostering of market capacity, 
all took long time to put in place and to have effect. 
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8.2.5 The significance of historical events 
The case study on China's NOC reforms also demonstrated the significance of historical 
events in deciding the agenda and content of NOC reforms. For example, the sudden 
split of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relationship in the first stage was a major driver of 
the "self-sufficiency" petroleum policy employed and the "self-contained" model 
pursued in the country as a result of the "massive Campaign" model, which was 
originated in Daqing oil field. The "self-contained" model prevailed in the petroleum 
industry until end 1990s and had a far reaching influence to the NOC reforms in China. 
The significance of historical events could also be illustrated by the significance of 
changes of economic policies under different leaderships. Mao Zedong's tough 
politically and ideologically centred regime was part of the reason for the establishment 
of the "self-contained" model. 
Deng Xiaoping's market-driven ideology enhanced the role of market in the national 
economy, the corporatisation of the petroleum sector, and the formalisation of the 
financial relationship between the government and the NOCs. Zhu Rongji's stronger 
and more decisive style resulted in the radical SOE reforms and the significant reforms 
of the industrial structure of the petroleum sector, which required substantial political 
will. The significance of historical events implied that the NOC reform is often 
country-specific experience, which requires not only general principles, but also 
flexibility that suits a country's institutional settings and political imperatives. 
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8.2.6 The experiences and lessons from the Chinese case 
Three specific experiences and lessons could be drawn from the Chinese practice 
covering more than 5 decades. 
First, for countries with extremely poor national capacity, effort could still be made to 
establish a suitable arrangement between the government and their NOCs, compatible 
with their institutional setting and national capacity. For example, China was facing a 
tough situation with a poor national capacity in stage one. The arrangements the 
government established during that stage, characterised by simple production tasks, 
direct and strict control, moral incentive systems and strict sanction system, was not 
only effective in achieving the specific government targets during that stage, but also 
suitable to the institutional setting and the national capacity of the country. 
Second, even when a country still lacked certain components of national capacity, effort 
can be made to design special arrangements between government and NOCs in order to 
supplement the weak national capacity. In stage four, the social welfare system of the 
country was still not fully-developed, and therefore the NOCs still had to undertake 
social functions such as providing employment and pensions. The government still had 
insufficient capacity in terms of regulating the petroleum sector. Furthermore, the 
government still wanted to control the pricing and distribution systems in order to 
stabilise the domestic market and to minimise the negative social impact. However, the 
unusual practice of separating the core commercial assets from the remaining assets 
298 
including service and social functions, and the public listing of a small percentage of 
shares of the NOCs were effective measures in enhancing the commercial performance 
of NOCs. 
Additionally, the formula system developed to link the domestic prices to the 
international system was also a positive measure in bringing in external market 
pressures on the NOCs, when the domestic market system was immature. In stage four, 
the government established the new mechanism to peg the domestic pricing with the 
international pricing in the major international markets. Although the mechanism had its 
weakness, it was effective in exposing the NOCs to the price fluctuations. This prepared 
the NOCs and consumers to the final liberalisation of the domestic pricing and 
distribution systems. 
Third, the main lessons that can be drawn from the Chinese experience were that 
governments should consciously establish their own regulatory capacity rather than rely 
on NOCs, and should foster market capacity in the country. The major problems causing 
inefficiency in the Chinese petroleum sector during stage two to four were caused by the 
reliance of the government on its NOCs for regulatory and social functions, and the 
extremely conservative attitude the government took in reforming the system. 
8.3 The limitations and further research 
The main limitations of the thesis arose from its reliance on a single case study. 
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Although a detailed case study covering a significant length of time has the advantage 
of revealing insights that other methodologies are likely to overlook, the single case 
study is highly restricted by the nature of the specific case chosen. 
For example, although China had been a large oil producer since 1960s, it had a 
diversified economy with petroleum sector accounting for only a modest share of GDP 
and government revenue. It had also been a major oil consumer country since the 1990s 
with significant security of supply considerations. Therefore its nature was different 
from many oil producing countries where the oil sector contributes a large share to the 
GDP and where the economy is not diversified. Additionally, China started in 1949 as a 
strict socialist country with Soviet style economic system. During the period of nearly 
six decades from 1949 to 2006, the country's economic ideology experienced a 
transformation from socialism to quasi-free market economy. Not many countries have 
a similar experience of transformation. Therefore the single case study approach has a 
limitation in terms of application of its specific findings to countries that are by nature 
fundamentally different from China 
Additionally, the thesis purposely avoided significant analysis of the Principal and 
Agent relationship between state and government, therefore overlooking another 
dimension of NOCs reforms, those driven by non-laudable political or personal 
considerations of leading politicians and ruling parties. This was mainly because of the 
specific nature of the subject and the different set of theoretical tools required by such 
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an approach. The thesis acknowledged that in many countries, especially those with 
very weak economic and political capacities and where governments have a poor 
governance record, political and personal considerations might play an important role in 
driving NOC reforms, and in selections of reform measures. 
In response to the limitations of the thesis in addressing the above issues, further 
detailed studies could be done employing a more representative and diversified sample 
of countries, using the framework developed by the thesis, and to test the tentative 
hypothesis of the thesis. Further studies could also be done on NOC reforms as a result 
of illaudable political and personal considerations and to explore the impacts of these 
reforms on the commercial performance of NOCs. 
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